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A Review
Henri Louis Bergson's Book
Creative Evolution
Chapter I: The Evolution of Life Mechanism and Teleology
Topic 9: Biology and Philosophy
by Doug Renselle
Doug's Pre-review Commentary
Start of Review

Chapter I II
Introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Chapter III IV
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45  46 47

Move to any Topic of Henri Louis Bergson's Creative Evolution,
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Topic 9...............Biology and Philosophy


(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis Bergson, some paraphrased.)

(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.)


"Whether nature be conceived as an immense machine regulated by mathematical laws, or as the realization of a plan, these two ways of regarding it [i.e., either radical mechanism or radical finalism] are only the consummation of two tendencies of mind [i.e., art and geometry] which are complementary to each other, and which have their origin in the same vital necessities.

"For that reason, radical finalism is very near radical mechanism on many points. Both doctrines are reluctant to see in the course of things generally, or even simply in the development of life, an unforeseeable creation of form. In considering reality, mechanism regards only the aspect of similarity or repetition. It is therefore dominated by this law, that in nature there is only like reproducing like. The more the geometry in mechanism is emphasized, the less can mechanism admit that anything is ever created, even pure form. In so far as we are geometricians, then, we reject the unforeseeable. We might accept it, assuredly, in so far as we are artists, for art lives on creation and implies a latent belief in the spontaneity of nature. But disinterested art is a luxury, like pure speculation. Long before being artists, we are artisans; and all fabrication, however rudimentary, lives on likeness and repetition, like the natural geometry which serves as its fulcrum. Fabrication works on models which it sets out to reproduce; and even when it invents, it proceeds, or imagines itself to proceed, by a new arrangement of elements already known. Its principle is that "we must have like to produce like." In short, the strict application of the principle of finality, like that of the principle of mechanical causality, leads to the conclusion that "all is given." [i.e., reality pre-exists] Both principles say the same thing in their respective languages, because they respond to the same need.

"That is why again they agree in doing away with time."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)

Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number.

Our bold and color highlights follow a code:

  • black-bold - important to read if you are just scanning our review
  • green-bold - we see Bergson suggesting axiomatic memes
  • violet-bold - an apparent classical problematic
  • blue-bold - we disagree with this text segment while disregarding context of Bergson's overall text
  • gray-bold - quotable text
  • red-bold - our direct commentary




Think about how quantum reality creates. Unlike classical creation concepts, it innovates and invents new from that which is wholly unlike its product. Perspicacious readers who develop products will infer an important percept for imminent Millennium III EEE manufacturing approaches.


"Real duration is that duration which gnaws on things, and leaves on them the mark of its tooth. If everything is in time, everything changes inwardly, and the same concrete reality never recurs. Repetition is therefore possible only in the abstract: what is repeated is some aspect that our senses, and especially our intellect, have singled out from reality, just because our action, upon which all the effort of our intellect is directed, can move only among repetitions. Thus, concentrated on that which repeats, solely preoccupied in welding the same to the same, intellect turns away from the vision of time. It dislikes what is fluid, and solidifies everything it touches. We do not think real time. But we live it, because life transcends intellect. The feeling we have of our evolution and of the evolution of all things in pure duration is there, forming around the intellectual concept properly so-called an indistinct fringe that fades off into darkness. Mechanism and finalism agree in taking account only of the bright nucleus shining in the centre. They forget that this nucleus has been formed out of the rest by condensation, and that the whole must be used, the fluid as well as and more than the condensed, in order to grasp the inner movement of life.

"Indeed, if the fringe exists, however delicate and indistinct, it should have more importance for philosophy than the bright nucleus it surrounds. For it is its presence that enables us to affirm that the nucleus is a nucleus, that pure intellect is a contraction, by condensation, of a more extensive power. And, just because this vague intuition is of no help in directing our action on things, which action takes place exclusively on the surface of reality, we may presume that it is to be exercised not merely on the surface, but below."

(Our bold and color.)

