Progress statement - 13-14Jul2005...
Our bold and color highlights follow a code:
We want to notify our readers of some Quantonics issues which arise from our research of Bohm's work.
Little of our commentary below has been QELRed. Please assume that when Doug uses 'not,' in quantum comtexts, he intends quantum~n¤t. When Doug uses 'con,' ..., he intends quantum~com. And so on... Doug seldom uses 'the' and when he does it should appear italicized as the.
We extend our list of references to include: The Essential David Bohm edited by Lee Nichol 2003, Unfolding Meaning by David Bohm 1985, Science Order and Creativity by David Bohm and F. David Peat, and Quantum Mechanics and Experience by David Z. Albert 1992.
Since our first exposure to David Bohm some 5-10 years ago in his Quantum Theory 1951, we have known that his approach suffers several major issues which are at odds with Quantonics, including:
These issues also disagree with Bohr's Copenhagen I (the orthodox) quantum theory.
However, and quite dyslexically to us, Bohm says that quantum reality is nonmechanical. Too, he says that quantum reality is affective, qualitative and shares reciprocal relations. Latter sounds much like Quantonics' coobsfection and included~middle. If you read carefully about Bohm's reciprocal relations you may have a feeling much like what we encountered reading Dr. Irving Stein's The Concept of Object as the Foundation of Physics 1993, regarding mandatory separability twixt Stein's nonspace and space.
So this effort, this QQA on Bohmian notions of reality as holographic, looks like it has many bumps along our pathway.
We plan to document those bumps here allowing interested readers
to follow our progress. We'll use this
as living text commentary on that progress leading
to our QQA document itself. Eventually, we will move this text
to a separate linkable web page.
Bohm blames mechanics for science's problems and failures at 20th century's ending. Too, he blames mechanical science for occidental society's ills. But, so far, he appears not to ask, "What is mechanics' fount and grail?" [In Quantonics we answer, "Dialectic!"]
Our next readings are from Lee Nichol's recent text.
What we find in Bohm's papers from about 1950-1960 is a man who understands evils of mechanical analysis. But he finds himself stuck in a place of inadequate linguistics to express what he needs to say. As a result, he warbles endlessly in QELP. Still, he makes his point: We must move beyond classical mechanics, and sooner is better. With that we can wholly agree. Mechanics is dead, passé, square and eminently conservative and thus stuck. Mechanics is an abyss of stayssyss!
This is why we still find Bohm interesting and worthy of our further efforts to attempt to understand his holomovement notions.
Something about Bohm keeps tugging on us to wade through his classical language and pan his transcendental nuggets.
Bohm essentially shows us that nature is outside any sentient ability for finite mechanical description let alone finite definition by classical 'laws.' We agree.
Mechanics is not up to, capable of, performing its assigned scientific endeavors of proving what is 'true' about reality. Mechanics, indeed, is scientifically inept. Again, we agree.
But should science be about that which is true? How can it be that if truth is an agent of its own change? Quantum reality is change, absolute change:
Worse, says Bohm, absolute mechanical truth permits only a single context! [In Quantonics, we call this OGT in OGC.] One mechanical context fits all. But, "Oh! My god!" Quantum reality is multicontextual, an absolute heterogeneity of fluxing and evolving contextings. Mechanics fails again! Unsubtly, too!!
Allow us to quote Julian Jaynes' analogy of what we have just said, here:
"Applied to the world as representative of all the world, facts become superstitions."
Added 27Oct2005 - Doug.
For an interesting life experience, read Old Testament's Amos (OT; b.c. 792-740), thence Ecclesiastes (OT; as late as b.c. 160). Then ask yourself, "What happened to human consciousness in those 600-700 intervening years?" Jaynes uses this exemplar to illustrate empirically what his book title is about. Jaynes shows how dialectic is even more engrained in humanity than we thought. Awesome! What we actually see though, is an evolutionary process of pre bicameral mind to bicameral mind to Aristotelianism to rationalism... In Quantonics, we are showing our readers that evolution's next evolutionary step appears to be quantum thinking, i.e., quantum mind...what we refer as quantum stage and memeotize as quanton whose comma~nospace issi a corpus callostic quantum copulum. Our quote of Jaynes above is an indictment of dialectical rationalism akin Quantonics own.
Readers, please be aware that Jaynes appears to believe in classical origins and classical beginnings. Our research of and in quantum memes of and in reality refutes such beliefs. One of our best examples is von Neumann's attempts to find "the locus" of quantum "special (measurement) events." He didn't! Quantum reality teaches us that he nor anyone can! So Jaynes was adhering some pretty silly classical notions, in our view. Even so, Jaynes, like so many others who have crept under our lenses, offers some very quantum memes; at least we can, on our quantum stagings, hermeneut and heurist them so. Most of Jaynes' and von Neumann's troubles arise from their acculturation, education, training and beliefs in antique classical notions: specifically notions whose bases of reason lie in Attic dialectic. It should be apparent to you that Bohm, less so, suffers similar issues. Doug does too, yet less, we believe.
