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A Review
Henri Louis Bergson's Book
Creative Evolution
Chapter IV: The Cinematographical Mechanism Of Thought
and the Mechanistic Illusion

A Glance at the History of Systems(1)

Real Becoming and False Evolutionism.

Topic 39: The Idea of 'Nothing'
by Doug Renselle
Doug's Pre-review Commentary
Start of Review

Chapter I II
Introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Chapter III IV
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45  46 47

Move to any Topic of Henri Louis Bergson's Creative Evolution,
or to beginning of its review via this set of links
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Topic 39...............The Idea of 'Nothing'


(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis Bergson, some paraphrased.)

(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.)


"IT remains for us to examine in themselves two theoretical illusions which we have frequently met with before, but whose consequences rather than principle have hitherto concerned us. Such is the object of the present chapter. It will afford us the opportunity of removing certain objections, of clearing up certain misunderstandings, and, above all, of defining more precisely, by contrasting it with others, a philosophy which sees in duration the very stuff of reality.

"Matter or mind, reality has appeared to us as a perpetual becoming. It makes itself or it unmakes itself, but it is never something made. Such is the intuition that we have of mind when we draw aside the veil which is interposed between our consciousness and ourselves. This, also, is what our intellect and senses themselves would show us of matter, if they could obtain a direct and disinterested idea of it. But, preoccupied before everything with the necessities of action, the intellect, like the senses, is limited to taking, at intervals, views that are instantaneous and by that very fact immobile of the becoming of matter."

Note (1) - The part of this chapter which treats of the history of systems, particularly of the Greek philosophy, is only the very succinct résumé of views that we developed at length, from 1900 to 1904, in our lectures at the Collège de France, especially in a course on the History of the Idea of Time (1902-1903). We then compared the mechanism of conceptual thought to that of the cinematograph. We believe the comparison will be useful here.

(Our bold and color.)

Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number.

Our bold and color highlights follow a code:

  • black-bold - important to read if you are just scanning our review
  • green-bold - we see Bergson suggesting axiomatic memes
  • violet-bold - an apparent classical problematic
  • blue-bold - we disagree with this text segment while disregarding context of Bergson's overall text
  • gray-bold - quotable text
  • red-bold - our direct commentary

Bergson's judgment is of supreme philosophical import. It has to do with how sentients perceive reality. It has to do with observation, measurement, idea, concept, percept, and most importantly of all: how we think.

Speaking only of Western culture, we can ask, "How do we think today?" And having answered that question to some satisfaction we can ask, "What is a better way to do our thinking?"

Bergson tells us current Western culture's perspectives of reality are illusionary. Where reality is always "being made," i.e., where reality is an endless absolute flux, our perceptions of that absolute flux are naught but intellectualized snapshots of it. Our classical intellect does everything it can to make reality hold still.



"Consciousness, being in its turn formed on the intellect, sees clearly of the inner life what is already made, and only feels confusedly the making. Thus, we pluck out of duration those moments that interest us, and that we have gathered along its course. These alone we retain. And we are right in so doing, while action only is in question. But when, in speculating on the nature of the real, we go on regarding it as our practical interest requires us to regard it, we become unable to perceive the true evolution, the radical becoming. Of becoming we perceive only states, of duration only instants, and even when we speak of duration and of becoming, it is of another thing that we are thinking. Such is the most striking of the two illusions we wish to examine. It consists in supposing that we can think the unstable by means of the stable, the moving by means of the immobile.

"The other illusion [i.e., classical 'independence'] is near akin to the first. It has the same origin, being also due to the fact that we import into speculation a procedure made for practice. All action aims at getting something that we feel the want of, or at creating something that does not yet exist. In this very special sense, it fills a void, and goes from the empty to the full, from an absence to a presence, from the unreal to the real. Now the unreality which is here in question is purely relative to the direction in which our attention is engaged, for we are immersed in realities and cannot pass out of them; only, if the present reality is not the one we are seeking, we speak of the absence of this sought-for reality wherever we find the presence of another. We thus express what we have as a function of what we want. This is quite legitimate in the sphere of action."

(Our bold and color.)



In Quantonics, yes, we do believe that our quantum stages are capable of 'think-king' dynamically. We only need learn how. We assume that our quantum stages are capable of dynamic think-king which we call QTMs and thus differentiate themselves from static thing-king of which Bergson speaks here, and we have already labeled 'CTMs.' So a major question to answer here is, "Are, as Quantonics assumes, our quantum stages capable of dynamic think-king?"

An answer is verifiable and can be validated empirically. An easy test for Doug is to visualize our Planck quantons in motion without directly viewing their graphic animation. Doug can do this, and can run 'movies' of nearly all his experiences, and further can imagine 'movies' of n-spatial novel experiences. (Doug did a lot of embedded real-time software requirements, analysis, design and engineering during 1980s.)

Try it! Imagine a train moving from your right to your left at 60mph. You should even be able to hear its Doppler transition from blue shift to red shift.

And think about this: when you whistle a tune, are you reproducing stasis or dynamis? Are you whistling snap shots? If you did that, it would sound like it feels when someone drives a car whose accelerator's control is nonproportional (i.e., classically either on or off). Don't thing about it. Think about it!



"But, whether we will or no, we keep to this way of speaking, and also of thinking, when we speculate on the nature of things independently of the interest they have for us. Thus arises the second of the two illusions. We propose to examine this first. It is due, like the other, to the static habits that our intellect contracts when it prepares our action on things. Just as we pass through the immobile to go to the moving, so we make use of the void in order to think the full. [I.e., dichon(empty, full) vis-à-vis quanton(empty,full).]

"We have met with this illusion already in dealing with the fundamental problem of knowledge. The question, we then said, is to know why there is order, and not disorder, in things. But the question has meaning only ff we suppose that disorder, understood as an absence of order, is possible, or imaginable, or conceivable. Now, it is only order that is real; but, as order can take two forms, and as the presence of the one may be said to consist in the [classically apparent] absence of the other, we speak of disorder whenever we have before us that one of the two orders for which we are not looking. The idea of disorder is then entirely practical. It corresponds to the disappointment of a certain expectation, and it does not denote the absence of all order, but only the presence of that order which does not offer us actual interest. So that whenever we try to deny order completely, absolutely, we find that we are leaping from one kind of order to the other indefinitely, and that the supposed suppression of the one and the other implies the presence of the two. Indeed, if we go on, and persist in shutting our eyes to this movement of the mind and all it involves, we are no longer dealing with an idea; all that is left of disorder is a word. Thus the problem of knowledge is complicated, and possibly made insoluble, by the idea that order fills a void and that its actual presence is superposed on its 'virtual absence."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)

In Quantonics, we address this second problem of classical contextual independence via our disaffirmation of Aristotle's syllogistic laws and all philosophical and metaphysical and scientific consequences which follow. One evident and easy to describe consequence is Quantonics' outright rejection of any genericity of mathematics' independence axiom (specificity yes, genericity no). There are many others.




"We go from absence to presence, from the void to the full, in virtue of the fundamental illusion of our understanding. That is the error of which we noticed one consequence in our last chapter. As we then anticipated, we must come to close quarters with this error, and finally grapple with it. We must face it in itself, in the radically false conception which it implies of negation, of the void and of the nought.(1)

"Philosophers have paid little attention to the idea of the nought. And yet it is often the hidden spring, the invisible mover of philosophical thinking. From the first awakening of reflection, it is this that pushes to the fore, right under the eyes of consciousness, the torturing problems, the questions that we cannot gaze at without feeling giddy and bewildered. I have no sooner commenced to philosophize than I ask myself why I exist; and when I take account of the intimate connection in which I stand to the rest of the universe, the difficulty is only pushed back, for I want to know why the universe exists; and if I refer the universe to a Principle immanent or transcendent that supports it or creates it, my thought rests on this principle only a few moments, for the same problem recurs, this time in its full breadth and generality: Whence comes it, and how can it be understood, that anything exists? Even here, in the present work, when matter has been defined as a kind of descent, this descent as the interruption of a rise, this rise itself as a growth, when finally a Principle of creation has been put at the base of things, the same question springs up: How—why does this principle exist rather than nothing?" [Please real~ize Bergson's creation, his principle of creation, as animate, durational, mobile process. He has just showed us that stability and independence are core classical illusions. If we apply Bergsonian durational thought to creation we immanate creation as process, indeed creation as self~realizing, SOrON evolutionary pr¤cæss. Design is a 'feature' of state-ic, stopped and independent, cinematographic classical, dialectical, analytic intellect. Doug - 12Sep2006. Doug's use of "immanate" is as a quantum~gn¤stic verb, a quantum pragmatic coining of immanence as a verb describing individual dynamic, quantum coherent action.]