Bergson's statement explains why Aristotle's syllogistic laws fail, in general. Reality has no ideal tautologies! Reality is absolute flux! Bergson's statement agrees with modern physics which shows us that no two physical 'objects' are ever identical, nor can they ever 'be' identical. When we develop products using EEEs we admit nature's intrinsic quantum uncertainty and pragmatic twin—absolute flux. Reader, you may also wish to compare Bergson's duration with Pirsig's Dynamic Quality. Further, we may begin a glimmer that DQ is unlimited, absolute isotimes. We commence a new temporal sensation of DQ as a kind of pure Bergsonian isoheterogeneity.

A Pirsigean dual of this would be that DQ transcends SQ. In Quantonics we extend that to say that DQ is Quantum Vacuum Flux or Vacuum Energy Space. We further extend QVF and VES memes as intrinsically co-aware. As such they are life's, indeed all reality's, well-spring and in that sense "transcend intellect."


Bergson's "fringe" corresponds roughly to Pirsig's DQ and to our Quantonic nonactuality/VES/QVF.

Quantonic HotMeme
"Fringe" as quantum included-middle: Bergson's "fringe" may also be thought of as atom's quantum wave function probability distributions. E.g. a 'mode' (or maximum) of an electron's distribution is what classicists call its Bohr orbit. But that is where an electron "most probably" is. Actually, any electron is (all electrons are) everywhere in our quantum multiverses! Ditto nuclei! This is Bergson's "fringe" and it also explains reality's quantum c¤mplementary included-middle. It also explains our How to Tap Into Reserve Energy meme, and it explains quantum SON associative memory. Quantonic HotMeme

Yes, since you/we are made of atoms (i.e., quantons), that means you/we are everywhere in our quantum multiverses, and our quantum multiverses are everywhere in us! We intrinsically, naturally tap into reserve energy, and it taps into us!

47 "As soon as we go out of the encasings in which radical mechanism and radical finalism confine our thought, reality appears as a ceaseless upspringing of something new, which has no sooner arisen to make the present than it has already fallen back into the past; at this exact moment it falls under the glance of the intellect, whose eyes are ever turned to the rear. This is already the case with our inner life. For each of our acts we shall easily find antecedents of which it may in some sort be said to be the mechanical resultant. And it may equally well be said that each action is the realization of an intention. In this sense mechanism is everywhere, and finality everywhere, in the evolution of our conduct. But if our action be one that involves the whole of our person and is truly ours, it could not have been foreseen, even though its antecedents explain it when once it has been accomplished. And though it be the realizing of an intention, it differs, as a present and new reality, from the intention, which can never aim at anything but recommencing or rearranging the past. Mechanism and finalism are therefore, here, only external views of our conduct. They extract its intellectuality. But our conduct slips between them and extends much further. Once again, this does not mean that free action is capricious, unreasonable action. To behave according to caprice is to oscillate mechanically between two or more ready-made alternatives and at length to settle on one of them; it is no real maturing of an internal state, no real evolution; it is merely—however paradoxical the assertion may seem—bending the will to imitate the mechanism of the intellect. A conduct that is truly our own, on the contrary, is that of a will which does not try to counterfeit intellect, and which, remaining itself—that is to say, evolving—ripens gradually into acts which the intellect will be able to resolve indefinitely into intelligible elements without ever reaching its goal."

(Our bold and color.)

Pirsig calls these encasings "Churches of Reason."


Bergson offers us more fascinating new memes! Bergson shows us how mechanism and finalism occur at each Quality Event or its quantum analogue, i.e., each Planck Event. Classicists see mechanism and finality as covering all of a single, homogeneous temporal alpha-omega. Bergson shows us that alpha-omega occur at Planck rate events, over and over and over… In a sense all of reality (note that my use of singular 'reality' is unilogical) is reborn over and over and over… Now if we take a classical concept or idea of time as a homogeneous "all is given," and call that "one time," we can use our new meme of quantum time as an alpha-omega "Planck quantum is given," and call that "many times." See our new Classical Homogeneous Time vis-à-vis Quantum Heterogeneous Time graphic based upon an e-merging Bergson's meme with our own Quantonics memes. Consider how this jibes with Dr. Irving Stein's view of a quantum walk (another way of saying this is Stein's own "nonpreferential random walk;" see link just below) in his 'nonspace' whose result is both mechanical and final, but whose next Planck Event outcome is always quantum uncertain. See Section 85, pp. 84-5, of his 1996, Peter Lang Pub's, The Concept of Object as the Foundation of Physics