Regardless, Jaynes is brilliant! His work is stimulating. We feel ken~like stimulation reading Ho, Baggott, Pirsig, Geertz, Kuhn, Bentov, Bohm, d'Espagnat, Dirac, Bergson, James, et al., - Doug.
Mechanical theories simply do not and cannot portray nature's real and vast qualitative essences. And, indeed, mechanical 'science' understands that and doesn't even try, but makes an enormous error of judgment, which in Quantonics we call 'science's' great deign to feign, in claiming that its theories depict nature's truths as 'scientific' 'law.' Mechanical 'science' resorts, as a supremely political act, to lying! In that sense, mechanical 'science' is a religion, period: a religion, naught more. Mechanical 'science' has become a great Babel of empirical dogmatic bogosity based upon Parmenidian, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Newtonian, et al., lies. Our "et al." there includes an enormous list of mechanically 'scientific' failures. Catholicism carried this same mechanical Babel extremely effectively into society borne of pure Aristotelian Thomism. We suffer those consequences today in countless evil manifestations.
Bohm writes, "...nature has an infinity of...significant qualities..." which mechanical theories cannot even begin to mechanically lock up in 'laws.' How does one legally lock up that which is absolute change? Society! Society claims not only can it do that, but it has a 'legal' right to do that. A tell: modern society is mechanical. Ssshhhh! Don't tell anyone! Hush!
To read Bohm's own words, see his 1957 The Qualitative Infinity of Nature. Nichols' 2003 book The Essential David Bohm starts off with that paper.
Bohm writes that mechanical theories (appear to) work when we constrain their context enough. What constrains any mechanical context? Assumptions about that context and axioms which form any theories manufactured in and for that context. Einstein to Heisenberg: "Only the theory determines what one can observe."But, upon what basis (bases) are these assumptions made, first of all, and secondly are those bases valid?
Bohm admits that scientists, even though they do, should not try to make a theory manufactured for one context work in a different context. Why shouldn't we apply theories to 'di' fferent contexts? When we build a theory, classically, mechanically, we literally objectify a local context. Our objectification of said context is carefully done in 'scientific' ways to intentionally ignore 'insignificant' subjective phenomena in that context, or to assume that problematic subjective phenomena may safely be objectified. Regardless, ignoring subjective phenomena is dangerous (e.g., Columbia, Challenger, December 2004 tsunami, Shoemaker Levy, etc.)
And as Bruno de Finetti says, "We are sometimes led to make a judgment which has a purely subjective meaning, and this is perfectly legitimate; but if one seeks to replace it afterward by something objective, one does not make progress, but only an error." Third paragraph of Chapter VI, 'Observation and Thought,' of his paper, Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources, Translated by Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., and published in Studies in Subjective Probability, Wiley, 1964.
Using that insight we can fathom how moving a theory manufactured for one context to another context might be objectifying, even ignoring, subjectives in said new context which might select harmful outcomes. In such a case said theory fails, radically and mechanically and finally, in 'not' handling 'classical unknowns.' For a superb recent exemplar of what we intend here see NSF contract to mechanically encode neurons. (Student astutes and adepts should fully grasp that 'mechanical theories' are intrinsically incapable of handling subjectives whether 'known' or 'unknown.' Doug - 14Jul2005.)
Kurt Gödel went on to show (1931) that no amount of mechanical-theory-patching can fix such a theory to handle even a minority of subjective unknowns. Those of you who have spent beau coup bucks on software applications which never 'worked' may now be capable of assessing retrospectively, why. But even neurons from a rat brain would do something and even have a modicum of a chance of saving, at least attenuating, radical failure. (Doug always thinks of Macro$lopt's blue screens when words like this arise on his quantum stagings...but now we have luscious Macintoshes... Nowadays we just pour s'more gravy on 'dem blue screen sumbitches. Actually, we just use them to play EZBridge...)
But upon what basis are 'scientific' mechanical assumptions made? That reality is dialectical.
Bohm writes as though he does not fathom what we just wrote. He is blaming mechanics for our problems without seeing what evil lies under mechanics as invalid assumptions used to manufacture theoretical axioms.
We interpret what Bohm says, that when he claims mechanics fail in general, it is due mechanics' dialectical foundations. We do not believe that Bohm saw dialectic as a deeper problem under classical mechanics' foundations. But Quantonics has shown vividly and vigorously that it is!
