PAGE |
QUOTEs
(Verbatim David Hume. Mostly following
Hafner Library of Classics, 1948.) |
COMMENTs
(Relevant to Pirsig, Quantum Gn¤stic
Jesuitism, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.) |
15 |
I must own, Cleanthes, said Demea, that nothing
can more surprise me, than
the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the
whole tenor of your discourse,
one would imagine that you were maintaining the Being of a God,
against the cavils of atheists and infidels, and were necessitated
to become a champion for
that fundamental principle of all religion. But this, I hope,
is not by any means a question
among us. No man, no man at least of common
sense [see Quantonics' QELR of consensus],
I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard
to a truth so certain
and self-evident. The question is not
concerning the being
but the nature of God. This, I affirm, from
the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible
and unknown to us. The essence
of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his existence,
the very nature of his duration
these and every particular which regards so divine
a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and blind creatures,
we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence, and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite perfections,
which eye hath not seen,
ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart
of man to conceive. They
are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity, it is profaneness
to attempt penetrating through these sacred obscurities, and,
next to the impiety of denying his existence, is the temerity
of prying into his nature and essence, decrees and attributes.
But lest you should think that my piety has here got
the better of my philosophy, I shall support
my opinion, if it needs any support,
by a very great authority.
I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation of
Christianity, who have ever treated of this or
any other theological subject, but I shall confine
myself, at present, to one equally celebrated for
piety and philosophy. It is Father Malebranche, who, I remember,
thus expresses himself.1 'One ought not
so much,' says he, 'to call God a spirit, in order
to express positively what he is, as in order
to signify that he is not
matter. He is a Being infinitely perfect
of this we cannot
doubt. But in the same manner
as we ought not to imagine,
even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed with a
human body, as the anthropomorphites
asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect
of any, so neither ought
we to imagine that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our spirit,
under colour that we know
nothing more
perfect than a human mind. We ought rather to believe that as
he comprehends the perfections of matter without being material
. . . he comprehends also the perfections of created spirits
without being spirit, in the manner we conceive
spirit: that his true
name is He that is, or,
in other words, Being without
restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal.'"
1 Recherche de la Verite, liv. 3, cap. 9.
|
Our bold and color highlights
follow a code:
- black-bold - important
to read if you are just scanning our review
- orange-bold - text ref'd
by index pages
- green-bold - we see Hume
proffering quantumesque memes
- violet-bold - an apparent
classical problematic
In Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion we mark
most 'classical English language problematics' using bold violet.
It seems fair to mark our own uses too. As you read do some substitutions
on your own: di to omni, con
to com, not to n¤t,
in to ihn, discard wasted the and when discard is impossible
use possessives, etc. See our QELR.
See our QELP.
- blue-bold - we disagree with this text segment while
disregarding
context of Hume's overall
text
- gray-bold - quotable
text
- red-bold - our direct commentary
- [] - our intra text commentary
Just for review, let's
reacquaint Doug's quantum assessment of Philo, Cleanthes, and
Demea:
- Philo - Careless sceptic, pluralist, somewhat a subjectivist
(In Greek, philo is 'love.')
- Demea - SOMite
par excellence, pure ratiocination is mechanical, formal,
ideally objective (We found
no Greek for
demea - delta epsilon micron etc., etc. was closest we
could get, something about
strings and packets. We found Latin demens which is roughly
'insane.')
- Cleanthes - Ænlihghtænæd gn¤stic (Couldn't
find a Greek match, but phonetically it is something
like "to clean and wash a broken flower." Do you believe
it accidental Hume named he-r 'clean the s?')
Demea holds true to his
SOMiticisms. He accepts truth,
certainty, ideal objective
negation, and dialectical
either-or as logical bases
of classical thought.
Demea assumes God's being while worrying about humankind's
qua to
assess God's nature. What do classicists assume about
God and nature? What do quantumists assume about G¤d and
naturæ? Let's show them compared directly:
- Classicists - dichon(God,
nature), and
- Quantumists - quanton(G¤d,naturæ).
Which of those most closely describes Demea's views expressed
in Hume's classical English? (Possibly translator's classical
English; we do not know what language Hume used when he originally
wrote his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. We guess
he used French. Doug - 23Aug2006.)