We have an analogue for Bergson's "caprice." If you recall our early work on sophisms, you remember how we depicted classical interpretation of "This sentence is not true," as a mind numbing whir, or using Bergson's words, mind "oscillating mechanically." We showed how if we leave CTMs and start using QTMs we can escape that classical caprice. See our SOM Connection, especially Figure 2, as a solution to classical caprice. Note how Bergson implies that SOM "counterfeits intellect." (Pay attention, Bo! J)


"The free act is incommensurable with the idea, and its "rationality" must be defined by this very incommensurability, which admits the discovery of as much intelligibility within it as we will. Such is the character of our own evolution; and such also, without doubt, that of the evolution of life.

"Our reason, incorrigibly presumptuous, imagines itself possessed, by right of birth or by right of conquest, innate or acquired, of all the essential elements of the knowledge of truth. Even where it confesses that it does not know the object presented to it, it believes that its ignorance consists only in not knowing which one of its time-honored categories suits the new object. In what drawer, ready to open, shall we put it? In what garment, already cut out, shall we clothe it? Is it this, or that, or the other thing? And "this, and "that, and "the other thing" are always something already conceived, already known. The idea that for a new object we might have to create a new concept, perhaps a new method of thinking, is deeply repugnant to us. The history of philosophy is there, however, and shows us the eternal conflict of systems, the impossibility of satisfactorily getting the real into the ready-made garments of our ready-made concepts, the necessity of making to measure. But, rather than go to this extremity, our reason prefers to announce once for all, with a proud modesty, that it has to do only with the relative, and that the absolute is not in its province. This preliminary declaration enables it to apply its habitual method of thought without any scruple, and thus, under pretense that it does not touch the absolute, to make absolute judgments upon everything. Plato was the first to set up the theory that to know the real consists in finding its Idea, that is to say, in forcing it into a pre-existing frame already at our disposal—as if we implicitly possessed universal knowledge."

(Our bold and color.)

Quantonic HotMeme
A Key SOM & CR Disabler Process:
Reader, be careful here. Bergson reserves, as should we, special meaning for his use of 'the idea.' He is speaking of a Platonic concept when he says, "the idea." He speaks of Pirsig's latched Static Quality, SQ. He tells us, as does Pirsig, that when an idea latches—it enters an intellectual box or trap—a Church of Reason. If one enters that box and chooses to stay there, then one remits one's own free will. Thus you can see how he says " act is incommensurable with the idea..." since a free act of having/latching an idea temporarily puts one in a trap. We must immediately have another act of free will to take us out of that box, back into a domain of balanced Dynamic Quality and Static Quality, i.e., quanton(DQ,SQ). Now, again, you may see very distinctly how our QTMs differ from CTMs:

  • CTMs keep you disabled in SOM's box.
  • QTMs keep your free will out of SOM's box.

Feynman/Dyson on Einstein: Notice that modern mathematics is, by intention and by ideal axiomatic system, a trap. Any science which uses modern mathematics enters said trap, unless it has a way to return to balance of both DQ and SQ. Modern mathematics we can say, imitating Pirsig, "Has lost its Quality." Both Feynman and Dyson thought that is what happened to Einstein when he entered modern mathematics' trap and could not escape. See, in James Gleick's Genius: "Feynman said to Dyson, and Dyson agreed, that Einstein's great work had sprung from physical intuition and that when Einstein stopped creating it was because '...he stopped thinking in concrete physical images and became a manipulator of ['elegant' mathematical] equations...'" Page 244 out of 531 total pages, in a first Vintage paperbacks edition, October, 1993. Reader, if you are a student of Quantonics or want to be a student of Quantonics and learn QTMs, please take careful notice that we developed our Quantonics symbols and notation to take us out of SOM's box and constantly remind us to stay out of SOM's box.

Bergson's "...impossibility...of making to measure." statement shows us why mathematics is stuck. It is forever trapped in its own ready-made intellectual, rational, object-based, axiomatic, Platonic and analytic realm.