So Bohm concludes, and for us this is a huge problem for us in accepting his thing-king as high value, that we can keep mechanics as a tiny subset of our tools in quantum reality. We see this as a tentative strategy in moving from classical to quantum, but not good for our medium term goals. Doug has, himself, said similar memes re: SOM and MoQ on this issue, but he always keeps in abeyance any memes of SOM as utile medium-to-long term. Why? Dialectic is just wr¤ng, period! Dialectic is evil! Bohm recognizes this subliminally in his, paraphrased by Nichol, "And currently, the assumptions of mechanism continue to be tacitly embraced by each of us, made only stronger by the further assumption that we have no metaphysical assumptions that we are more or less seeing reality 'as it is...' In the social domain, these nested assumptions virtually assure conflict and fragmentation, because they tie us to existential identifications as absolutes rather than as functional categories [in place of functional categories, we would have said, "wave functions"]. Self, family, nation, and ideology become restrictions and distortions, rather than mem[e]branes which connect us to larger wholes." Page 5, The Essential David Bohm, by Lee Nichol. Our brackets. Please note our use of a quantized 'o' in wr¤ng above, a partial QELR.
On page 15, Bohm writes, "Not only can nothing of real value for scientific work be lost if we adopt the notion of the qualitative infinity of nature in the specific form that has been described here, but on the contrary, much can be gained by doing this. For, first of all, we can thereby free scientific research from irrelevant restrictions which tend to result from (and which have in fact so often actually resulted from) the supposition that a particular set of general properties, qualities, and laws must be the correct ones to use in all possible contexts and conditions and to all possible degrees of approximation. Secondly, we are led to a concept of the nature of things which is in complete accord with the most basic and essential characteristic of the scientific method; i.e. the requirement of continual probing, criticizing and testing of every feature of every theory, no matter how fundamental that theory may seem to be. For this view explains the necessity for doing scientific research in just this way and in no other way, since, if there is no end to the qualities in nature, there can be no end to our need to probe and test all features of all of its laws." Ibid. (All ibids in this QION research segment shall refer to Nichol's text. Our bold colors.)
What a noble effort!
Bohm is trying his level best to save mechanistic science from its imminent demise. But in order to do so, mechanics has to admit that reality is mostly qualitative. Do you really believe that can happen? Implicit, and he says this prior, in his message here is that science can find n¤ final theory, n¤ GUT and n¤ TOE. Science is relegated by nature's qualitative infinity to a never ending search and a relentless absence of any 'mechanistic understanding' of nature.
Bohm has just explained why Quantonics is so important. We do n¤t 'need' mechanistic CTMs anymore! We nææd qualitative QTMs, NOWings!!!
Every ill that we have found so far in what Bohm says needs fixing in mechanistic science can be and is alleviated in Quantonics.
Doug - 13-14Jul2005.
Next progress statement - 15-16Jul2005...
Devout readers of Quantonics and Pirsig's works have some depth of standingunder what we mean when we say "stindyanicity." Pirsig has taught us well that reality is both Static Quality (SQ) and Dynamic Quality (DQ). Quantonics has further taught us well that reality is quanton(DQ,SQ). Now it is clear, at least to students of Quantonics, that our quanton shows an included~middle. Classicists do 'not' see, 'nor' fathom, our quantum~included~middle. Instead they see a, Bohmian 'mechanistic,' dichon(DQ, SQ). That dichon shows classical mechanics' assumption of an excluded-middle, i.e., DQ is separate and separable (via comma-space knife cut) from SQ. Our quanton instead, and we believe better, shows DQ is in SQ and SQ is in DQ. Colloquially, and qualitatively, "We are in It and It is in us."
Bohm offers his version. It appears, yet radically mechanical, unlike Pirsig's and Quantonics' versions, though Pirsig, similar Irving Stein [macrocosmic dichon(nonspace, space)] and Henri Louis Bergson, appears to envision a macrocosmic dichon(DQ, SQ). See our paper on Pirsigean vis-à-vis Bergsonian Perspectives.
"There is, however, one general statement that can be made on this point about the inexhaustible diversity of things that may exist in the universe; namely, that they must have some degree of autonomy and stability in their modes of being. Now, thus far, we have always found that such autonomy exists.8 Indeed, if it did not exist, then we would not be able to apply the concept of a "thing" and there would then be no way even to formulate any laws of nature. For how can there be an object, entity, process, quality, property, system, level, or whatever other thing one cares to mention, unless such a thing has some degree of stability and autonomy in its mode of existence, which enables it to preserve its own identity for some time, and which enables it to be defined at least well enough to permit it to be distinguished from other things? If such relatively and approximately autonomous things did not exist, then laws would lose their essential significance..." Ibid. Page 20.
