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Bibliography | Author's Preface |
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | ||||
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18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | Conclusion | Index |
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(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis Bergson, some paraphrased.) |
(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.) |
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"Perhaps the difficulty of
the latter problem is principally due to the fact that we are
unwilling to
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(Our bold, color, violet bold italic problematics and violet bold problematics.) Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number. Our bold and color highlights follow a code:
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33 |
"If the more intense sensation seems to us to contain the less intense, if it assumes for us, like the physical impression itself, the form of a magnitude, the reason probably is that it retains something of the physical impression to which it corresponds. And it will retain nothing of it if it is merely the conscious translation of a movement of molecules; for, just because this movement is translated into the sensation of pleasure or pain, it remains unconscious as molecular movement. "But it might be asked whether pleasure and pain, instead of expressing only what has just
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(Our bold and color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
It is just another 'form' of classical dichotomy to assume "past or present no longer depend on us." Actually, we know Bergson does n¤t agree with this view either, since one of his greatest, most famous memes is that of duration, which happens to be many quantons like and analogous these triples:
It is an enormous philosophical mistake to use SOM's knife to sever time as dichon(past, present), dichon(present, future), and dichon(past, future). We show above in our bullet list a new way of think-king about quantons. If you intuited what we are about to say, then you are a superb student of Quantonics! Congratulations! Our fourth comjugate bullet probably is a good one to continue our exegeses. We can use some other present participle 'infinitive' triples to show what we intend:
Latter we simply show as: quanton(n¤nactuality,actuality) So, you may now see how our scripted comma without any space sort of melts away and then reemerges as it should in its role of representing all animate quantum c¤mplementary included-middlings, n¤t classically static comma space SOM walls. And, you can see how those other bullets above may be shown as simple quantons! Quantum included-middlings are one of nature's greatest miracles (though a greater one is fermionic wobble!). Without quantum included-middlings, e.g., oxidation of hydrogen could not emerse a liquid (water) from two gases. All other complex molecules in nature depend upon quantum included-middlings for their actualization in reality! As Pirsig might say, "That comma_no_space is where (almost) ALL the (least) actions are!" Doug - 23Feb2002. |
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34 |
"If pleasure and pain make their appearance in certain privileged beings, it is probably to call forth a resistance to the automatic reaction which would have taken place: either sensation has nothing to do, or it is nascent freedom. But how would it enable us to resist the reaction which is in preparation if it did not acquaint us with the nature of the latter by some definite sign? And what can this sign be except the sketching, and, as it were, the prefiguring of the future automatic movements in the very midst of the sensation which is being experienced? The affective state must then correspond not merely to the physical disturbances, movements or phenomena which have taken place, but also, and especially, to those which are in preparation, those which are getting ready to be. "It is certainly not obvious at first sight how this hypothesis simplifies the problem. For we are
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(Our bold and color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
Bergson is now describing quantum phenomena. From a classical perspective reality is objective and causal. He, without saying explicitly such, tells us that consciousness and 'future' reaction are not classically causal, rather they are locally quantum coherent. His scenario is very similar Pirsig's hot stove example. Causality requires temporal latency. Quantum conscious coherence, absent temporal latency, from a classical perspective, appears to "anticipate a future."
His use of "necessarily unconscious" implies to us a classical perspective of a quantum coherent quanton(unconsciousness,consciousness). |
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35 |
"But the automatic [quantum coherent] movements which tend to follow the stimulus as its natural outcome are likely to be conscious as movements: or else the sensation itself, whose function is to invite us to choose between this automatic reaction and other possible movements, would be of no avail. The intensity of affective sensations might thus be nothing more than our consciousness of the involuntary movements which are being begun and outlined, so to speak, within these states, and which would have gone on in their own way if nature had made us automata instead of conscious beings. "If such be the case, we shall not compare a pain of increasing intensity to a note which grows
Note (1): L'homme et l'intelligence, p. 36. |
(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.
Richet's observation fits what we know of quantum reality. A double-slit experiment run with many photons will exhibit a wide-area interference pattern. a double-slit experiment run with temporally separated photons will show localized 'pain' initially while spreading to generalized 'pain' as photons gradually accumulate, eventually producing a wide-area pattern like that described just above. |
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36 |
"And he concludes by saying that "the pain spreads in proportion as it is more intense." (1) We should rather reverse the sentence, and define the intensity of the pain by the very number and extent of the parts of the body which sympathize with it and react, and whose reactions are perceived by consciousness. To convince ourselves of this, it will be enough to read the remarkable description of disgust given by the same author: "If the stimulus is slight there may be neither nausea nor vomiting. . . . If the stimulus is stronger, instead of being confined to the pneumo-gastric nerve, it spreads and affects almost the whole organic system. The face turns pale, the smooth muscles of the skin contract, the skin is covered with a cold perspiration, the heart stops beating: in a word there is a general organic disturbance following the stimulation of the medulla oblongata, and this disturbance is the supreme expression of disgust." (2) But is it nothing more than its expression? In what will the general sensation of disgust consist, if not in the sum of these elementary sensations? And what can we understand here by increasing intensity, if it is not the constantly increasing number of sensations which join in with the sensations already experienced?" Note (1): Ibid. p. 37. Note (2): Ibid. p. 43. |
(Our brackets, bold and color.)
And Bergson, of course, is correct. Quantum intensity is n¤t analytic, n¤t proportional, as careful observation of our incremental photon double-slit experiment will show. It may be helpful to readers, now CeodE 2009-2010, to see our more recent exegeses of both intensity and quantum~intensity. Doug - 15Dec2009.
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37 |
"Darwin has drawn a striking picture of the reactions following a pain which becomes more and more acute. "Great pain urges all animals . . . to make the most violent and diversified efforts to escape from the cause of suffering. . . . With men the mouth may be closely compressed, or more commonly the lips are retracted with the teeth clenched or ground together. . . . The eyes stare wildly . . . or the brows are heavily contracted. Perspiration bathes the body. . . . The circulation and respiration are much affected." (1) Now, is it not by this very contraction of the muscles affected that we measure the intensity, of a pain? Analyse your idea of any suffering which you call extreme: do you not mean that it is unbearable, that is to say, that it urges the organism to a thousand different actions in order to escape from it? I can picture to myself a nerve transmitting a pain which is independent of all automatic reaction; and I can equally understand that stronger or weaker stimulations influence this nerve differently. But I do not see how these differences of sensation would be interpreted by our consciousness as differences of quantity unless we connected them with the reactions which usually accompany them', and which are more or less extended and more or less important." "Without these subsequent reactions, the intensity of the pain would be a quality, and not a magnitude. Note (1): The Expression ot the Emotions. 1st ed., pp. 72, 69, 70. |
(Our bold, color, violet bold italic problematics and violet bold problematics.)
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38 | "We have hardly any other means
of comparing several pleasures with one another. What
do
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(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
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