Note (1) - The analysis of the idea of the nought which we give here (pp. 275-298) has appeared before in the Revue philosophique (November 1906).

(Our bold and color.)




Reader, please consider what must pre-exist for there to be a nought, or zero. Answer: a perfect concept of unity. Yet when we search reality's actuality we can find no such 'thing.' How would we recognize it? By assuming that if we subtracted two such identical unities we would achieve Bergson's nought. See our One is the Onliest.



This is classical reality's vicious either/or loop, eminent promulgator of paradice. It is a trap. Only way to exit this trap and see it for what it is, in our opinion, is to have some analogue of a quantum epiphany. Oversimplified, that means we must throw away classical excluded-middle either/or thing-king and adopt quantum included-middle both/and think-king. From thence: there is no '1' and from thence there is no 'nought.'

One and zero can only 'be' if one assumes Aristotle's syllogisms are, indeed, tautologous. However, we have effectively refuted them! They too are quantum sophisms! See our connections at our Buridan Review.




"Now, if I push these questions aside and go straight to what hides behind them, this is what I find:Existence appears to me like a conquest over nought. I say to myself that there might be, that indeed there ought to be, nothing, and I then wonder that there is something. Or I represent all reality extended on nothing as on a carpet: at first was nothing [Reader, please attempt to view classical apparency of 'nothing' as quantum isoflux, i.e., It.], and being has come by superaddition to It. Or, yet again, if something has always existed, nothing must always have served as its substratum or receptacle, and is therefore eternally prior. A glass may have always been full, but the liquid it contains nevertheless fills a void. In the same way, being may have always been there, but the nought which is filled, and, as it were, stopped up by it, pre-exists for it none the less, if not in fact at least in right. In short, I cannot get rid of the idea that the full is an embroidery on the canvas of the void, that being is superimposed on nothing, and that in the idea of "nothing" there is less than in that of "something." Hence all the mystery. [In quantum philosophy, at Millennium III's start, "nothing" corresponds quantum vacuum flux. In QVF "there is more than in that of 'something.'" What Bergson calls "nothing," we call "nonactuality," Pirsig calls, "DQ," Stein calls "nonspace," and quantum science calls "QVF," It has an isotropic energy density of 1093 grams/cubic-centimeter! Calculate our classically 'known' universe's energy density based upon 1080 average weight atoms, with a ~spheric volume 30 billion light years across. Then compare your result to QVF's density! Doug - 13Apr2001.]

"It is necessary that this mystery should be cleared up. It is more especially necessary, if we put duration and free choice at the base of things. For the disdain of metaphysics for all reality that endures comes precisely from this, that it reaches being only by passing through "not-being," and that an existence which endures seems to it not strong enough to conquer non-existence and itself posit itself. It is for this reason especially that it is inclined to endow true being with a logical, and not a psychological nor a physical existence. For the nature of a purely logical existence is such that it seems to be self sufficient and to posit itself by the effect alone of the force immanent in truth. If I ask myself why bodies or minds exist rather than nothing, I find no answer; but that a logical principle, such as A=A [Aristotle's first felonious syllogism], should have the power of creating itself, triumphing over the nought throughout eternity, seems to me natural."

(Our capitalization of It, link, brackets, bold, and color.)

Arisen by quantum ontology from isoflux or unlatched flux to latched flux. See our quantum becoming ontology graphic. Also consider an important philosophical intueme: reality appears always in flux, whether as pure isoflux, or mixed flux, or latched flux. What is important philosophically is that quantum many realities' actualities/nonactualities ontologies are each: becoming, changing, isobecoming, isofluxing, becoming,

Try to envision quantum both incremental evolution to and devolution from It—think of quantum both cellular birth and cellular apoptosis—with incremental differential gains or superaddition of actuality as incremental latched actual persistence of nonactual QVF/VES.

In Quantonics we see quantum isoflux (for now) as "eternally prior." Also, we see it as describable, but never wholly definable or knowable. Why? Once we think we have defined It or know It, It changes. Why? Because reality is eternal, absolute flux!


We must come to realize, using our newer think-king modes, that classical enigmas evaporate once we adopt those newer QTMs. We have shown and can show endlessly that CTMs cause "…this mystery." Our quantons show Isoflux/DQ (i.e., Bergson's "nothing") as blue dotted patterns. We also show actuality's latched flux/SQ patterns always commingling, compenetrating, coinsiding It and It coinsiding, compenetrating, commingling them.

Reader, please consider classical metaphysics' dichotomy of being vis-à-vis not-being. This is SOM's either/or schism/wall, Pirsig's classical platypus, Aristotle's excluded-middle. Also try to see how this classical wall may only 'exist' if classical negation remains objective! This is the n¤nquantum flaw in all classical philosophy, metaphysics, science today at Earth-Millennium III's start! Doug - 13Apr2001.




"A circle drawn with chalk on a blackboard is a thing which needs explanation: this entirely physical existence has not by itself wherewith to vanquish non-existence. But the "logical essence" of the circle, that is to say, the possibility of drawing it according to a certain law—in short, its definition—is a thing which appears to me eternal: it has neither place nor date; for nowhere, at no moment, has the drawing of a circle begun to be possible. Suppose, then, that the principle on which all things rest, and which all things manifest possesses an existence of the same nature as that of the definition of the circle, or as that of the axiom A=A: the mystery of existence vanishes, for the being that is at the base of everything posits itself then in eternity, as logic itself does. True, it will cost us rather a heavy sacrifice: if the principle of all things exists after the manner of a logical axiom or of a mathematical definition, the things themselves must go forth from this principle like the applications of an axiom or the consequences of a definition, and there will no longer be place, either in the things nor in their principle, for efficient causality understood in the sense of a free choice. Such are precisely the conclusions of a doctrine like that of Spinoza, or even that of Leibniz, and such indeed has been their genesis.

"Now, if we could prove that the idea of the nought, in the sense in which we take it when we oppose it to that of existence, is a pseudo-idea, the problems that are raised around it would become pseudo-problems. The hypothesis of an absolute that acts freely, that in an eminent sense endures, would no longer raise up intellectual prejudices. The road would be cleared for a philosophy more nearly approaching intuition, and which would no longer ask the same sacrifices of common sense."

(Our bold.)

Reader, please be aware that we can show that an analytic, "intellectually logical," classical circle depends upon a Platonic idea of '1' which we can also quite easily show depends upon an either-or Platonic idea of "nought."

Also, imagine various 'circles' as many truths-"illusions" of reality: e.g., an end-on non-perspective view of a coil spring or a tin can (i.e., cylinder) with both ends cut out, or a dynamic generator of sinusoidal flux, or spoked as an end view of collinear double-helix DNA.

Now, for fun, extend your imagination. Consider how intellect might 'latch' as Platonic ideas quantal flux.

Thinking in 2D, imagine quantal flux as radial isometric impulses from 'point' origins. Stretch that to 3D with spherical impulses. Thence to nD. Now, you should be able to further imagine our Quantonics' isocones! See our QELR of point.

Consider how isocones do n¤t Platonically latch, rather quantumly and tentatively persist as quantum~duration while simultaneously under Its vital impetus for absolute change. Imagine both stasis and dynamis commingling. Caveat: beware assuming our quantum use of stasis is kin of classical 'state.' Compare state-mental and phase~mental and state and phase.

Updates - 12Sep2006 - Doug.


"Let us then see what we are thinking about when we speak of "Nothing." To represent "Nothing," we must either imagine it or conceive it. Let us examine what this image or this idea may be. First, the image.

"I am going to close my eyes, stop my ears, extinguish one by one the sensations that come to me from the outer world. Now it is done; all my perceptions vanish, the material universe sinks into silence and the night.—I subsist, however, and cannot help myself subsisting. I am still there, with the organic sensations which come to me from the surface and from the interior of my body, with the recollections which my past perceptions have left behind them—nay, with the impression, most positive and full, of the void I have just made about me. How can I suppress all this? How eliminate myself? I can even, it may be, blot out and forget my recollections up to my immediate past; but at least I keep the consciousness of my present reduced to its extremest poverty, that is to say, of the actual state of my body. I will try, however, to do away even with this consciousness itself. I will reduce more and more the sensations my body sends in to me: now they are almost gone; now they are gone, they have disappeared in the night where all things else have already died away. But no! At the very instant that my consciousness is extinguished, another consciousness lights up—or rather, it was already alight: it had arisen the instant before, in order to witness the extinction of the first; for the first could disappear only for another and in the presence of another. I see myself annihilated only if I have already resuscitated myself by an act which is positive, however involuntary and unconscious. So, do what I will, I am always perceiving something, either from without or from within. When I no longer know anything of external objects, it is because I have taken refuge in the consciousness that I have of myself." [Doug has spent decades getting here, but now in late 2006 it becomes quantumly apparent how Bergson nailed this, apperceived this, fabulously. Of course Bergson's corpus of memetic potentia exceeded that of nearly all his peers over 100 years ago. Why is Doug writing this and saying this? Bergson intuited one of quantum reality's protoproemial, protean and nascent memeotics: reality is positive! Flux is n¤n negative. Flux is quantum. There are no negatives in reality except as formal analytics manufacture and design them. Metaphysical and philosophical protoaffects of grasping this quantum essential are just staggering. Doug - 13Sep2006. See our QELRs of positive and negative.]