"But this belief is natural to the human intellect, always engaged as it is in determining under what former heading it shall catalogue any new object; and it may be said that, in a certain sense, we are all born Platonists.

"Nowhere is the inadequacy of this method so obvious as in theories of life. If, in evolving in the direction of the vertebrates in general, of man and intellect in particular, life has had to abandon by the way many elements incompatible with this particular mode of organization and consign them, as we shall show, to other lines of development, it is the totality of these elements that we must find again and rejoin to the intellect proper, in order to grasp the true nature of vital activity. And we shall probably be aided in this by the fringe of vague intuition that surrounds our distinct—that is, intellectual—representation. For what can this useless fringe be, if not that part of the evolving principle which has not shrunk to the peculiar form of our organization, but has settled around it unasked for, unwanted? It is there, accordingly, that we must look for hints to expand the intellectual form of our thought; from there shall we derive the impetus necessary to lift us above ourselves. To form an idea of the whole of life cannot consist in combining simple ideas that have been left behind in us by life itself in the course of its evolution. How could the part be equivalent to the whole, the content to the container, a by-product of the vital operation to the operation itself? Such, however, is our illusion when we define the evolution of life as a "passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous," or by any other concept obtained by putting fragments of intellect side by side."

(Our bold and color.)

We strongly disagree! We are all trained and propagandized Platonists. Bergson apparently did not study pre-Greek (i.e., pre-Homer's Iliad) ancient human history. Sophists are a good example. Their thinking was not intrinsically Platonic! Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle and other Greek materialists marketed early Platonic propaganda so that absolute analytic truth could survive and replace dynamic, evolute, plural Heraclitean change.




It is quantum vacuum flux. It is QVF AKA VES AKA Pirsig's Dynamic Quality.

We need to climb, lift ourselves, out of SOM's box.

SOM's box is full of simple ideal objects.


"We place ourselves in one of the points where evolution comes to a head—the principal one, no doubt, but not the only one; and there we do not even take all we find, for of the intellect we keep only one or two of the concepts by which it expresses itself; and it is this part of a part that we declare representative of the whole, of something indeed which goes beyond the concrete whole, I mean of the evolution movement of which this "whole" is only the present stage! The truth is, that to represent this the entire intellect would not be too much—nay, it would not be enough. It would be necessary to add to it what we find in every other terminal point of evolution. And these diverse and divergent elements must be considered as so many extracts which are, or at least which were, in their humblest form, mutually complementary. Only then might we have an inkling of the real nature of the evolution movement; and even then we should fail to grasp it completely, for we should still be dealing only with the evolved, which is a result, and not with evolution itself, which is the act by which the result is obtained.

"Such is the philosophy of life to which we are leading up. It claims to transcend both mechanism and finalism; but, as we announced at the beginning, it is nearer the second doctrine than the first. It will not be amiss to dwell on this point, and show more precisely how far this philosophy of life resembles finalism and wherein it is different.

"Like radical finalism, although in a vaguer form, our philosophy represents the organized world as a harmonious whole. But this harmony is far from being as perfect as it has been claimed to be. It admits of much discord, because each species, each individual even, retains only a certain impetus from the universal vital impulsion and tends to use this energy in its own interest. In this consists adaptation. The species and the individual thus think only of themselves—whence arises a possible conflict with other forms of life."

(Our bold and color.)











It will be interesting to see how closely Bergson's "harmonious whole" resembles quantum cohesion. Clearly, this is a benchmark not unlike our current benchmark analogues of quantum science to Pirsig's MoQ and both of those to William James' fluxing empirical evolute pluralism. Where James' flux and Pirsig's DQ are respectively cohesive with percepts-concepts and Static Quality, we anticipate Bergson's

duration quanton(~nonactuality,~actuality).

We already prototyped artwork which depicts this, and it will attend these comments regardless whether our anticipation finds acceptance. (See our Bergsonian Duration Quantons from original sketch artwork dated 28Sep2000.)

Already, his use of "universal vital impulsion" and "energy" fit our anticipation.