A larger query emerges: Is 'God' separate (classically
lisr) from humankind
and humankind separate from 'God?'
Of course Doug's quantum answer is that G¤d issi
ihn us and wæ aræ ihn G¤d. Further, G¤d issi
nature and nature issi G¤d. Further, we are nature, at
least quantum~l¤cally.
None of us is universal,
rather each of us is islandically representative of (an
active sui generis agent of) nature. Each of us l¤cally
describes nature.
Each_of_us quanton(naturæ,l¤cally_each_of_us),
and
Each_of_us quanton(G¤d,l¤cally_each_of_us).
Behold! We see quantum l¤cal assessments of nature...ihn each of us. Each of us b¤th c¤¤bsfæcts
amd exhibits,
at least l¤cally (partially;
we abhor classical notions of 'part,' 'particle,'
'particularity,' etc.; why? quantum reality
is n¤t a particulate, ideally objective reality), nature.
As Earth's ultimate sophist said, paraphrased, "Look within
yourself and you will find 'the
nature
of God.'" Actually, quantum~gn¤stic
Jesus said, "You will find G¤d." That is what
it means to be quantum gn¤stic!
But listen to what Demea is saying. God is separate from us,
and therefore we cannot even
partially (i.e., l¤cally) understand what 'the nature of God' is. Dogmatic
dialectic! Either-or. SOM's wall. Ultimate classical ugly. (Doug
does n¤t view partial understanding of G¤d's
nature somehow providing an inside track to
"what G¤d wants." 23Aug2006.)
Pirsig said it better, "Each of and all of us
are nature's judgment." We would say "judgmentings."
Those judgmentings emerge via a quantum miracle of creatio
ex nihilo aperio.
Only human arrogance assumes hegemony above nature and tries
to control he-r. Catholics
and Muslims try to control
he-r religiously. Science tries to control
he-r ratiocinationally.
By observation nature is radically animate, spontaneously
emergent, holographically self~other co~volitional, everywhere~included~middle~associative,
and massively heterolithic, but...
Demea holds to one God as "universal."
Pure catholicism!
Underlying all this is an apparent assumption by Demea that
all sentients perceive reality alike. Hume's trialogue, though,
shows otherwise, does it n¤t? Experience of Earth's religions
shows us how God is quantum~hermeneutic. Each of us views God,
individually, in our own way. But social organization AKA 'Demos
state,' demands a "tragedy
of common sense," doesn't
it? "Our organization has the correct
view of God: our God is the God." When
we apply either-or dialectic
to that social belief, what do we get? War. Conflict.
"Dialectic
is war."
Quantum~hermeneuticism shows us that God is unique to each
of us. Quantum~gn¤sticism teaches us to learn and understand
that. Quantum~hermeneuticism gravidates
theory (comprendre) and emotive~practice (pragma)
of Philip R. Wallace's "Interpretation involves according
primacy to subjectivity over objectivity." (paraphrased)
Our view is that reality is much like a huge Bohmian holomovement.
It may be apparent to you that a holomovement is quantum~hermeneutic,
and thus interpretively uncertain,
subjective at all scales. In dialectical
contrast, classical reality
is a huge determinate (certain)
machine.
See certainty,
uncertainty,
common sense,
subject, etc. See
Bohm's The Qualitative
Infinity of Nature, his Physics
and Perception, his Enfolding-Unfolding
Universe and Consciousness, and his Super
Implicate Order Dialogue with Reneé Weber (latter
review is "in progress;" Doug is using it to innovate
Quantonics' own comprehensive memeos of quantum phasicityings;
may take better part of a year during 2006-2007, perhaps into
2008-9).
Doug - 9-26Aug2006.