In this large paragraph we see Bergson attempting, without success, to do an Aristotelian formal, analytical, mechanical, dialectical "you minus you" on himself. Essence? Classical negation simply is a bogus concept in quantum reality.


Once we eradicate intellect's illusions of things, we can cognize—that without classical things there are no classical 'nothings.' Thing is an analytical precursor of nothing! One is an analytical precursor of zero. Absent any real 'one' there is real 'zero.' Compare:

dichon is an ideal classically negatable dichotomy, and quantons are classically non-negatable quantum c¤mplementarities.

Reality's quantum flux is not 'thingy.' It is n¤t just lisr! Rather it is both apparently classically lisr and n¤t lisr. '1' and '0' are classical apparitions of lisr. They are classical illusions of Aristotle's, et al's., objective 'thingy' deign to feign. Doug.

See Doug's Suggested Requirements for a Quantum~Mathematics. Doug - 19Nov2012.



"If I abolish this inner self, its very abolition becomes an object for an imaginary self which now perceives as an external object the self that is dying away. Be it external or internal, some object there always is that my imagination is representing. My imagination, it is true, can go from one to the other, I can by turns imagine a nought of external perception or a nought of internal perception, but not both at once, for the absence of one consists, at bottom, in the exclusive presence of the other. [Students of Quantonics should be capable to, have qua to see Bergson's quantum prescience in that last bold green clause... Doug - 13Sep2006.] But, from the fact that two relative [ideal, classical] noughts are imaginable in turn, we wrongly conclude that they are imaginable together: a conclusion the [classical] absurdity of which must be obvious, for we cannot imagine a nought without perceiving, at least confusedly, that we are imagining it, consequently that we are acting, that we are thinking, and therefore that something still subsists.

"The image, then, properly so called, of a suppression of everything is never formed by thought. The effort by which we strive to create this image simply ends in making us swing to and fro between the vision of an outer and that of an inner reality. [This either/or "to and fro" loop Bergson refers arises, as we have shown dramatically, from CTMs. See our SOM Connection.] In this coming and going of our mind between the without and the within, there is a point, at equal distance from both [a kind of mental, quantum~stage memetic libration - Doug - 13Sep2006], in which it seems to us that we no longer perceive the one, and that we do not yet perceive the other [I.e., Buridan's ass parable.]: it is there that the image of "Nothing" is formed. In reality, we then perceive both, having reached the point where the two terms come together, and the image of Nothing, so defined, is an image full of things, an image that includes at once that of the subject and that of the object and, besides, a perpetual leaping from one to the other and the refusal ever to come to rest finally on either. Evidently this is not the nothing that we can oppose to being, and put before or beneath being, for it already includes existence in general. [Bergson just took us to a quantum epiphany, "a quanton(subject,object)." Our comma~no~space quanton copulum represents quantum~stage memetic libration, i.e., quantum~c¤mplæmæntary~equilibrium. However, as Bergson writes, that may not be dialectically referred "nothing," rather fuzzonically and memetically and memeotically, it is "all." It is "direct experience." It is Platt Holden's "Edge of now." It is Pirsig's "leading edge of the train." - Doug - 13Sep2006.]

(Our links, brackets, bold, and color.)

A recent, year 2000, A&E video affirms what Bergson says here. Go to (no Quantonics affiliation), and acquire a copy of Beyond Death. In our view, it is superb and fits supremely well with Bergson's words here.


Quantonics' quantum leap, a quantum epiphany, a simple quanton permits us to do what Bergson classically denunciates as "absurd." Again, here is our simple graphic of it:

Compare it to our graphic of Bergson's I-Cubed. See absurd.




"But we shall be told that, if the representation of Nothing, visible or latent, enters into the reasonings of philosophers, it is not as an image, but as an idea. It may be agreed that we do not imagine the annihilation of everything, but it will be claimed that we can conceive it. We conceive a polygon with a thousand sides, said Descartes, although we do not see it in imagination: it is enough that we can clearly represent the possibility of constructing it. So with the idea of the annihilation of everything. Nothing simpler, it will be said, than the procedure [a finite set of axioms] by which we construct the idea of it. There is, in fact, not a single object of our experience that we cannot suppose annihilated. Extend this annihilation of a first object to a second, then to a third, and so on as long as you please: the nought is the limit toward which the operation tends. And the [classical] nought so defined is the annihilation of everything. That is the theory. We need only consider it in this form to see the absurdity it involves.

"An idea constructed by the mind is an idea only if its pieces are capable of coexisting; it is reduced to a mere word if the elements that we bring together to compose it are driven away as fast as we assemble them. When I have defined the circle, I easily represent a black or a white circle, a circle in cardboard, iron, or brass, a transparent or an opaque circle—but not a square circle, because the law of the generation of the circle excludes the possibility of defining this figure with straight lines. So my mind can represent any existing thing whatever as annihilated;—but if the annihilation of anything by the mind is an operation whose [radical, formal] mechanism implies that it works on a part of the whole, and not on the whole itself, then the extension of such an operation to the totality of things becomes [classically] self-contradictory and absurd, and the idea of an annihilation of everything presents the same character as that of a square circle: it is not an idea, it is only a word."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)


Yes! However, that is not whole reality! Nor does it disclose whole reality's essence. It discloses only one tiny axiomatic subset of reality. All of Descartes', and subsequent classical, mathematics are naught but finite axiomatic subsets of reality. Worse, they deny and call "absurd" larger subjective reality which subsumes them. Finite axiomatic conventional actualities, as Gödel has told us and shown us well, innately have no access to a quantum reality c¤mplement of both completeness and consistency.



And thus implicitly and intrinsically precludes any notion of 'oneness.' But, again for fun, consider how easily one may make a square from four circles! Thence how one might use that technique to square a circle!


Quantum reality denies, intrinsically, any possibility of general "contradiction." So Bergson's assessments of "absurdity" and "contradiction," again show him with at least one foot in CTMs. Specific "contradiction" is locally possible within a closed axiomatic system which ignores a larger, more general quantum reality.

Consider for a moment Bergson's incredibly important clause: " on a part of the whole, and not on the whole itself..." It is a purely classical idea that part of a whole is classically and ideally lisr from its whole. It is an inept and inane Aristotelian/ Parmenidean/ Newtonian excluded-middle idea based on an objective, substantial reality. Juxtapose that classical concept of reality with a more quantum perspective. In a quantum c¤mplementary, included-middle reality, one may "...not work on a part of whole reality, without affecting whole reality itself..." Doug - 3Jun2001.



"So let us examine more closely the mechanism of the operation.

"In fact, the object suppressed is [classically, excluded-middle] either external or internal: it is a thing or it is a state of consciousness. Let us consider the first case. I annihilate in thought an external object: in the place where it was, there is [classically] no longer anything.—No longer anything of that object, of course, but another object has taken its place: there is [quantumly, ] no absolute void in nature. But admit that an absolute void is possible : it is not of that void that I am thinking when I say that the object, once annihilated, leaves its place unoccupied; for by the hypothesis it is a place, that is a void limited by precise outlines, or, in other words, a kind of [classical, radically formal] thing. The void of which I speak, therefore, is, at bottom, only the absence of some definite object, which was here at first, is now elsewhere and, in so far as it is no longer in its former place, leaves behind it, so to speak, the void of itself. A being unendowed with memory or prevision would not use the words "void" or "nought;" he would express only what is and what is perceived; now, what is, and what is perceived, is the presence of one thing or of another, never the absence of anything. There is absence only for a being capable of remembering and expecting. He remembered an object, and perhaps expected to encounter it again; he finds another, and he expresses the disappointment of his expectation (an expectation sprung from recollection) by saying that he no longer finds anything, that he encounters "nothing." Even if he did not expect to encounter the object, it is a possible expectation of it, it is still the falsification of his eventual expectation that he expresses by saying that the object is no longer where it was."

(Our link, brackets, bold, color.)