8 "The autonomy may have many origins; e.g., the falling of the propagation of influences of one thing on another with an increase of separation between them, the decay of such influence with the passage of time, electrical screening, the existence of thresholds, such that influences which are too weak to surpass these thresholds produce no significant effects; the fact that individual constituents of an object (such as atoms) are too small to have an appreciable effect on the object as a whole, while collectively there is considerable independence of motions of the constituents leading to cancellation of chance fluctuations. Many other such sources of autonomy exist, and doubtless more will be discovered in the future." Bohm footnote. Ibid. Page 37.
Our student adepts, at this stage of our Bohm research, would ask, "Doug, how can we simply deal with classical thing-king like this?"
This one is, at least from Doug's quantum~perspectives, "Easy!" What do objects require, classically? They require lisr, stoppability (see our Zeno paper), and measurability (AKA scalarbation). Trouble is, quantum ræhlihty issi n¤nlisr, unstoppable, and state-ically immeasurable...i.e., 'mechanistically' immeasurable.
Allow us a luxury of using our bold color highlights above to discuss Bohm on Autonomy.
We agree with his apparently axiomatic, "they must have some degree of autonomy and stability in their modes of being." When we read this wearing our QTM hats, Bohm appears to be making an included~middle BAWAM(autonomy,stability). But compare this to Mae-wan Ho's BAWAM(autonomy,coherence). Compare it to Quantonics' stindyanicity. When you do that, you may commence a sense that Bohm is really talking about 'rocks' as classical objects.
Sure enough, his "such autonomy exists.8 Indeed, if it did not exist, then we would not be able to apply the concept of a "thing" and there would then be no way even to formulate any laws of nature" bespeaks our sense and con(m)cern. This red text shows Bohm as a 'consummate objectivist,' which demands being a 'consummate mechanic.' But he is deriding and immersing mechanics while tending its anchorage. To us, this appears as mental dyslexia, yet that is a tell of quantum reality, isn't it? Bumpy, to a fault. We ask you to struggle with our views, so we better respect Dr. Bohm and struggle with his...you may observe that happenings with us just nowings.
Bohm, like Mitch, asks quite awesome questions, like "how can there be an object, entity, process, quality, property, system, level, or whatever other thing one cares to mention, unless such a thing has some degree of stability and autonomy in its mode of existence, which enables it to preserve its own identity for some time, and which enables it to be defined at least well enough to permit it to be distinguished from other things?" Our answer is that objects, mechanical objects, cann¤t do what he asks. Quantum reality to our rescue: quantons can! But they require that we depart mechanicity, mentally, with Bergson's eloquent disclosure of two classical mechanical delusions which Bohm, cursorily, appears to be harboring:
Bohm's qualifying "If such relatively and approximately autonomous things did not exist, then laws would lose their essential significance..." offers his own, in our view, anticipation and heuristic expectation for a more Quantonic reality, though we doubt that is what he intended. Classical 'laws' in our view are dialectically bogus, intellectually dishonest! For us, they have "los[t] their essential significance..." Doug - 15Jul2005.
Aside on confusing quantum~adiabaticity with classical 'stability:'
First, please read Doug's details on both fermionic atomic adiabaticity and absence of fermionic ensemble adiabaticity, simply atoms are zeroentropy~adiabatic but their ensembles are posentropically n¤n~adiabatic.
By themselves, quantumly per intera, protons, electrons, and photons (more generally phoxons) are adiabatic. Another way to say that is they are really in perpetual motion. Their self flux and its iso~complementationings never stop. Classicists call that "stability." But is anything which has unstoppable and mutable self flux, "stable?" Our quantum view is "N¤!" Adiabatic, "Yes!" Classically 'stable,' "N¤!"
If protons, electrons, and photons were classically 'stable,' could they interrelate chemically? This is what Bergson meant when he said "...classical views of reality as stable concrete are deluded." Read Doug's reviews of Bergson's Creative Evolution, Time and Free Will, and An Introduction to Metaphysics.
Practicing QTMs requires moving from CTMs to novel means of quantum~thinkqing. Part of that quantum~individual~due~diligence is understanding quantum~cohera and ~entropa.
A great exemplar of classical confusion -- adiabaticity as stability -- is how Einstein treated all energies as posentropic. (All classical physicists do this. LOL!) He didn't understand what Doug writes just above. He believed that J. C. Maxwell's second 'law' of thermodynamics is correct. It isn't! It is bogus! Recall that Bill Sidis understood what Doug is writing now; he understood it nearly 100 years ago. Socialists called Sidis, "The April Fool."
Doug - 12Sep2009.
End aside on confusing quantum~adiabaticity with classical 'stability.'
In his footnote 8 Bohm expresses a nearly total mechanical
consepctive of autonomy. Too, he appears to agree with
that atomic and subatomic microcosmic vagaries "are ironed
out in reality's macrocosm."