Page top index.
|
16 |
After so great an authority,
Demea, replied Philo, as that which you have produced, and a
thousand more which you might
produce, it would appear ridiculous in me to add my sentiment,
or express my approbation
of your doctrine. But surely, where reasonable
men treat these subjects, the question can never be concerning the being, but
only the nature, of the Deity. The former
truth, as you well observe,
is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing
exists without a cause, and the original
cause of this universe (whatever
it be) we call God, and piously ascribe to him every species
of perfection. Whoever scruples this
fundamental truth, deserves every punishment which can be inflicted
among philosophers, to wit, the greatest ridicule, contempt,
and disapprobation. But as all
perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to
imagine that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being,
or to suppose that his perfections
have any analogy or likeness
to the perfections of a human creature. Wisdom, thought, design, knowledge
these we justly ascribe
to him because these words are honourable
among men, and we have no
other language or other conceptions by which we can express
our adoration of him. But
let us beware, lest we think that our
ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes
have any resemblance to these qualities among men. He is infinitely
superior to our limited view and comprehension, and
is more the object
of worship in the temple,
than of disputation in the schools.
In reality, Cleanthes, continued
he, there is no need of having
recourse to that affected scepticism so displeasing to you, in
order to come at this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We
have no experience of divine
attributes and operations. I need not
conclude my syllogism. You
can draw the inference yourself. And it is a pleasure to me (and
I hope to you, too) that just reasoning
and sound piety here concur
in the same conclusion,
and both of them establish the adorably
mysterious and incomprehensible
nature of the Supreme Being.
|
Philo appears to 'buy-in' to Demea's classicisms.
And he makes this trialogue even more classical by proffering
bogus notions of cause.
What does Philo mean by 'exists?'
Classical existence is material,
objective, immutable, EEMD
state. Quantum 'existence' is quantal, holographic,
flux essential, EIMA
emergence. We might show it like this for better analogy:
quantum_existence classical_unstate
and
"classically absurd" ideal_absence_of_state
absolute_quantum_fluxings.
Pirsig might say it like this:
MoQ_existence
ideal_classical_absence_of_ESQ (which is "classically
absurd")
in all Patterns of Value, both known and
unknown.
Doug - 25Aug2006.
More worrisome than any sentence on this page is Philo's "Whoever scruples [i.e., doubts] this fundamental
truth, deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among
philosophers, to wit, the greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation."
This is warlike dialectic at its finest. This is what Clifford
Geertz means by "absolutism removes judgment from history."
We see its innate classical certainty.
Its classical stupidity. Its catholic dogma.
And Philo goes on to say, "...all
perfection is entirely relative..." About that
kind of classical thought Geertz said, "relativism disables
judgment." Did Philo fathom his own words? Their deep philosophical
problematics?
Philo, though, approaches quantum memeos of n¤nactuality
in his "...let us beware, lest
we think that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections,
or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities
among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and
comprehension..." We like that.
Quantumly, we substitute bettership for wors[e]hip.
If reason is dialectical,
we have to disagree with Philo here. We agree that "mysterious incomprehensibility"
is reality's quintessence and we like to believe it is
quantum~quintessence.
See see cause,
design,
grammar, holograph,
object, quanta,
etc.
Doug - 9Aug2006.
Page top index.
|
17 |
Not to lose any time in
circumlocutions, said Cleanthes, addressing himself to Demea,
much less in replying to the pious declamations of Philo, I shall
briefly explain how I conceive
this matter. Look round the world,
contemplate the whole and
every part of it:
you will find it to be nothing
but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number
of lesser machines, which
again admit of subdivisions
to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace
and explain. All these various machines,
and even their most minute parts,
are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into
admiration all men who have ever contemplated
them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature,
resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of
human contrivance, of human
designs, thought, wisdom,
and intelligence. Since, therefore,
the effects resemble each
other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that
the causes also resemble,
and that the author of Nature is somewhat similar to the
mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this
argument a posteriori,
and by this argument alone, do we prove
at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human
mind and intelligence.
I shall be so free, Cleanthes, said Demea, as to tell you,
that from the beginning, I could not
approve of your conclusion concerning
the similarity of the Deity to men, still less can I approve of the mediums by which you
endeavour to establish it. What! No
demonstration of the Being of God! No
abstract arguments! No proofs a priori!
Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers,
all fallacy, all sophism? Can we reach no
further in this subject than experience and probability? I will
not say that this is betraying
the cause of a Deity:
but surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to
atheists, which they never could obtain by the mere dint
of argument and reasoning.
|
Sadly, Cleanthes, appears here too (like Demea and Philo)
as a classicist believing in classical: mechanism, localability,
isolation, separation, reduction, particularity, cause and proof.
