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Book Review
Buridan's explicit assumptions:
- substance exists
- nonsubstance does not exist
- classical objects are substantial and exist
- classical objects possess attributes or properties
- truth value may be assessed only by propositions which exist
- truth may take only three values: true, false, unknown/undefined
- propositions may exist or not exist and may alternate existence
in time
- propositions take four different truth condition forms:
- For the terms of the truth conditions listed here, A, E,
I, and O, use:
- s for subject
- p for predicate
- s and p may stand for objects which:
- exist
- exist not
- are empty
- The truth conditions are:
- A - Every s is (a) p.
- if s stands for something, and
- everything s stands for p stands for
- E - No s is (a) p.
- I - Some s is (a) p.
- O - Some s is not (a) p.
- Buridan offers extensions to these truth conditions, other
forms of them, and unique jargon for other terms in the truth
conditions. Reader, please investigate these on your own.
- Buridan calls the connective 'is' a copula. Copulae are connectives
of the verb form 'be.' We take 'is' grammatically equivalent
to 'iso,' or 'equal.' I.e., A is B + C is equiform A =
B + C.
- propositions are written, spoken, or mental
- written and spoken propositions represent mental propositions
- objects of belief are propositions (p. 16)
- propositions must be asserted declaratively or indicatively
- propositions are sentence tokens that are either true
or false (logic is bivalent)
- proposition meaning may
change upon change of conventional global context Note
1:
- equiform propositions differ only when their truth conditions
differ
- equiform propositions may not be true and false simultaneously
(e.g., p. 47 - parity, universality)
- propositions which exist include terms whose suppositions
stand for substance, objects, object properties, personal suppositions,
or material suppositions
- truth value is either true or false
- true premises never entail
a false conclusion Note 2:
- suppositions exist
- suppositions adapt the terms of a proposition to the details
of the global context
- signification is an insubstantial
dialectical concept where supposition is a substantial concept
- significative (indirect)
supposition is similar to modern logic's 'use'
- material (direct) supposition is similar to modern logic's
'mention' (a la Latin's ly prefix/sign)
- signification 'within
the mind' is material supposition
- contexts exist
- selected context is conventional, established by both consensus
and propositions under evaluation
- once selected, the context becomes global for propositions
and entailments under evaluation
- a proposition's truth value is true in the global context
when the proposition's subject is non-empty, and the proposition
is consistent, and the proposition satisfies all of its:
- truth conditions
- suppositions
- entailments
- a proposition's truth value is false in the global context
when the proposition's subject is empty, or the proposition is
inconsistent, or the proposition contradicts any of its:
- truth conditions
- suppositions
- entailments
- a proposition is consistent if its truth value recurs in
the global context (notice a classical
canonic edict that classical 'reality' must hold still
in order for 'consistent' 'truth' to be assessed - Doug - 17Dec2007)
- a proposition is inconsistent if its truth value changes
in the global context (notice that, classically
judged, quantum~reality (QR) is always classically inconsistent
since QR always changes all - see coquecigrues)
- an inconsistent proposition's truth value is false
(Classical 'reality' says "quantum~reality is 'false'.")
- every true proposition is contextually consistent
- self-contradictory propositions are false (Classical
'reality' says "quantum animate EIMA fractal self~other~reference" is false;
quantum~process is 'false!' Ugh!)
- self-contradictory propositions appear both true and
false simultaneously (note: both~and
is natural in quantum~reality; indeed, both~all~while~and~many is natural in quantum~reality...)
- self-referent propositions exist
- non-self-referent propositions exist
- sophisms exist (Buridan concluded
"all sophisms are 'false';" therefore, quantum~reality
is 'false.')
- sophisms are self-referential propositions
- some sophisms are directly self-referential
- some sophisms are indirectly self-referential
- some sophisms are paradoxical
- some sophisms are contextually
inconsistent
- the context in which a sophism is uttered either makes the
sophism true, or
- makes the sophism contextually inconsistent (p. 149). Note 3:
- contexts which make the sophism contextually inconsistent
make the sophism false Note 3:
- some sophisms are self-contradictory (p. 149)
- paradox arises only if we can prove a proposition false,
then it follows that the proposition is true
- dialecticians
may declare certain concepts non-existent, for example:
- chimeras (p. 15)
- a proposition whose suppositions stand for nothing
- empty subclasses of object categories Note
4:
- dialecticians may declare certain results of propositions
absurd, for example:
- see discussion on signification
on p. 13
Notes:
Note 1: Buridan admits
the existence of multiple contexts. But they may not exist simultaneously!
One global context must be conventionally accepted, or it is impossible
to assess truth value either true or false. Return
1:
Note 2: See p. 20;
this is ever so close to an edict for absolute truth major
problems here in quantum reality; also in classical reality
this assumption/edict demands either unchanging truth, absence
of time flux, or demands that the global context remains unchanged
if a premise is stable or that the global context changes synchronously
with changes in a premise' entailment this generates implied
assumptions clearly, we see here, classical reality's innate
inability to classify and define change we also see the
insistence upon impossible classical objects: objects that are
isolable, separable, individuistic, observable in isolation, observable
in one conventional and unchanging context, and hold still, and
do not change Return 2:
Note 3: Here we see again
Buridan's insistence on One Global Truth. Return
3:
Note 4: This
has huge philosophical ramifications, i.e., if we have not categorized
something, it by assumption does not exist Return
4:
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©Quantonics, Inc., 1998-2009
Rev. 10Nov2007 PDR Created: 3Nov1998 PDR
(10Nov2007 rev - Reformat slightly. Red
bold occurrences of signification.)