"What he perceives in reality, what he will succeed in effectively thinking of, is the presence of the old object in a new place or that of a new object in the old place; the rest, all that is expressed negatively by such words as "nought" or the "void," is not so much thought as feeling, or, to speak more exactly, it is the [quantum interrelationship Value/Qualitative] tinge that feeling gives to thought. The idea of annihilation or of partial nothingness is therefore formed here in the course of the substitution of one thing for another, whenever this substitution is thought by a mind that would prefer to keep the old thing in the place of the new, or at least conceives this preference as possible. The idea implies on the subjective side a [many] preference[s], on the objective side a substitution, and is nothing else but a [much more than many] combination[s] of, or rather an [many] interference[s] [quantum interrelationships] between [among], this [many] feeling[s] of preference[s] and this idea[s] of substitution[s].

"Such is the mechanism of the operation by which our mind annihilates an object and succeeds in representing in the external world a partial nought. Let us now see how it represents it within itself. We find in ourselves phenomena that are produced, and not phenomena that are not produced. I experience a sensation or an emotion, I conceive an idea, I form a resolution: my consciousness perceives these facts, which are so many presences, and there is no [Planck] moment in which facts of this kind are not present to me. I can, no doubt, interrupt by thought the course of my inner life; I may suppose that I sleep without dreaming or that I have ceased to exist; but at the very instant when I make this supposition, I conceive myself, I imagine myself watching over my slumber or surviving my annihilation, and I give up perceiving myself from within only by taking refuge in the perception of myself from without."

(Our brackets, bold and color.)










Unsure you notice reader, but Bergson offers his almost intuitive use of non-standard plurals. Bergson's plurals fit James' intuitions of pluralism and their strong ties to quantum flux. They fit our many truths in many contexts.



"That is to say that here again the full always succeeds the full, and that an intelligence that was only intelligence, that had neither regret nor desire, whose movement was governed by the movement of its object, could not even conceive an absence or a void. The conception of a void arises here when consciousness, lagging behind itself, remains attached to the recollection of an old state when another state is already present. It is only a comparison between what is and what could or ought to be, between the full and the full. In a word, whether it be a void of matter or a void of consciousness, the representation of the void is always a representation which is full and which resolves itself on analysis into two positive elements: the idea, distinct or confused, of a substitution, and the feeling, experienced or imagined, of a desire or a regret.

"It follows from this double analysis that the idea of the absolute nought, in the sense of the annihilation of everything, is a self-destructive idea, a pseudo-idea, a mere word. [Yes! We concur! Flux is crux!] If suppressing a thing consists in replacing it by another, if thinking the absence of one thing is only possible by the more or less explicit representation of the presence of some other thing, if, in short, annihilation signifies before anything else substitution, the, idea of an "annihilation of everything" is as absurd as that of a square circle. The absurdity is not obvious, because there exists no particular object that cannot be supposed annihilated; then, from the fact that there is nothing to prevent each thing in turn being suppressed in thought, we conclude that it is possible to suppose them suppressed altogether. We do not see that suppressing each thing in turn consists precisely in replacing it in proportion and degree by another, and therefore that the suppression of absolutely everything implies a downright contradiction in terms, since the operation consists in destroying the very condition that makes the operation possible."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)



See our Quantonic Millennium III remediation of classicalese 'state.'




"But the illusion is tenacious. Though suppressing one thing consists in fact in substituting another for it, we do not conclude, we are unwilling to conclude, that the annihilation of a thing in thought implies the substitution in thought of a new thing for the old. We agree that a thing is always replaced by another thing, and even that our mind cannot think the disappearance of an object, external or internal, without thinking—under an indeterminate and confused form, it is true—that another object [rather, quanton] is substituted for it. But we add that the representation of a disappearance is that of a phenomenon that is produced in space or at least in time, that consequently it still implies the calling up of an image, and that it is precisely here that we have to free ourselves from the imagination in order to appeal to the pure understanding. "Let us therefore no longer speak," it will be said "of disappearance or annihilation; these are physical operations. Let us no longer represent the object A as annihilated or absent. Let us say simply that we think it [classically] "non-existent." To annihilate it is to act on it in time and perhaps also in space; it is to accept, consequently, the condition of spatial and temporal existence, to accept the universal [analytic, homogeneous, immutable] connection that binds an object to all others, and prevents it from disappearing without being at the same time replaced. But we can free ourselves from these conditions; all that is necessary is that by an effort of abstraction we should call up the idea of the object A by itself, that we should agree first to consider it as existing, and then, by a stroke of the intellectual pen, blot out the clause. The object will then be, by our decree, "non-existent."

"Very well, let us strike out the clause. We must not suppose that our pen-stroke is self-sufficient—that it can be isolated from the rest of things."

(Our brackets, bold and color.)

Bergson does n¤t go far enough here. Substitution as objective 'replacement' is just as bogus an illusion as 'negation.'

Quantum reality doesn't 'replace.' Quantum reality doesn't 'negate.' Better, quantum reality positively "heals," "mends," "evolutionarily adapts."

One manifestation of quantum reality which appears as ideal dialectical, objective negation is two waves (quantons) whose phasicities are tentatively 'inverse,' may combine to only appear absent. Yet both energies are still p¤sitive and quantum real, we just cann¤t quantum~ "~sense" and "~omnitor" them as we usually do with n¤n inverse "out of phase" interrelationships (i.e., 'actual' quantons).

Something politicians need to real-ize is that 'killing,' and 'negating,' and 'offing,' your enemies only appears to make them "go away."

When a day, n¤t so far away, arrives...when you understand how quantum flux survives...

You will cease demos wills' dialectical drives...and plausibly and gratefully seek compromise.

Doug - 13Sep2006.



"We shall see that it carries with it, whether we will or no, all that we tried to abstract from. Let us compare together the two ideas—the object A supposed to exist, and the same object supposed "non-existent."

"The idea of the object A, supposed existent, is the representation pure and simple of the object A, for we cannot represent an object without attributing to it, by the very fact of representing it, a certain reality. Between thinking an object and thinking it existent, there is absolutely no difference. Kant has put this point in clear light in his criticism of the ontological argument. Then, what is it to think the object A non-existent? To represent it non-existent cannot consist in withdrawing from the idea of the object A the idea of the attribute "existence," since, I repeat, the representation of the existence of the object is inseparable from the representation of the object, and indeed is one [i.e., quantumly~coherent] with it. To represent the object A non-existent can only consist, therefore, in adding something to the idea of this object: we add to it, in fact, the idea of an exclusion of this particular object by actual reality in general. To think the object A as nonexistent is first to think the object and consequently to think it existent; it is then to think that another reality, with which it is incompatible, supplants it. Only, it is useless to represent this latter reality explicitly; we are not concerned with what it is; it is enough for us to know that it drives out [emerses, immerses] the object A, which alone is of interest to us. That is why we think of the expulsion rather than of the cause which expels. But this cause is none the less present to the mind; it is there in the implicit state, that which expels being inseparable from the expulsion as the hand which drives the pen is inseparable from the pen-stroke. The act by which we declare an object unreal therefore posits the existence of the real in general."

(Our brackets, bold and color.)

When we negate another, we negate self! We negate part of self... It makes us less sane, less factual as who we are...that somewhat explains why and how our children return from 'war' with such terrible physical and mental 'medical' syndromes.

Society does this! Society teaches this! Society teaches dialectic, war and hate! We have to be carefully taught...

And Roman-derived right-wing cons are mostly purveyors of this social satanism. They call it 'catholic,' i.e., 'general' "thought, reason, politics, science, and religion." Distilled 'tis naught but "simple toys" AKA dialectic.

We are born whole. Social dialectic gradually analyzes us and tears us asunder. Social dialectic remanufactures sanity into classical insanity and with extraordinary hubris blames their work product on individuals.

Doug - 13Sep2006.

Reader, juxtapose Bergson's metaphor of a pen stroke vis-à-vis our quantum egg. As his pen stroke carries its c¤mplement with it, we see that our egg does too. Imagine his pen stroke in place of our Arial C in our egg. Imagine his pen stroke having a c¤mplement of quantum waves of flux and isoflux which quantumly commingle that pen stroke with reality, just as we show our Arial C quantum commingling reality. We thought our ideas were new, but Bergson has already tread this philosophical grundlagen—100 years afore us. Has no other philosopher understood what Bergson was saying?