For us, personally, at this early stage of our review of Hume's
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, this is a huge
disappointment. This is just too sad...
Newton and Einstein and countless of their predecessors bought
into this classical funda mental bilge.
Newton and Einstein both saw reality as a classical clockwork
mechanism.
But reality is quantum~emergent~process, n¤t classical
clockwork mechanism.
Mechanism is how primitive man thought, n¤t G¤d's
methodologies of evolutionary
creation.
Will you allow Doug to share
an recent (August, 2006) anecdotal experience?
Last week we, Beth and Doug, had a tiny dinner party at our
place with Steve and Jessica. Both are very bright folk, and
Steve is exceptional in his repertoire of technical skills.
Midway dinner Doug had an opening to ask this simple question:
"What is our universe's principal 'feature?' "
Pause...paws...
Steve had just started to emit some complex rhetoric when
both ladies simultaneously said, "change!"
Steve sat there, apparently one word, single semantic, flummoxed.
Doug raised both arms above his head and said, "Yes!"
(Haven't felt that much social aritos in a couple of moons.
Nonpareil delight!)
Most of us still intuit (maltuit) reality as a mechanical
system. Why? We have been carefully taught by academe to believe
it. But it is wrong! Academe is wrong.
How did Beth and Jessica intuit "change?" Beth lives
with Doug. Jessica possesses intuitively Women's Ways of Knowing.
Ever wonder why there aren't any women priests? Women's
Ways of Knowing are anti-catholic: instinctively quantum!
(Most) Men's ways of thing-king
are objective, mechanistic, catholic!
By-'d-way...Does
our anecdote exhibit macroscopic uncertainty
ad oculos?
Aside:
Several of you have been searching Google, MSN, Yahoo, etc.
for ad oculos' semantic.
Doug is somewhat, has evolved to become somewhat, quantum~gn¤stic.
You may n¤t always take Doug's words classically, literally.
Just as with some women, "no" may mean,
sort of, "yes." A quantum tell of almost implicit
feminine gn¤stic pneumatics. If 'no' is quantum subjective,
and of course we believe it is, those women are dead-reckonings
on a path of quantum~prescience.
In Latin, literally 'occulo' means 'hidden' much as and similar
to French couvert. Doug has bastardized occulo to oculos
(sometimes occulos) and quantumly perverted its sensibility
as quanton(Hyde,Jekyll) and quanton(hidden,ostensibly_obviously_apparent).
To Doug, ad oculos means by observation, fully apparent,
but with BAWAM
tongue in cheeque, and a quantum wink. Essene~ce of quanton(wave,particle).
Doug's first encounter, on 21Jun2003, occurred with a 'scientific'
"use" by Max Jammer of ad oculos, while quoting
Niels Bohr on page 93 of
Jammer's The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics. Jammer
wrote there, "The association of a particle with a wave
packet, Bohr pointed out, demonstrates the complementarity character
of the description almost ad oculos; for 'the use of wave
groups is necessarily accompanied by a lack of sharpness in the
definition of period and wave-length, and hence also in the definition
of the corresponding energy and momentum...' "
Doug - 5Sep2006.
End aside.
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Doug - 9,23Aug2006.
Page top index.
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18 |
What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said Philo, is not so much that all religious arguments
are by Cleanthes reduced to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that
inferior kind. That a stone
will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity,
we have observed a thousand and a thousand times, and when any
new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation
the accustomed inference.
The exact similarity of the
cases gives us a perfect assurance
of a similar event, and a
stronger evidence is never desired nor
sought after. But wherever you depart,
in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish
proportionably the evidence,
and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which
is confessedly liable to
error and uncertainty.
After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human
creatures, we make no doubt
that it takes place in Titius and Maevius. But from its circulation
in frogs and fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong
one, from analogy, that it takes place in men and other animals.
The analogical reasoning
is much weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables
from our experience that the blood circulates in animals, and
those, who hastily followed that imperfect analogy, are found,
by more accurate experiments,
to have been mistaken.