Bohm, in his 'worldview' actually anticipates Quantonics! To our great delight, while in his deliberations of classical mechanics' incapabilities, he writes, "Thus, we may be led to a theory in which appears a much closer integration of substructure and background into a well-knit whole than is characteristic of current theories." Ibid, page 19. Bohm, if anything, is prescient! And his ideas keep tugging, and we keep panning...
Doug - 15-16Jul2005.
Next progress statement - 17-18Jul2005...
Bohm starts out his next section, 'Chance and Necessary Causal Connections,' showing us, again, even though his section title shows otherwise, that he appears to understand essences of quantum reality.
"First of all, we point out that if there are an unlimited number of kinds of things in nature, no system of purely determinate law can ever attain a perfect validity. For every such system works only with a finite number of kinds of things, and thus necessarily leaves out of account an infinity of factors, both in the substructure of the basic entities entering into the system of law in question and in the general environment in which these entities exist. And since these factors possess some degree of autonomy, one may conclude that the things that are left out of any such system of theory are in general undergoing some kind of a random fluctuation. Hence, the determinations of any purely causal theory are always subject to random disturbances, arising from chance fluctuations in entities, existing outside the context treated by the theory in question. It thus becomes clear why chance [i.e., quantum uncertainty] is an essential aspect of any real process and why any particular set of causal laws will provide only a partial and one-sided treatment of this process, which has to be corrected by taking chance [i.e., quantum uncertainty] into account." Ibid, page 21. We left out footnote 9, a ref. to one of Bohm's textbooks. Our brackets.
You may be able to grasp, here in this quoted text, why we revere Bohm so highly. In ~1950, he was simply far ahead of most of his peers in physics. And, mostly, he was ridiculed for it. Having said that, Bohm still harbored several, in our way of thinking, disabling classical notions.
Bohm's "if there are an unlimited number of kinds of things in nature, no system of purely determinate law can ever attain a perfect validity" explains why monism reigned supreme for over two millennia. Pluralism and heterogeneity break classical mechanistic 'laws.' It turns out that, as Heraclitus surmised, dialectical laws are only "simple toys" when we endeavor any attempts to describe reality.
His "since these factors possess some degree of autonomy, one may conclude that the things that are left out of any such system of theory are in general undergoing some kind of a random fluctuation" admits to what we call "quantum essence:" flux!
What pragma do Quantonics and its quantons offer in that regard? We put flux back. What does Pirsig's MoQ do? MoQ puts DQ back! Bohm doesn't say so, but is it apparent that his "random fluctuation" hides? Bohm's "left out" flux is nonapparent. In Quantonics, we cannot 'leave anything out.' Why? See our point, line, and circle QELRs and focus on our language re: 'missing.' Ditto Quantonics' n¤nactuality (isoflux) and Pirsig's DQ. Does Bohm put "random fluctuation[s]" back? Well see...
Classical mechanical quantum theory injects Bohm's "random fluctuation" into classical mechanics using Planck's 'h' and 'h.' As Dirac has shown us, to 'mechanically' return mechanical quantum theory to mechanical classical theory, all we have to do is zero Planck's constant. (Students should note that in Quantonics we view h as a radius 'vector' which is intrinsically animate and 'rotating' [classical problematics with language here; quantum flux is n¤ntransverse; Bohm deals with this issue using 'random;' see Dr. Matthew R. Watkin's Number Theory and Physics Archive and look for his critical strip explorer there which animate graphically shows i as an 'h' fecundulator] relentlessly, which in Quantonics' sense says 'h' represents both flux and isoflux.)
Bohm uses a phrase, 'causal interconnectedness.' Bohm appears to retain classical causality in his rendition of quantum reality. Students realize, in Quantonics, we do not! But, as before, Bohm shows us he understands issues involved and he writes along lines of our What is Wrong with Probability as Value? re: an insurance exemplar.
"Consider, for example, the case of insurance statistics. Here, one is able to make approximate [actually, quantum uncertain] predictions concerning the mean lifetime of an individual in a given group (e.g. one of definite age, height, weight, etc.) without the need to go into a detailed investigation of the multitudes of complex factors that contribute to the life or death of each individual in this group. This is possible only because the factors responsible for the death of any individual are extremely manifold and diverse, and because they tend to work more or less independently in such a way as to lead to regular statistical laws. But the assumptions underlying the use of these statistical laws are not always true. Thus, in the case of an epidemic or a war, the systematic interconnection between the cause of death of different individuals grows so strong that statistical preconditions of any kind become practically impossible. To apply the laws of chance uncritically, by ignoring the possibility of corrections due to causal interconnections that may be unimportant in some conditions but crucially important in others, is therefore just as capable of leading to erroneous results as is the uncritical application of causal laws, in which one ignores the corrections that may be due to the effects of chance fluctuations." Ibid, page 22. Our bold color.