It is even clearer, now (September, 2006), that Bergson is describing quantum reality as radically stochastic and positive. See our QELRs of fact, judge, logic, measure, object, opposite, positive, probability, quanta, reality, reason, subject, suppose, think, truth, uncertainty, understanding, etc. Nearly all of those QELRs were done after this review was written. If you do not look at anything else, be sure to look at our QELR of 'truth.'Doug - 11Sep2006.
Reader, we can tell you now that Bergson's entire bold paragraph [excepting his classical jargon which we highlight bold violet] develops neatly Quantonics' name sake, i.e.: meme 'quanton.' Where he speaks of two realities, we speak of two reality partitions: actuality and nonactuality. Where he says existent object A is in reality one, we say it is in actuality. Where he says non-existent object A is in reality two, we say it is in nonactuality. Where he implies both are c¤mplementary, we say they quantum commingle and share a non-Aristotelian included-middle. Where he retains his 'object' jargon, we discard SOM's dichotomy of subjects and objects and replace them with quantons(nonactuality,actuality).



"In other words, to represent an object as unreal cannot consist in depriving it of every kind of existence, since the representation of an object is necessarily that of the object existing. Such an act consists simply in declaring that the existence attached by our mind to the object, and inseparable from its representation, is an existence wholly ideal—that of a mere possible. But the "ideality" of an object, and the "simple possibility" of an object, have meaning only in relation to a reality that drives into the region of the ideal, or of the merely possible, the object which is incompatible with it. Suppose the stronger and more substantial existence annihilated: it is the attenuated and weaker existence of the merely possible that becomes the reality itself, and you will no longer be representing the object, then, as non-existent. In other words, and however strange our assertion may seem, there is more, and not less, in the idea of an object conceived as "not existing" than in the idea of this same object conceived as "existing"; for the idea of the object "not existing" is necessarily the idea of the object "existing" with, in addition, the representation of an exclusion of this object by the actual reality taken in block.

"But it will be claimed that our idea of the non-existent is not yet sufficiently cut loose from every imaginative element, that it is not negative enough. 'No matter,' we shall be told,

—'...though the unreality of a thing consist in its exclusion by other things; we want to know nothing about that. Are we not free to direct our attention where we please and how we please? Well then, after having called up the idea of an object, and thereby, if you will have it so, supposed it existent, we shall merely couple to our affirmation a 'not,' and that will be enough to make us think it [both included-middle existent and] non-existent. This is an operation entirely intellectual, independent of what happens outside the mind. [Bergson preserves SOM's excluded-middle wall via his use of 'not.' Reread his 'not' sentence and substitute 'commingling c¤mplement.'] So let us think of anything or let us think of the totality of things, and then write in the margin of our thought the 'not,' which prescribes the rejection of what it contains: we annihilate everything mentally by the mere fact of decreeing its annihilation...'—"

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)

This is exactly what our quantons do! Blue dotted represents all realities' possibles. Solid represents one possible c¤mplement,, an actualized instance which tentatively persists. 'Tentative' is at least as long as one Planck moment.

This is where we add Value to what Bergson already intuited. We deny any Aristotelian exclusion. Why? Exactly because of his italicized text which we show in bold green. We must eventually learn to not toggle twixt CTMs and QTMs. Rather, we must learn to habitually think using QTMs. Reversion to CTMs puts us back in SOM's evil church of reason. When we do use CTMs, we want to do that as a subsumed subset of our general QTM capabilities. E.g., civilized people go to war, but they may only temporarily alter their civility. MoQites may go to CTM wars, but they always do so within their QTM civility. By comparison, SOMites are always in their CTM wars, and they always perceive MoQites' dissents to their 'reasoning' as combative.

Consider how Niels Bohr followed Bergson's lead. Bohr's quantum complementarity has an Aristotelian excluded-middle. Bohr calls his version of quantum complementarity "exclusive."

And fathom deeply how a 'catholic' organization neatly excommunicates that and those who 'di' sagree with it. We see in 'catholicism' its own, designed-in methods of self-destruction. A dialectically logical recursion of "kill all the killers..." Catholics did (attempted) just that with Muslims, Cathars, etc. See? C? Sea? Si? Doug - 13Sep2006.



"Here we have it! The very root of all the difficulties and errors with which we are confronted is to be found in the power ascribed here to negation. We represent negation as exactly symmetrical with affirmation. We imagine that negation, like affirmation, is self-sufficient. So that negation, like affirmation, would have the power of creating ideas, with this sole difference that they would be negative ideas. By affirming one thing, and then another, and so on ad infinitum, I form the idea of "All;" so, by denying one thing and then other things, finally by denying All, I arrive at the idea of Nothing.—But it is just this assimilation which is arbitrary. We fail to see that while affirmation is a complete act of the mind, which can succeed in building up an idea, negation is but the half of an intellectual act, of which the other half is understood, or rather put off to an indefinite future. We fail to see that while affirmation is a purely intellectual act, there enters into negation an element which is not intellectual, and that it is precisely to the intrusion of this foreign element that negation owes its specific character.

To begin with the second point, let us note that to deny always consists in setting aside a possible affirmation.(1) Negation is only an attitude taken by the mind toward an eventual affirmation. When I say "This table is black," I am speaking of the table; I have seen it black, and my judgment expresses what I have seen."

Note (1) - Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd edition, p. 737: "From the point of view of our knowledge in general . . . the peculiar function of negative propositions is simply to prevent error." [In Quantonics we demur, "Use of negative propositions merely elicits classical paradice." Doug 6Nov2000.] Cf. Sigwart, Logik, 2nd edition, vol. i. pp. 150 ff.

(Our brackets and bold.)

We can use quantonics' script to narrate what Bergson is saying, writing here.


That script shows that any 'a_quanton's' quantum~complement comprises all other reality. Its 'negation' is all else!

Let's look at AH's OEDC as a quanton(immersion,emersion).

Emersion of actuality from nonactuality:

from nonactuality to sui generis actuality (analogous squaring quantum~probability functions)

An oversimplified quantum~emersion analogue is:

from muchness to oneness
however, nonclassically, one is in much and much is in one

Immersion of actuality to nonactuality:

from sui generis actuality to nonactuality (analogous square-rooting a quantum~probability)

An oversimplified quantum~immersion analogue is:

from oneness to muchness
however, nonclassically, much is in one and one is in much

Bergson's affirmation is one, unique sui generis. (while an affirmation's complement is "all else")

Bergson's negation is one sui generis' many complements. (while negation affects any affirmation's "all else" complement; minus sui generis is sui generis' many complements)

Our little quantum narration illustrates why Bergson said, "We shall never affirm a thing is not." See page 291, here.

Negation, due its quantum~subjectivity, is outside intellect's dialectical "church of reason," its oppositional classical mythos.

We avoided use of our own quantum remediation here to allow you to digest it in plain English.

We shall QELR above text within 30-60 days.

Doug - 13Sep2006.



"But if I say, " This table is not white," I surely do not express something I have perceived, for I have seen black, and not an absence of white. It is therefore, at bottom, not on the table itself that I bring this judgment to bear, but rather on the judgment that would declare the table white. I judge a judgment and not the table. The proposition, "This table is not white," implies that you might believe it white, that you did believe it such, or that I was going to believe it such. I warn you or myself that this judgment is to be replaced by another (which, it is true, I leave undetermined). Thus, while affirmation bears directly on the thing, negation aims at the thing only indirectly, through an interposed affirmation. An affirmative proposition expresses a judgment on an object; a negative proposition expresses a judgment on a judgment. Negation, therefore, differs from affirmation properly so called in that it is an affirmation of the second degree: it affirms something of an affirmation which itself affirms something of an object.

"But it follows at once from this that negation is not the work of pure mind, I should say of a mind placed before objects and concerned with them alone. When we deny, we give a lesson to others, or it may be to ourselves. We take to task an interlocutor, real or possible, whom we find mistaken [only possible in a local comtext] and whom we put on his guard. He was affirming something: we tell him he ought to affirm something else (though without specifying the affirmation which must be substituted). There is no longer then, simply, a person and an object; there is, in face of the object, a person speaking to a person, opposing him and aiding him at the same time; there is a beginning of society. Negation aims at some one, and not only, like a purely intellectual operation, at some thing."

(Our link and brackets.)

Doug, retrospectively, loves this paragraph. Why? Bergson's affirmation of an affirmation rings a note of re cognition. He is saying, as Doug hermeneuts him, "...color is an affirmation of an affirmation of ideal objectivity." Yet he is saying also, "Color (beingq fluxiallyq stochasticq thus qualitative) lacks qua to claim its own objectivityc." Subscripts q for quantum and c for classical.

Doug re cognizes here, over a decade later, a similar situation with Einstein declaring "...gravity is acceleration." However, Doug showed that, "[anti]gravityq issi superluminalq (atemporalq) attractionq among ("seriously") all fermionic masses ihn our cosmos." Since accelerationc is luminal and temporalc, Doug says, "...accelerationq is a symptomq of gravityq, n¤t gravityq itself."

To narrate this in Bergsonese, "...temporal acceleration affirms atemporal attraction affirms gravity." Thus so apparentq, we fathom Einstein's "accelerationc is gravityc" as dialectically bogus. To say what Einstein said implies gravityc is temporalc, orc has to be temporalc. More simply, there are n¤ identitiesc ihn quantum~reality.

