| Dedication | Introduction | Note |
|
II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X | XI | XII | XIII | Appendix | Index |
 |
says, "You are here!")|
|
(Most quotes verbatim William James, some paraphrased.) |
(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.) |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
James tells us no exact definition of metaphysics is possible, and a good way to get a sense of what metaphysics is, is to ask questions whose answers partially uncloak its ineffability. "No exact definition of the term 'metaphysics' is possible, and to name some of the problems it treats of is the best way of getting at the meaning of the word. It means the discussion of various obscure, abstract, and universal questions which the sciences and life in general suggest but do not solve; questions left over, as it were; questions all of them very broad and deep, and relating to the whole of things, or to the ultimate elements thereof. Instead of a definition let me cite a few examples, in a random order, of such questions: |
(Our bracketed review comments.) If you infer and intellectually grunt just a bit here, you almost sense James is saying something very close to this: "metaphysics is reality," or as Dan Glover has so eloquently helped us in Quantonics, "metaphysics is modeling reality." Doug likes to say, "metaphysics is reality examining itself." If you, reader, keep that in mind as we provide our own heuristic answers to James' fecund questions, our intent may be clearer. Are we arrogant to attempt answers? No, for if we do not, how can others compare and improve? If we do not, how else can reality know more about itself? Science refuses to do it, so we must. It is good... (We may answer, "quanton(s)" for all 'what' questions below.) |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
29-31, cont'd... |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
29-31, cont'd... |
[Note: Consider 21, 22, 25, and 28 above. James quite clearly
assumes, despite his declared pluralism, global/universal principles
in his asking of these questions. He appears, obviously, to use
homogeneous (one, continuous) time and space. He appears to assume
unilogical/homological views of 'principles' in his "universal."
These are important antithetical examples to other perceptions
your reviewer has of James as a natural and intuitive MoQite/quantum-mechanic.]
James tells us Christian Wolf said that metaphysics is the science of the possible, and 'normal' science is about the actual. |
Kant is a dyed-in-wool objectivist, so we see
little use in answering these. You, reader —
if you wish, may infer answers from our answers to James' questions
above. We assume all sentient intellect is finite. We assume
choice/chance/change. We assume hope, like reality is essentially
boundless. Yes, and 'normal' (classical) science obviates reality's most important 'parts:' both actuality's complement, nonactuality, and their commingling interrelationships. Further, we will add that normal, classical science obviates all but 'known' actuality. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 | "These problems are for the most part real; that is, but few of them result from a misuse of terms in stating them. 'Things,' for example, are or are not composed of one stuff; they either have or have not a single origin; they either are or are not completely predetermined, etc. Such alternatives may indeed be impossible of decision; but until this is conclusively proved of them, they confront us legitimately, and some one must take charge of them and keep account of the solutions that are proposed, even if he does not himself add new ones. The opinions of the learned regarding them must, in short, be classified and responsibly discussed." |
Here we see James, as we saw Bergson, exposing his soft underbelly of entrenched Aristotelian syllogistic thought. He broaches exclusive either/or as alternatives, then wafts, "may be impossible of decision." Latter, to our quantum mind set, hints enlightenment — better, quantum epiphany: inclusive both/and — included-middle both/and — complementarity of actuality and nonactuality and included-middle commingling of both. Via quantum reality, once grasped and beheld in full light, SOM's dichons and paradice evaporate — then reality harmonizes instead of head-bangs, opposes, and contradicts. Once played on our quantum stages, one intuits, 'Flux is crux!' Opinion: Doug's. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34 |
"There must in short be metaphysicians. Let us for a while become metaphysicians ourselves. "As we survey the history of metaphysics we soon realize that two pretty distinct types of mind have filled it with their warfare. Let us call them the rationalist and the empiricist types of mind. A saying of Coleridge's is often quoted, to the effect that every one is born either a platonist or an aristotelian. By aristotelian, he means empiricist, and by platonist, he means rationalist; but although the contrast between the two Greek philosophers exists in the sense in which Coleridge meant it, both of them were rationalists as compared with the kind of empiricism which Democritus and Protagoras developed; and Coleridge had better have taken either of those names instead of Aristotle as his empiricist example." |