And thus we see conflict as harmony. Consider de Broglie's violin metaphor. Bow in 'conflict' with string making harmonious patterns of Value… Value arises from differences, from diversity, from conflicting patterns of Value finding harmony:

in their

Anvil and hammer in conflict with cherry hot metal. Grinder and artisan in conflict with rough diamond and leaded glass. New memes in conflict with static know ledges. And on and on and on…

51 "Harmony, therefore, does not exist in fact; it exists rather in principle; I mean that the original impetus is a common impetus, and the higher we ascend the stream of life the more do diverse tendencies appear complementary to each other. Thus the wind at a street-corner divides into diverging currents which are all one and the same gust. Harmony, or rather "complementarity," is revealed only in the mass, in tendencies rather than in states. Especially (and this is the point on which finalism has been most seriously mistaken) harmony is rather behind us than before. It is due to an identity of impulsion and not to a common aspiration. It would be futile to try to assign to life an end, in the human sense of the word. To speak of an end is to think of a pre-existing model which has only to be realized. It is to suppose, therefore, that all is given, and that the future can be read in the present. It is to believe that life, in its movement and in its entirety, goes to work like our intellect, which is only a motionless and fragmentary view of life, and which naturally takes its stand outside of time. Life, on the contrary, progresses and endures in time. Of course, when once the road has been traveled, we can glance over it, mark its direction, note this in psychological terms and speak as if there had been pursuit of an end. Thus shall we speak ourselves. But, of the road which was going to be traveled, the human mind could have nothing to say, for the road has been created pari passu [i.e., synchronously, side-by-side, or in a balanced fashion — Doug.] with the act of traveling over it, being nothing but the direction of this act itself. At every instant, then, evolution must admit of a psychological interpretation which is, from our point of view, the best interpretation; but this explanation has neither value nor even significance except retrospectively. Never could the finalistic interpretation, such as we shall propose it, be taken for an anticipation of the future."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)




Bergson's "identity of impulsion" is an analogue of Pirsig's Value arising out of Dynamic Quality at Quality Events. Value (harmony) arises as a satisfaction "identity" (rather, say, quantum~c¤mplæmæntarity?) of comflict between and among Static Patterns of Value with impulsion from Dynamic quality. Using Pirsigean MoQese, we call this emersion of new Value, "a Quality Event."



Reader, your reviewer has similar conflicts of thought with classical Latin's a priori and a posteriori. That difficulty we think arises from classicism's homogeneous perspective of unilogical time combined with both alpha-omega radical mechanism and radical finalism (analyticity). If you think carefully about this, you will see that these same classical thing-king methods (CTMs) insist on no flux; i.e., no change except for temporal flow, and Voilà! that is just what we see. Doug.

52 "It is a particular mode of viewing the past in the light of the present. In short, the classic conception of finality postulates at once too much and too little: it is both too wide and too narrow. In explaining life by intellect, it limits too much the meaning of life: intellect, such at least as we find it in ourselves, has been fashioned by evolution during the course of progress; it is cut out of something larger, or, rather, it is only the projection, necessarily on a plane, of a reality that possesses both relief and depth. It is this more comprehensive reality that true finalism ought to reconstruct, or, rather, if possible, embrace in one view. But, on the other hand, just because it goes beyond intellect—the faculty of connecting the same with the same, of perceiving and also of producing repetitions—this reality is undoubtedly creative, i. e. productive of effects in which it expands and transcends its own being. These effects were therefore not given in it in advance, and so it could not take them for ends, although, when once produced, they admit of a rational interpretation, like that of the manufactured article that has reproduced a model. In short, the theory of final causes does not go far enough when it confines itself to ascribing some intelligence to nature, and it goes too far when it supposes a pre-existence of the future in the present in the form of idea. And the second theory, [i.e., radical mechanism] which sins by excess, is the outcome of the first, which sins by defect. In place of intellect proper must be substituted the more comprehensive [analytic] reality of which intellect is only the contraction. The future then appears as expanding the present: it was not, therefore, contained in the present in the form of a represented end. And yet, once realized, it will explain the present as much as the present explains it, and even more; it must be viewed as an end as much as, and more than, a result." (Our brackets, bold, and color.)

"Our intellect has a right to consider the future abstractly from its habitual point of view, being itself an abstract view of the cause of its own being.