Doug - 6Jul2014.

Another way to say this in our own Quantonics lingo is that classical logical negation implies what SOM refers as paradice. Classical logical negation implies many truths, many quantum islands of truth. Yet it does not imply any quantum included-middle. We also see Bergson's description as closely approaching and closely akin what logicians call "contra-factual definiteness." Quantum islands of truth offer many contrafactual definites. In Quantonics we think it is easier to just say, "Quantum reality offers an unlimited number of tentative TRUTHS and tentative FALSES and an unlimited number of tentative MUs, all in quantum c¤mplementary-uncertain interrelationships with one another."



"It is of a pedagogical and social nature. [In a socially and logically local comventional comtext.] It sets straight or rather warns, the person warned and set straight being possibly, by a kind of doubling, the very person that speaks. [The person warned is notified that s-he is out of comtext or out of comvention's mythos.]

"So much for the second point; now for the first. We said that negation is but the half of an intellectual act, of which the other half is left indeterminate. If I pronounce the negative proposition, "This table is not white," I mean that you ought to substitute for your judgment, "The table is white," another judgment. I give you an admonition, and the admonition refers to the necessity of a substitution. As to what you ought to substitute for your affirmation, I tell you nothing, it is true. This may be because I do not know the color of the table; but it is also, it is indeed even more, because the white color is that alone that interests us for the moment, so that I only need to tell you that some other color will have to be substituted for white, without having to say which. A negative judgment is therefore really one which indicates a need of substituting for an affirmative judgment another affirmative judgment [a radical change of comtextq], the nature of which, however, is not specified, sometimes because it is not known, more often because it fails to offer any actual interest, the attention bearing only on the substance of the first.

"Thus, whenever I add a "not" to an affirmation, whenever I deny, I perform two very definite acts: (1) I interest myself in what one of my fellow-men affirms, or in what he was going to say, or in what might have been said by another Me, whom I anticipate; (2) 1 announce that some other affirmation [a radical change of comtextq], whose content I do not specify, will have to be substituted for the one I find before me. Now, in neither of these two acts is there anything but affirmation. The sui generis character of negation is due to superimposing the first of these acts upon the second [imposing one context on another...i.e., One Size Fits All, One Context Fits All... Doug - 6Jul2014]."

(Our links and brackets.)

Voila! We have a n¤væl Quantonics~Bergsonian HotMeme™:

A Quantonics~Bergsonian HotMeme™ "Second through Nth degree indirect affirmations represent radical quantum~change of comtexting(s) (rcoc) away from any direct affirmation's comtext."™ Quantonics~Bergsonian HotMeme™.

Ihn quantum~reality we can n¤t avoid rcoc due quantum~reality's absoluteq changeq mandate. Evolutionq happens due quantum, up to Planck rate, radical quantal~scintillation. See changeq. See too, Doug's recent acronyms expressing Bergson's Vital Impetus (elan vitale) as rqfv and rqis. In that senseq all comtexts are evolvingq perpetuallyq and ubiquitouslyq. So Doug's HotMeme™ issi phasementing an obviousq.

Classical dialectical thought is, "..a genetic defect of human reason..." (Pirsig). Classical dialectical thought is a con job!

Einstein's imposing of temporal accelerationc as an 'identity' of atemporal gravityq is a con



"It is in vain, then, that we attribute to negation the power of creating ideas sui generis, symmetrical with those that affirmation creates, and directed in a contrary sense. No idea will come forth from negation, for it has no other content than that of the affirmative judgment which it judges.

"To be more precise, let us consider an existential, instead of an attributive, judgment. If I say, "The object A does not exist," I mean by that, first, that we might believe that the object A exists: how, indeed, can we think of the object A without thinking it existing, and, once again, what difference can there be between the idea of the object A existing and the idea pure and simple of the object A? Therefore, merely by saying "The object A," I attribute to it some kind of existence, though it be that of a mere possible, that is to say, of a pure idea. And consequently, in the judgment "The object A is not," there is at first an affirmation such as "The object A has been," or "The object A will be," or, more generally, "The object A exists at least as a mere possible." Now, when I add the two words "is not," I can only mean that if we go further, if we erect the possible object into a real object, we shall be mistaken, and that the possible of which I am speaking is excluded from the actual reality as incompatible with it. [I.e., because we have said it, "is not."] Judgments that posit the nonexistence of a thing are therefore judgments that formulate a contrast between the possible and the actual (that is, between two kinds of existence, one thought and the other found), where a person, real or imaginary, wrongly believes that a certain possible is realized. Instead of this possible, there is a reality that differs from it and rejects it: the negative judgment expresses this contrast, but it expresses the contrast in an intentionally incomplete form, because it is addressed to a person who is supposed to be interested exclusively in the possible that is indicated, and is not concerned to know by what kind of reality the possible is replaced."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)


We now know that reality is nonsymmetrical and open. Classicism teaches that reality is symmetrical and closed. Quantum reality discloses its nonsymmetry in many ways, e.g.: fermionic rotational nonsymmetry, quantum c¤mplementarity, actual energy vis-à-vis nonactual energy nonsymmetry, entropy asymmetry, etc.





From whence we may infer:

  • many realities;
  • many realities deny implicitly any possibility of any global, "is not;"
  • this is easier to see if we realize that we can construct an unlimited number of realities in which we can assess "is," "is not," locally or "mu" generally;
  • general quantum reality says that, because of many realities, global is/is_not is always quantum uncertain;
  • classically, is/is_not is a dichon(is_not, is), and this classical dichotomy assumes a single, unilogical and monolithic reality;
  • quantumly, assuming many heterological and c¤mplementary realities, all quantons both are their actual part and their c¤mplement of unlimited possibilities, i.e., quanton(possibilities,actual_part).



"The expression of the substitution is therefore bound to be cut short. Instead of affirming that a second term is substituted for the first, the attention which was originally directed to the first term will be kept fixed upon it, and upon it alone. And, without going beyond the first, we shall implicitly affirm that a second term replaces it in saying that the first "is not." We shall thus judge a judgment instead of judging a thing. [Thus innately making classical propositional logic nonabsolute!] We shall warn others or warn ourselves of a possible error instead of supplying positive information. Suppress every intention of this kind, give knowledge back its exclusively scientific or philosophical character, suppose in other words that reality comes itself to inscribe itself on a mind that cares only for things and is not interested in persons: we shall affirm that such or such a thing is, we shall never affirm that a thing is not.

[Did you grasp what Bergson just did? If "...we shall never affirm a thing is not," then we deny classical reasoning its greatest tool: contradiction. This is devastating to classical logic. Why has no one (at least that we know of) ever brought this to philosophy's fore? Shame on us! Shame on philosophers who keep sweeping classicism's vast ills under carpets of ignorance!]

(Our increased font size, brackets, bold, and color.)

It is now EOY 2004, over four years since we first did this review. Bergson argues affirmation over denial here: posit over negat.

What are we, as students of Quantonics k~now~ing about posit over negat?

To paraphrase a quote of Bruno de Finetti, mathematically, "Probability is a non negative, additive set function, whose maximum value is unity." Quantonically we can interpret that sentence as "Probability quantum~always affirms and quantum~never negates." See subjectiv[e].

But our statement about probability is still dialectical isn't it? How? "...a non...set function...maximum value is unity."

Classical 'one' does not exist in quantum hlihty. Why?

Quantum ¤næ issi pr¤babilistihc. Ahll nægati¤n issi subqjæctihvæ ihn quantum ræhlihty amd fumcti¤n (i.e., quantum pr¤cæss) issi anihmatæ, s¤rs¤, EIMA pr¤cæss ihn quantum ræhlihty. H¤w d¤ wæ QELR that classical problematic? Wæ can uhsæ quantum ¤mnihty amd quantum ¤næ. Amd wæ can sahy "quantum pr¤babilihtyings," amd "quantum lihkælih¤¤dings." S¤ QELRæd ¤ur qu¤te ræhds lihkæ this:

"Quantum pr¤babilihty issi n¤n nægatih, addqihtih ænsehmble anihmatæ, s¤rs¤ EIMA pr¤cæssings, wh¤se quantum pr¤babilistihc maxqihmum valuings aræ mæmæ¤tihcahlly ¤mnihty, ¤næ,  1q, amd quantum ¤næ."