Now ponder modern 'science,' especially envirnomental 'scientists' on global warming in light of what Bohm just wrote.
Too, note how those insurance 'laws' themselves are evolving to adapt to increasing human longevity, etc., which itself is a tell of quantum real evolution.
Now if insurance companies were to start viewing their insurables as quantum wave functions...and start 'calculating' their actuarial wave functions on quantum computers... And if meteorologists were to start viewing Earth's weather as quantum wave functions...and start...
You may fathom Quantonics' New (N¤vel) Way of Thinking...and then again...
Bohm wraps up by saying, "Neither causal laws nor laws of chance can ever be perfectly correct, because each inevitably leaves out some aspect of what is happening in broader contexts." But natural quantum qubits do n¤t leave out...
Doug - 17-18Jul2005.
Bohm is teaching us how to share our omniffering linguistics, i.e., his vis-à-vis Quantonics' in light of n¤vel philosophical appellations. We want to share a few apparent ones here, one of which we previously averred:
|the qualitative infinity of nature||quantum|
|reciprocal relationship, interconnection, affected background and substructure||coobsfection, included~middle, affectation|
Bohm continues with his concerns, re: autonomy. H5W is autonomy? Why does he care? So that 'scientists' can assess when 'science' has a chance of working. If some stuff in reality is ideally autonomous (e.g., "rocks"), then science is viable. However, that stuff in reality which is less autonomous (e.g., waves AKA evolving "probability distributionings") may n¤t be objectified by 'scientific laws.'
On page 23 he tells us that 'scientifically' macrocosm is essentially autonomous microcosm, especially 'mechanical' interactions at macro level have small effects on micro level. Of course this is how one justifies 'classical mechanics' as the 'scientific' tool to use only when one is working at a macroscopic level. This is just and simply bogus Bobbie Streisand bat-scatified 2500+ year-old coprolytic classical legacy: CTM!
Quantum wave functions and their ensembles' affectations coinside and compenetrate across all 'levels' of reality! They are n¤t any more or less autonomous at a macro than at a micro level. Material reality viewed objectively and dialectically only makes it appear so. Size matters classically regarding macroscopic material autonomy. It doesn't matter quantumly. Flux is crux, n¤t amplitude! What is one of our biggest quantum tells? Evolution! Evolution scales and with it quantum uncertainty! Using Bohm's language "background and substructural" changes are c¤~affecting our macrocosm and con(m)versely. We can use our quantonic script to show this:
"For example, in the case of the relationship between the large scale level and the atomic level, we find that under conditions that are usually met and in most of the contexts that have thus far been treated in research in physics, the effect of the atomic motions on the laws of the large-scale level is much more important than the effects of the large-scale level on the laws of the atomic motions." Ibid., page 25.
If that is so, why do 'scientists' focus their attentions on atomic research? Why not just forget about the atomic level and focus on substantial material objects at a macro level? That would take us back to Newton, at least.
Bohm has already shown us that 'mechanics' do not work, in general, since reality is n¤t mechanical. Why then is he arguing for a 'mechanical dichotomy' twixt macro and micro? He is seeking a means of showing us what he means by n¤n mechanical autonomy, or at least that is what we noodle here.
You see, classical autonomy has to be EOOO: either autonomy or 'not' autonomy. Bohm is attempting to show us, using his 1950s jargon, that autonomy is QLOs. Let's use you as an example. At any given moment you have both more and less autonomy in evolving 'reciprocal [inter]relationships' with all of y~our evolving complements, and these may be expressed as animate EIMA wave functions AKA QLOs.
Bohm is mitigating dialectical autonomy, mechanical autonomy, while attempting to (w)holisitically 'reciprocal relationship' retain it in his Bohmian natural qualitative infinity, in our opinion.
We like what Bohm is attempting here due its import for quantum individualism as Mae-wan Hoesque quanton(autonomy,coherence). We dislike his mechanical tenor.
Bohm's extraordinary genius re erupts, though, as he tells us autonomies are everywhere under widely variegated yet coherent 'conditions,' both all macro while and many micro. Why do we say "genius?" Are we qualified to call Bohm a "genius?" Only on bases that he appears to us to see quantum reality much as we see quantum reality and almost n¤ one else sees quantum reality that one unique way(ings) of unlimited animate EIMA recursive sorso and recapitulative heuristics. But Doug, "How do classicists see it 'di' fferently?"