"It is true that the cause may then seem beyond our grasp. Already the finalist theory of life eludes all precise verification. What if we go beyond it in one of its directions? Here, in fact, after a necessary digression, we are back at the question which we regard as essential: can the insufficiency of mechanism be proved by facts? We said that if this demonstration is possible, it is on condition of frankly accepting the evolutionist hypothesis. We must now show that if mechanism is insufficient to account for evolution, the way of proving this insufficiency is not to stop at the classic conception of finality, still less to contract or attenuate it, but, on the contrary, to go further.

"Let us indicate at once the principle of our demonstration. We said of life that, from its origin, it is the continuation of one and the same impetus, divided into divergent lines of evolution. Something has grown, something has developed by a series of additions which have been so many creations. This very development has brought about a dissociation of tendencies which were unable to grow beyond a certain point without becoming mutually incompatible. Strictly speaking, there is nothing to prevent our imagining that the evolution of life might have taken place in one single individual by means of a series of transformations spread over thousands of ages. Or, instead of a single individual, any number might be supposed, succeeding each other in a unilinear series. In both cases evolution would have had, so to speak, one dimension only. But evolution has actually taken place through millions of individuals, on divergent lines, each ending at a crossing from which new paths radiate, and so on indefinitely."

(Our bold and color.)
54 "If our hypothesis is justified, if the essential causes working along these diverse roads are of psychological nature, they must keep something in common in spite of the divergence of their effects, as school-fellows long separated keep the same memories of boyhood. Roads may fork or by-ways be opened along which dissociated elements may evolve in an independent manner, but nevertheless it is in virtue of the primitive impetus of the whole that the movement of the parts continues. Something of the whole, therefore, must abide in the parts; and this common element will be evident to us in some way, perhaps by the presence of identical organs in very different organisms. Suppose, for an instant, that the mechanistic explanation is the true one: evolution must then have occurred through a series of accidents added to one another, each new accident being preserved by selection if it is advantageous to that sum of former advantageous accidents which the present form of the living being represents. What likelihood is there that, by two entirely different series of accidents being added together, two entirely different evolutions will arrive at similar results? The more two lines of evolution diverge, the less probability is there that accidental outer influences or accidental inner variations bring about the construction of the same apparatus upon them, especially if there was no trace of this apparatus at the moment of divergence. But such similarity of the two products would be natural, on the contrary, on a hypothesis like ours: even in the latest channel there would be something of the impulsion received at the source. Pure mechanism, then, would be reputable and finality, in the special sense in which we understand it, would be demonstrable in a certain aspect, if it could be proved that life may manufacture the like apparatus, by unlike means, on divergent lines of evolution; and the strength of the proof would be proportional both to the divergency between the lines of evolution thus chosen and to the complexity of the similar structures found in them. …thus chosen and to the complexity of the similar structures found in them.'"

(Our bold and color.)


In quantum terms, multiversal, compenetrating quantum cohesion running at Planck rates is Bergson's "primitive impetus of the whole."





We find this an extremely weak argument for/against both pure mechanism and finality. Rather, we choose William James' variety of evolute, radical empiricism using plural, quantal flux. Our problem with Bergson's argument here is that quantum reality offers many truths, many falsehoods, and many 'mu' outcomes. I.e., quantum reality is omnicomtextual. Quantum logicians refer many comtexts as "contrafactual definiteness." Quantum reality offers a distinct possibility, however remote, "that life may manufacture the like apparatus, by unlike means, on divergent lines of evolution" Consider, still, that quantum reality denies both radical mechanism and radical finalism. In radical mechanism's place quantum reality offers ensemble, quantal, "brief duration," stochastic determinism. In radical finality's place quantum reality offers Planck rate quantal finalisms (i.e., unending alpha-omega Planck times vis-à-vis classicism's one-beginning-Alpha for all time to one-ending-Omega for all time (unilogical, homogeneous time). Quantum reality's many finalities last only Planck times or fractions or multiples thereof. Its process is stochastic, not mechanistic.

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Doug Renselle
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©Quantonics, Inc., 2000-2028 Rev. 14Nov2007  PDR Created: 20Sep2000  PDR
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