Our ræcursi¤n hæræ issi explihciht ihn ¤ur quantum pr¤babilihty (pr¤cæssings) ¤f quantum pr¤babilihty (¤mnihty). That ræcursi¤n may bæ easier t¤ fath¤m ihf wæ ¤ffer an umQELRed værsi¤n ¤f ¤ur quantum qu¤te:

"Probability is non negative, additive ensemble animate, sorso EIMA processings, whose probabilistic maximun valuings are semiotically unity, 1, and one." Ræcursi¤n manihfests hæræ as, "Pr¤¤babilistihc..."

As y¤u can easily gather, this issi radihcahlly ¤mnihfferænt fr¤m classical dialectical notions of probability!

Further, formal, non quantum, probability is mathematics' best means of mechanically describing quantum reality. For an exemplar see Northrop in EPR.

Is there a clue here? We think yes! Quantum reality is a quantum~positive, affirmative reality. Students must learn to omnistinguish classical social-positivism from quantum~probabilistic~positivism. Former is another classical deign to feign: social consensus. Latter is a natural, affective, quantum~statistical~selection~process based upon quantum~ensemble attractors.That explains why 'normal' mathematical and logical dialectic often renders 'paradice.' Dialectic requires formal 'consensed' negation in order for dialectic to work. Negation mixed with affirmation can easily generate paradice. Usually as self-other-referent classical contradiction and inconsistency. Positive quantum reality generates paradice and further it can explain any classical paradice. We have shown this repeatedly in Quantonics.

See truth. See our 2004 Bases of Judgment hierarchy (work that table bottom up; be sure to study column headings prior).

Doug - 25-26Dec2004.


P291 cont'd... "How comes it, then, that affirmation and negation are so persistently put on the same level and endowed with an equal objectivity? How comes it that we have so much difficulty in recognizing that negation is subjective, artificially cut short, relative to the human mind and still more to the social life? The reason is, no doubt, that both negation and affirmation are expressed in propositions, and that any proposition, being formed of words, which symbolize concepts, is something relative to social life and to the human intellect. Whether I say "The ground is damp" or "The ground is not damp," in both cases the terms "ground" and "damp" are concepts more or less artificially created by the mind of man—extracted, by his free initiative, from the continuity of experience. In both cases the concepts are represented by the same conventional words."

We concur with Bergson! We arrived where he is independently using different memes. But our results concur. It is time to expose classicism's innate deign to feign. It is time for all to know of classicism's phony foundations. It is utterly disgusting to know that we of Western culture are still teaching and have taught our children this gunk for centuries! Doug 6Nov2000.



P291 comments
25Jul2002 comments:

To further illustrate how utterly inept CTMs are for thinking, in general, about quantum reality let's use our Quantonics script to depict all n¤nactual (comjugal) quantum c¤mplements of a quanton's actual quantum c¤mplement, then do similarly for all actual (conjugal) quantum c¤mplements of a quanton's actual quantum c¤mplement:

  • all_of_a_quanton's_comjugal_c¤mplements


  • all_of_a_quanton's_conjugal_c¤mplements



P291 comments
25Jul2002 comments:

As you may choose to perceive, in quantum reality any actual quantum c¤mplement has an unlimited number (see n¤mbær) of potential n¤nactual (comjugal) quantum c¤mplements. We also show that any actual quantum c¤mplement also has a ~limited number of potential actual (conjugal) quantum c¤mplements. (I.e., quantum actuality is a tiny sub- 'set' of quantum n¤nactuality.)

We can use these two depictions to glaringly show how inept classical thing-king really is. Classical reasoning declares all opposites are Bohrian, 'exclusive complementary.' Thus, from a classical perspective, every classical conjugal complement of our quantum comjugal and quantum conjugal c¤mplement1 is a classically logical objective opposite or objective negative of c¤mplement1. In Bergsonese, "We shall always classically affirm a thing's complements are not." As Bergson tells us so eloquently, CTMs turn quantum quality into classical quantity.

It is always worth your while to ask classicists exactly what they mean when they say, "...the opposite." Thence, "How can more than one 'opposite' (plural opposites) be Bohrian excluded-middle complementary?" Then ask them, "How can there be both 'the opposite,' and 'many opposites' in classical logical simultaneity?" Hmmmm...?

Red text added 25Jun2002 - Doug.


P291 comments
7-11Feb2003 comments:

Our efforts to explain, partially, aspects of Riemann's Hypothesis have offered us another obvious 'mathematical' rendition/description of why negation is really, quantumly subjective. See our afterthought at our Quantonic Symbols page (big page, lots of graphics).

Quite simply, it distills classically to this:

-1 = ei (A Feynman epiphany!)

At first blush this appears as a classical proposition, usually taken tautologously as an Aristotelian 'identity.' But it is n¤t! It is a quantum sophism (Indeed, all of Aristotle's syllogisms are actually quantum sophisms! See link above and see our Quantum Connection.), which we can demonstrate quite readily:

classically, i = -1 = ei


P291 comments
7-11Feb2003 comments, cont'd...:

What do we notice immediately here? Even using classical notation, we see minus one 'defined' self-referently, subjectively, qualitatively, coobsfectively in terms of i! We can show this quantum recursion more vividly using our Quantonics script and semiotics:

iq -1q ei


If you wish to see our application of quantum subjective negation to classical minus one and its relatives, check out our recent Hamiltonian Quaternion with Quantonic Square root.

Last paragraphs added 7-11Feb2003 - Doug.



"In both cases we can say indeed that the proposition aims at a social and pedagogical end, since the first would propagate a truth as the second would prevent an error. From this point of view, which is that of formal logic, to affirm and to deny are indeed two mutually symmetrical acts, of which the first establishes a relation of agreement and the second a relation of disagreement between a subject and an attribute. But how do we fail to see that the symmetry is altogether external and the likeness superficial? Suppose language fallen into disuse, society dissolved, every intellectual initiative, every faculty of self-reflection and of self-judgment atrophied in man: the dampness of the ground [or grayness of a black/white table] will subsist none the less, capable of inscribing itself automatically in sensation and of sending a vague idea to the deadened intellect. The intellect will still affirm, in implicit terms. And consequently, neither distinct concepts, nor words, nor the desire of spreading the truth, nor that of bettering oneself, are of the very essence of the affirmation. But this passive intelligence, mechanically keeping step with experience, neither anticipating nor following the course of the real, would have no wish to deny. It could not receive an imprint of negation; for, once again, that which exists may come to be recorded, but the non-existence of the non-existing cannot. For such an intellect to reach the point of denying, it must awake from its torpor, formulate the disappointment of a real or possible expectation, correct an actual or possible error—in short, propose to teach others or to teach itself.

"It is rather difficult to perceive this in the example we have chosen, but the example is indeed the more instructive and the argument the more cogent on that account. If dampness is able automatically to come and record itself, it is the same, it will be said, with non-dampness; for the dry as well as the damp can give impressions to sense, which will transmit them, as more or less distinct ideas, to the intelligence."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)

There can only be logically-local errors in specific and local axiomatic conventions or logically-absolute errors in unilogical monisms! Quantum reality offers no errors, only uncertainties.


It offers your reviewer great relish to note, for you reader, that Karl Popper and other 'reputed' philosophers base their whole philosophical systems upon formal logic's metaphysical 'power' of falsifiability!






But we, upon further thought, might glimmer that non-dampness may have many hues: hot, dry, dusty, cool, crisp, arid, scorching, even colors of blue (moon) and red (Mars) and yellow (sun), etc. These and many others are all quantum c¤mplements of dampness.


293 "In this sense the negation of dampness is as objective a thing, as purely intellectual, as remote from every pedagogical intention, as affirmation.—But let us look at it more closely: we shall see that the negative proposition, "The ground is not damp," and the affirmative proposition, "The ground is dry," have entirely different contents. The second implies that we know the dry, that we have experienced the specific sensations, tactile or visual for example, that are at the base of this idea. The first requires nothing of the sort; it could equally well have been formulated by an intelligent fish, who had never perceived anything but the wet. It would be necessary, it is true, that this fish should have risen to the distinction between the real and the possible, and that he should care to anticipate the error of his fellow-fishes, who doubtless consider as alone possible 'the condition of wetness in which they actually live. Keep strictly to the terms of the proposition, " The ground is not damp," and you will find that it means two things: (1) that one might believe that the ground is damp, (2) that the dampness is replaced in fact by a certain quality x [rather by qualities x, y, z,…q, r, s.]. This quality is left indeterminate [rather, quantum uncertain], either because we have no positive knowledge of it, or because it has no actual interest for the person to whom the negation is addressed. To deny, therefore, always consists in presenting in an abridged form [i.e., stuck or status quo; convention] a system of two affirmations: the one determinate, which applies to a certain possible; the other indeterminate, referring to the unknown or indifferent reality that supplants this possibility. The second affirmation is virtually contained in the judgment we apply to the first, a judgment which is negation itself. And what gives negation its subjective character is precisely this, that in the discovery of a replacement it takes account only of the replaced, and is not concerned with what replaces."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)








Notice how our quanton, by contrast, offers a memetic awakening. It affirms both actual and nonactual, and as Bergson inures, a quanton never denies. A quanton is always open! A quanton may be actually squeezed to achieve comtextual comsistency, but it will always remain nonactually open. Where SOM's CTMs snare reason in dichons, as Bergson incisively elicits, MoQ/Quantonics' QTMs free reason via quantons.



