(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis Bergson, some paraphrased.)
(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.)
|"If there is a phenomenon which
seems to be presented immediately to consciousness under the
Note (1): The Senses and the Intellect, 4th ed., (1894), p. 79.
Note (2): Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie, 2nd ed. (1880), Vol. i, p. 375.
(Our brackets, bold, color, violet bold italic problematics and violet bold problematics.)
Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number.
Our bold and color highlights follow a code:
|22||"Most of the authorities adhere
to this opinion, which would be the unanimous view of positive
science were it not
that several years ago Professor William James drew the attention
of physiologists to certain [experimental
investigation of] phenomena
which had been but little remarked, although they were very remarkable.
"When a paralytic strives to raise his useless limb, he certainly does not execute this movement,
Note (1): W. James, Le sentiment de 1'effort (Critique philosophique, 1880, Vol. ii,) [cf. Principles of Psychology, (1891), Vol. ii, chap. xxvi.]
Note (2): Functions of the Brain, 2nd ed. (1886), p. 386.
(Our brackets, bold, color, link and violet bold italic problematics.)
|23||"On a closer examination, however,
you will perceive that this sensation of effort coincides with
the fixation of the muscles of your chest, that you keep your
glottis closed and actively contract your respiratory muscles.
As soon as respiration resumes its normal course the consciousness
of effort vanishes, unless you really move your finger. These
facts already seemed to show that we are conscious, not of an expenditure of force,
but of the [quantum coherent] movement of the muscles which results
from it. The new feature in Professor James's
investigation is that he has verified the hypothesis in the case
of examples which seemed to contradict
it absolutely. Thus when the external rectus muscle of the right
eye is paralysed, the patient tries in vain to turn his eye towards
the right; yet objects seem to him to recede towards the right,
and since the act of volition
has produced no effect, it follows, said Helmholtz, (1) that he
is conscious of the effort of volition.
But, replies Professor James, no
account has been taken of what goes on in the other eye. This
remains covered during the experiments; nevertheless it moves
and there is not much
trouble in proving that it does. It is the movement of the left
eye, perceived by consciousness, which produces the sensation
of effort together with the impression that the objects perceived
by the right eye are moving. These and similar observations lead
Professor James to assert
that the feeling of effort
is centripetal and not
Note (1): Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik, 1st ed. (1867), pp. 600-601.
(Our brackets, bold, color, link, violet bold italic problematics and violet bold problematics.)
"We are not conscious of a force which we are supposed to launch upon our organism: our feeling of muscular energy at work "is a complex [quantum affective ensemble] afferent sensation, which comes from contracted muscles, stretched ligaments, compressed joints, an immobilized chest, a closed glottis, a knit brow, clenched jaws," in a word, from all the points of the periphery where the effort causes an alteration.
"It is not for us to take a side in the dispute. After all, the question with which we have to deal is not
"Try, for example, to clench the fist with increasing force. You will have the impression of a sensation of effort entirely localized in your hand and running up a scale of magnitudes."
(Our brackets, bold, color, link, and violet bold italic problematics.)
Again, here, it is we believe helpful to imagine a quanton analogous to this:
where actual_SON is you/us, and n¤nactual_SON represents y-our shared ~n¤nconceptual QVF c¤mplement. N¤nactual_SON is analogous Bergson's instinct compenetrating in a c¤mplementary manner, y-our actual_SONs.
|25||"In reality, what you experience
in your hand remains the same, but the sensation which
(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
What Bergson just accomplished so beautifully and so eloquently might slip past us were we n¤t students of Quantonics. When we generalize a human body classically, we see it as an ideal classical object. Bergson tells us, "No! No! No! A human body is an ensemble of qualitative affectors." In Quantonics we call it, "A quantum real quanton of quantons." Bravo! Bergson. Bergson intuits, instinctively, quantum reality.
"Yet the subject will imagine that he is conscious of a continual increase in the psychic force flowing into his arm. He will not recognize his mistake unless he is warned of it, so inclined is he to measure a given psychic state by the conscious movements which accompany it! From these facts and from many others of the same kind we believe we can deduce the following conclusion: our consciousness of an increase of muscular effort is reducible to the twofold perception of. a greater number of peripheral sensations, and of a qualitative change occurring in some of them.
"We are thus led to define the intensity of a superficial effort in the same way as that of a
(Our bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
Our Quantonic script shows this nicely:
"Exact point" is a classical delusion. In Einstein's relativity, which we find problematic in many ways, quantum time and space, and thus momentum, energy, temperature, et al., always form n¤ntrivial quantum c¤mplementary interrelationships! Locus is always, to some extent, uncertain. All quantum c¤mplementary interrelationships form quantons whose Static Value, as an apparent aggregate in actuality, manifests as a classical object/illusion. Really, they are qualitative Value:
just as Bergson has been explaining. Any human's consciousness, when trained in CTMs turns quantum real and c¤mplementary duration into classical state, locus, and lisr independence. From which any classicist may establish 'opposition,' thence 'contradiction,' thence Popperian 'falsifiability,' thence provisional 'scientific proof.' This is SOM's great deign to feign. This is all plainly and simply classical putative, 'tautologous' HyperBoole.