Do you recall Mitch's Question Number Three from our June, 2005 TQS News? That's how classicists see It 'di' fferently. A classicist would say "There is only autonomy in the macrocosm!" and just as importantly and classically 'di' fferently, "There is only quantum uncertainty in the microcosm." Classical EOOO vis-à-vis quantum BAWAM. Genius 'omni' stinguishes classical and quantum. Quantum genius realizes that "...indeterminacy is the principal feature of intelligence." (quote from Paul Pietsch; and a key enabler of nonmechanical quantum AI)
"We see, then, that the existence of reciprocal relationships of things implies that each "thing" existing in nature makes some contribution to what the universe as a whole is, a contribution that cannot be reduced completely, perfectly, and unconditionally, to the effects of any specific set or sets of other things with which it is in reciprocal interconnection. And, vice versa, this also means evidently that no given thing can have a complete autonomy in its mode of being, since its basic characteristics must depend on its relationships with other things. The notion of a thing is thus seen to be an abstraction, in which it is conceptually separated from its infinite background and substructure. Actually, however, a thing does not and could not exist apart from the context from which it has thus been conceptually abstracted. And therefore the world is not made by putting together the various "things" in it, but, rather, these things are only approximately what we find on analysis in certain contexts and under suitable conditions." Ibid., pages 25-6.
Here, Bohm captures essence. Use this paragraph to explain to y~our children how our world IS. Bohm explains H5W our world is n¤nmechanical, n¤nanalytical, etc.
That paragraph begs Quantonics, and we are learning whether it begs a quantum real holomovement. Can anyone read that paragraph without inferring an included~middle? Can anyone read that paragraph without feeling strong urgings to refute Aristotle, now and finally?
But H5W quantum~nonactuality? We'll see...
Doug - 19-20Jul2005.
FYE, we are adding Bohm's 1957 Causality & Chance in Modern Physics, to our list of holomovement references.
This is our last status on Bohm's 1957 paper, The Qualitative Infinity of Nature.
Our next status report shall commence with his 1967 paper Physics and Perception.
Bohm offers at least four statements which we interpret as axiomatic in Quantonics:
Some of this is familiar to students of Quantonics, only we have said it in other ways and using QELR. We would like to say at this juncture, that if we QELRed this entire paper, we and you probably would find Bohm and Quantonics in agreement with few exceptions, which we have mentioned in our status reports previously. If you do your own QELR of Bohm's paper we believe you will con(m)cur that assessment. In retrospect, Quantonics in our own QTM way, has just refined, modernized, colloquialized and brought closer to a lay level Bohm's own words. It is a great joy for us to feel such affine registration with one of Earth's most prescient theoreticians.
Those four apparent-axiomatics are a longer way of saying Bergson's (we posit Bergson's negats here): a) reality is animate, and b) objects in reality depend upon one another for their existence.
Our biggest gripes re: Bohm's view, so far, are these (in order which Dougings' quantum stagings appraised them):
Bohm, using our gripes, comes remarkably close to what we try to teach in quantonics (but) while using mostly classical tools. Overall, our biggest gripe is that those tools are problematic in any n¤nmechanical quantum realm.
Doug - 21-22Jul2005.
What we have researched so far is Chapter 1 of Nichol's The Essential David Bohm text. Now we are ready to move on to Chapter 2, a 1967 Bohm paper entitled, 'Physics and Perception.' Nichol's precis of this paper is superb. Read it!
Nichol tells us that Bohm's paper shown in Chapter 1 essentially described a physical, external world. Now Bohm moves into mind and commences (similar our work in tapping reserve energy), with help of Piaget, developing a quasi included-middle of internal mind and external physical reality. Of course, we like the included meme but we dislike any classical notions of dichon(external, internal). We need to offer a note here on Jean Piaget. He was a Swiss child psychologist. He very carefully studied children and found that they don't grasp essentials of dialectic and logic, but have to be carefully trained to be 'capable' of doing that. Simply, we take our children's natural intuitions of a fluxing quantum reality and map then onto a socially contrived mechanical view of reality. "We have to be carefully taught."
Doug needs to share his deeply personal and emotional feelings about that. In Doug's viewings, classical (vis-à-vis quantum) society turns quantum beings into formal saserp robots. It is an evil whose only comparison we have in a dialectical conspective is Satan he-rself! Sadness felt here, given our awareness of this societal detritus being jammed into our youngster's minds is outside of words' abilities to fathom...
A feeble and only tentative cure? We watch nature, he-r creatures, he-r works, he-r processes, her ensemble coherencies of all individuals...
We only wish humanity-as-individuals could free themselves from societies' Greco-Roman massively unnatural dialectical evils: d'evils.
Little Man Tate...
Just so we keep in perspective what we are doing here, we want to answer a living Quantonics Question,
"In what ways are Quantonics' breakthr¤ugh, n¤vel descriptions of quantum reality h¤l¤graphic? H5W? H5W n¤t?"