Pages 34 and 35 are of el primo importance to understanding James' philosophy and his metaphysics. That import urges us to distill Western culture's three major competing philosophies at Millennium III's beginning:
Crudely, SOM is more rational than empirical. CR is chaos (relative truth, relative value, relative everything). MoQ is more empirical — of the novel r-evolutionary kind — (context dependent islandic truth, absolute moral value/change). We agree with his substitution of Democritus and Protagoras in place of Aristotle. Plato just didn't "get it." |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35 |
"Rationalists are the men of principles, empiricists the men of facts; but, since principles are universals, and facts are particulars, perhaps the best way of characterizing the two tendencies is to say that rationalist thinking proceeds most willingly by going from wholes to parts, while empiricist thinking proceeds by going from parts to wholes. Plato, the archrationalist, explained the details of nature by their participation in 'ideas,' which all depended on the supreme idea of the 'good.' Protagoras and Democritus were empiricists. The latter explained the whole cosmos, including gods as well as men, and thoughts as well as things, by their composition out of atomic elements; Protagoras explained truth, which for Plato was the absolute system of the ideas, as a collective name for men's opinions. "Rationalists prefer to deduce facts from principles. Empiricists prefer to explain principles as [novel] inductions from facts. Is thought for the sake [a purpose] of life? Or is life for the sake [a purpose] of thought? Empiricism inclines to the former, rationalism to the latter branch of the alternative." |
(Our brackets.) MoQites are folk of Value. And we may show Pirsig's Value using James' own words, thus: Value James' distinction of rationalists and empiricists encompasses only actuality. Using our notation we can depict a larger frame: Reality MoQites prefer to model new Static Patterns of Value (SPoVs) based upon novel, empirical (stochastic), incremental evolutions of local and nonlocal preconditions of SPoVs — all commingling and compenetrating absolute, isotropic flux. Simply, these models are quantons! |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 36 | "[Rationalism's] theories are usually optimistic, supplementing the experienced world by clean and pure ideal constructions. Aristotle and Plato, the Scholastics, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, and Hegel are examples of this. They claimed absolute finality for their systems, in the noble architecture of which, as their authors believed, truth was eternally embalmed. This temper of finality is foreign to empiricist minds. They may be dogmatic about their method of building on 'hard facts,' but they are willing to be sceptical about any conclusions reached by the method at a given time. They aim at accuracy of detail rather than at completeness; are contented to be fragmentary; are less inspiring than the rationalists, often treating the high as a case of 'nothing but' the low ('nothing but' self-interest well understood, etc.), but they usually keep more in touch with actual life, are less subjective, and their spirit is obviously more 'scientific' in the hackneyed sense of that term." |
(Our bold color emphasis. Our brackets.) Pirsig sees fundamentalists' insistence on absolute finality as Exclusive Static Quality, or ESQ. In his MoQ, he declares ESQ its only 'evil.' Static Quality which absolutely refuses DQ's persistent mandate for change is, in Pirsig's MoQ, 'immoral.' |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 37 |
"Socrates, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, the Mills, F.A. Lange, J. Dewey, F.C.S. Schiller, Bergson, and other contemporaries are specimens of this type. Of course we find mixed minds in abundance, and few philosophers are typical in either class. Kant may fairly be called mixed. Lotze and Royce are mixed. The author of this volume is weakly endowed on the rationalist side, and this book will show a strong leaning towards empiricism. The clash of the two ways of looking at things will be emphasized throughout the volume. "I will now enter the interior of the subject by discussing special problems as examples of metaphysical inquiry; and in order not to conceal any of the skeletons in the philosophic closet, I will start with the worst problem possible, the so-called 'ontological problem,' or question of how there comes to be anything at all." |
(Our bold color emphasis.) Unfortunately, James is a thelogosist
of first magnitude. You may wish to see our June,
1999 Quantonic Question and Answer on thelogosis. Try reading
James by just deleting his 'THEs' or by substituting either an
'a' or a possessive article. Most 19th and 20th
century academics suffer this lingual disease. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