"The replaced exists only as a [tentatively latched] conception of the mind. It is necessary, in order to continue to see it, and consequently in order to speak of it, to turn our back on the reality, which flows from the past to the present, advancing from behind. It is this that we do when we deny. We discover the change[s], or more generally the substitution[s], as a traveller would see the course of his carriage if he looked out behind, and only knew at each moment[s] the point[s] at which he had ceased to be; he could never determine his actual position[s] except by relation to that which he had just quitted, instead of grasping it in itself.

"To sum up, for a mind which should follow purely and simply the thread of experience, there would be no void, no nought, even relative or partial, no possible negation. Such a mind would see facts succeed facts, states succeed states, things succeed things. What it would note at each moment would be things existing, states appearing, events happening. It would live in the actual, and, if it were capable of judging, it would never affirm anything except the existence of the present.

"Endow this mind with memory, and especially with the desire to dwell on the past; give it the faculty of dissociating and, of distinguishing: it will no longer only note the present state of the passing reality; it will represent the passing as a change, and therefore as a contrast between what has been and what is. And as there is no essential difference between a past that we remember and a past that we imagine, it will quickly rise to the idea of the "possible" in general.

"It will thus be shunted on to the siding of negation. And especially it will be at the point of representing a disappearance. But it will not yet have reached it."

(Our bold and color.)

Bergson's uses of singular 'past' and singular 'present' assume a classical homogeneous time perspective.

Thus we may argue that classical denial depends upon a homogeneous time perspective. Were there many different pasts—all contributing to many different nexts, denial or negation would appear then to be, as Bergson states, "subjective." See our Classical Homogeneous Time vis-à-vis Quantum Heterogeneous Times.






And, Pirsig fans, this is where Pirsig arrived, too. Pirsig calls Bergson's ever present "the Quality Event." But beware, Pirsig's singular belies his classical assumption of homogeneous time.



"To represent that a thing has disappeared, it is not enough to perceive a contrast between the past[s] and the present[s]; it is necessary besides to turn our back on the present, to dwell on the past, and to think the contrast of the past with the present in terms of the past only, without letting the present appear in it.

"The idea of annihilation is therefore not a pure idea; it implies that we regret the past or that we conceive it as regrettable, that we have some reason to linger over it. The idea arises when the phenomenon of substitution is cut in two [using SOM's ubiquitous knives; thus classically, we see dichon(past, future) just as we see dichon(object, subject)] by a mind which considers only the first half, because that alone interests it. [Juxtapose quanton(future,past) and quanton(subject,object).] Suppress all interest, all feeling, and there is nothing left but the reality that flows, together with the knowledge ever renewed that it impresses on us of its present state.

"From annihilation to negation, which is a more general operation, there is now only a step. All that is necessary is to represent the contrast of what is, not only with what has been, but also with all that might have been. And we must express this contrast as a function of what might have been, and not of what is; we must affirm the existence of the actual while looking only at the possible. The formula we thus obtain no longer expresses merely a disappointment of the individual; it is made to correct or guard against an error, which is rather supposed to be the error of another. In this sense, negation has a [classically defensive and pessimistic fear mongering] pedagogical and social character.

"Now, [classically] once negation is formulated, it presents an aspect symmetrical with that of affirmation; if affirmation affirms an objective reality, it seems that negation must affirm a non-reality equally objective, and, so to say, equally real. In which we are both right and wrong: wrong, because negation cannot be objectified, in so far as it is negative; right, however, in that the negation of a thing implies the latent affirmation of its replacement by something else, which we systematically leave on one side."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)




"But the negative form of negation benefits by the affirmation at the bottom of it. Bestriding the positive solid reality to which it is attached, this phantom objectives itself. Thus is formed the idea of the void or of a partial nought, a thing being supposed to be replaced, not by another thing, but by a void which it leaves, that is, by the negation of itself. Now, as this operation works on anything whatever, we suppose it performed on each thing in turn, and finally on all things in block. We thus obtain the idea of absolute Nothing. If now we analyze this idea of Nothing, we find that it is, at bottom, the idea of Everything, together with a movement of the mind that keeps jumping from one thing to another, refuses to stand still, and concentrates all its attention on this refusal by never determining its actual position except by relation to that which it has just left. It is therefore an idea eminently comprehensive and full, as full and comprehensive as the idea of All, to which it is very closely akin.

"How then can the idea of Nought be opposed to that of All? Is it not plain that this is to oppose the full to the full, and that the question, "Why does something exist?" is consequently without meaning, a pseudo-problem raised about a pseudo-idea? Yet we must say once more why this phantom of a problem haunts the mind with such obstinacy. In vain do we show that in the idea of an "annihilation of the real" there is only the image of all realities expelling one another endlessly, in a circle; in vain do we add that the idea of non-existence is only that of the expulsion of an imponderable existence, or a "merely possible" existence, by a more substantial existence which would then be the true reality; in vain do we find in the sui generis form of negation an element which is not intellectual—negation being the judgment of a judgment, an admonition given to some one else or to oneself, so that it is absurd to attribute to negation the power of creating ideas of a new kind, viz. ideas without content;—in spite of all, the conviction persists that before things, or at least under things, there is 'Nothing.'"

(Our single quotes replace double quotes on last "Nothing.".)



297 "If we seek the reason of this fact, we shall find it precisely in the feeling, in the social and, so to speak, practical element, that gives its specific form to negation. The greatest philosophic difficulties arise, as we have said, from the fact that the forms of human action venture outside of their proper sphere. We are made in order to act as much as, and more than, in order to think—or rather, when we follow the bent of our nature, it is in order to act that we think. It is therefore no wonder that the habits of action give their tone to those of thought, and that our mind always perceives things in the same order in which we are accustomed to picture them when we propose to act on them. Now, it is unquestionable, as we remarked above, that every human action has its starting-point in a dissatisfaction, and thereby in a feeling of absence. We should not act if we did not set before ourselves an end, and we seek a thing only because we feel the lack of it. [Apply Bergson's last sentence to his prior page comment that "Why does a thing exist?" is a pseudo-problem. Answer: it chooses to exist; it wants to exist! Quantons interrelate and make choices based upon how they Value those interrelationships. Quantons set before themselves an end of next as 'better.'] Our action proceeds thus from "nothing" to "something," and its very essence is to embroider "something" on the canvas of "nothing." The truth is that the "nothing" concerned here is the absence not so much of a thing as of a utility. If I bring a visitor into a room that I have not yet furnished, I say to him that "there is nothing in it." Yet I know the room is full of air; but, as we do not sit on air, the room truly contains nothing that at this moment, for the visitor and for myself, counts for anything. [To classical humans quantum nonactuality appears as "nothing." As intense isotropic flux, it appears absent just as a room full of air appears empty.] In a general way, human work consists in creating utility; and, as long as the work is not done, there is "nothing"—nothing that we want."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)




298 "Our life is thus spent in filling voids, which our intellect conceives under the influence, by no means intellectual, of desire and of regret, under the pressure of vital necessities; and if we mean by void an absence of utility and not of things, we may say, in this quite relative sense, that we are constantly going from the void to the full: such is the direction which our action takes. Our speculation cannot help doing the same; and, naturally, it passes from the relative sense to the absolute sense, since it is exercised on things themselves and not on the utility they have for us. Thus is implanted in us the idea that reality fills a void, and that Nothing, conceived as an absence of everything, pre-exists before all things in right, if not in fact. It is this illusion that we have tried to remove by showing that the idea of Nothing, if we try to see in it that of an annihilation of all things, is self-destructive and reduced to a mere word; and that if, on the contrary, it is truly an idea, then we find in it as much matter as in the idea of All." Index
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©Quantonics, Inc., 2000-2028 Rev. 12Jun2015 Created: 20Sep2000  PDR
(28Nov2000 rev - Add anchor to page 291, 'Negation is Subjective.')
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(13Apr2001 rev - Add "classical negation is objective" comment on p. 276.)
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(11-12Sep2006 rev - Reformat colors. Extend p. 285 comments. Add movie title at A&E. Add bracketed comments to p. 275 text. Add 'fermionta' link to p. 276 comments.)
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(8Aug2012 rev - Add p. 275 text link to Doug's 'What is Immanence?')
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