Recall how Bergson described one of those dialectical evils as a deluded classical belief that reality holds still (i.e., reality is inanimate; a core notion of fundamentalist creationism and 'intelligent' design both of which we refer as DIQheadedness).
Bohm starts out Physics and Perception describing Einsteinian relativity. Einstein used Leibnitz' works, but Leibnitz apparently was evolving his own views away from quantitative objectivity and toward qualitative subjectivity. Apparently Leibnitz had concluded that reality held little or offered few notions objective. (We need to research this.)
However, Einstein, in his naïve realism and naïve localism insisted that his Special- and General-Relativities had to be objective, "...an assumption which originates in everyday thought, physical thought in the sense familiar to us would not he possible. Nor does one see how physical laws could be formulated and tested without..." normative, putative, dogmatic objectivity. Our quote, remarkably is from a journal titled Dialectica, 1948, 2: 320-324. L
How did Einstein retain dialectical objectivity in his SR and GR? "Invariant Geometrical Interval," IGI! So his SR and GR are relativities of IGI AKA RIGI. Special Relativity has a <0,0,0,0> absolute reference locus in reality. GR removes that absolute reference and makes it relative too. His IGI then becomes an objective reifier of quantum flux, AKA quanta, where classically radical-mechanical invariant length can represent space, time, mass, and gravity and thus all physical measurables of classical science. See our review of Irving Stein's 1996 The Concept of Object as The Foundation of Physics. Also see Doug's now ancient Have a DQ Moment!
Some troublings on Dougings' quantum~stagings on 24Jul2005:
HotMeme Key Quantonic Enabler - Key here: gravity issi a quanton (of quantons), and gravity issi n¤t a dichon! HotMeme
In light of those comparisons "What are quanta AKA What issi ¤ne quantum, a Planck quantum?" when we compare quanta to Einstein's RIGI? They are quantum~durati¤nal, quantum~n¤n~reifiable quantum~flux! We could call them "Abs¤lutely Varying Durati¤nings, AVDs!" Quanta are AVDs!
HotMeme Key Quantonic Enabler - Quanta are abs¤lute quantum flux, packetized, part of a very general quantum~message~pr¤t¤c¤l. Doug - 24Jul2005. HotMeme
So, according to Dirac, "What do Einsteinian RIGIs do to quantum reality?" They, "Zero h-bar!"
HotMeme Key Quantonic Enabler - Einstein's theories of relativity classically disable quantum reality!!! Doug - 24Jul2005. HotMeme
And, indeed, IGI is Bohm's subject of discussion commencing his paper, Physics and Perception.
Now keep on y~our quantum stagings a quantum, classically-dissident, fact: "N¤thing ihn quantum ræhlihty issi ihnvariant!" Before we research Bohm's Physics and Perception paper, shouldn't we ponder that quantum dissidence a tad?
If quantum reality is absolutely variant, while even sheltering memeos of variable persistence, and a 'scientist's' premier axiom in one of his theories is that aspects of his theory must be invariant, what can we say about said theory without even discussing its detail further?
What does dialectic require? Certainty. What did Einstein require in his SR and GR? Certainty. How could he achieve dialectical certainty in his SR and GR? A last bastion application of a weak sister of objectivity: IGI.
Einstein was dialectically disabled, intellectually, from making that bigger leap: "...dialectical certainty is our problem!" Diealectical certainty is a key SOM disabler! But classically, 'science' means true! 'Science' means assessing aspects of reality which are dialectically, certainly true. Einstein was incapable of ever accepting such unorthodox heresy.
The bastions of SOM's OSFA wall are great! They are thick and almost impenetrable! They are Dialectically IQ "obvious." They provide a simple tragedy of commons sense ontology which all can understand. They appear natural. But as Heraclitus said, "They are mere toys."
As Bohm has suggested in his previous paper, dialectical CTMs' classical 'laws' and 'methods' are 'disciplinary matrix' restrictive, with classical-society as disciplinarian, and place saserp "stay in our box" limitations on our thingking. D'evil! Stuff of inquisitions. Stuff of ScA-SPoV wars. Stuff of cultural negation, contradiction, and dichotomous judgments thence hatred and disrespect.
In QTMs those restrictions are removed by a simple quantum fact: due quantum evolution what is 'true' is an agent of its own change. Metaphysically, if we adopt and adapt a Gödelian tenor, we can nurture a meme, a metameme of truth as quantum evolving, quantum~durational process. Compare that to classical 'science's' subnotion of true as 'invariant.'
We didn't move past Bohm's second sentence use of "relatively invariant," but we are sure we showed its problematics, and we are ready to proceed now with our Bohmian Physics and Perception research...
Doug - 23-24Jul2005.