If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude,
with the greatest certainty,
that it had an architect or
builder, because this is
precisely that species of effect
which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears
such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same
certainty infer a similar
cause, or
that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude
is so striking, that the utmost you
can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture,
a presumption concerning
a similar cause, and how that pretension will be received in the
world, I leave you to consider.
It would surely be very ill received, replied Cleanthes, and
I should be deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that
the proofs of a Deity amounted
to no more
than a guess or conjecture. [However, that is all
we can, all we have qua to, do! God simply isn't reducible
to logic, classical and otherwise. Doug -23Aug2006. Our quantum~phasement
is intrinsic in real Quality! Real Quality is indefinable. We
cann¤t put real quality in a thing-king
box, a classical detention center of reason. Real Quality con(m)flates
and subqsumes reason.] But is the whole adjustment
of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance?
The economy of final causes? The order,
proportion, and arrangement
of every part? Steps of a
stair are plainly contrived,
that human legs may use them in mounting, and this inference
is certain and infallible.
Human legs are also contrived
for walking and mounting,
and this inference, I allow, is not
altogether so certain, because of the dissimilarity which
you remark, but does it, therefore,
deserve the name only of presumption or
conjecture? [If macroscopic
quantum~uncertainty reigns, we have to... Doug - 23Aug2006. Is
Earth a similitudinous model for Venus? Jupiter for Uranus? Our
Sun for Capella? Our moon for Titan? In general, n¤.]
|
Our bold, color, brackets, subscripts, links.
Philo appears to believe that experience is an inferior means
of, basis of argument.
Fire won't burn on our moon, and in space. A stone at gravitational
libration will n¤t 'fall.' Earth's solidity is a mechanical
apparition. Earth, and all 'solids,' are almost entirely vacuum
energy 'space.'
Philo vivifies our earlier comments re: consensus
with his, "the accustomed inference."
And, isn't it entirely apparent to our quantonics students
that Philo's "exact similarity"
is an oxymoron?
Doesn't Philo's "perfect assurance"
reek of classical certainty.
Another anecdote:
We need to paraphrase liberally here Paul Pietsch from his
Shufflebrain...
"What is individual human intellect's principal 'feature?'
" (A huge quantum tell!)
Pause...paws...clause...claws...flause...flaws...
And O'gadon said, "uncertainty." (We can omnistinguish
fools via their
classical DIQheaded
'certainty.')
Bravo!
Doug's meme here is that, in general, classical certainty
isn't. Quantum uncertainty is. Quantum reality's nature
is ubiquitous compenetrating uncertainty due absolute change
borne of absolute flux:
- absolute flux is con(m)sistent: it always changes,
and
- absolute flux is complete: it changes all.
Predicable certainty, on all scales of reality, is just and
simply bilge. At best, it is only apparent due viscosity of some
classes of change. See quantum variable persistence, QVP.
Notice how this entire page's trialogue harbors implicit classical
notions of stoppability and immutability. With cause thence effect
as bogus inductive credo of determinism and classical 'certainty,'
both borne of those deluded implicits of stoppability and immutability:
classical concrete. Funda mental cement. ESQ.
On their cause and effect and our last paragraph's first sentence's
memetic potential, allow us to quote PAM Dirac:
"...we must revise our ideas of causality. Causality
applies only to a system which is left undisturbed." Page
4, Dirac's The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. See our
Recommended Reading:
Dirac. See cause.
Then Philo suddenly sounds like a quantum~hermeneuticist with
his, "...that the utmost you can
here pretend to is a guess...," and "...how that pretension will be received in the
world, I leave you to consider." Those words
show why classicists call quantum thinking "equivocal,"
"prevaricative," "perverse,"
"absurd," etc. To classical minds quantum reality is
"nonsense."
Heraclitus hinted
that these tiny minds are but toddlers twaddling in their "toy
boxes" of mechanical rules is tules for fules. Said toddlers
shall become extinct during Millennium III's first few centuries.
Doug - 23Aug2006.
Page top index.
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19 |
Good God! cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous
defenders of religion allow, that the proofs
of a Deity fall short of
perfect evidence! And you, Philo, on whose assistance I depended
in proving the adorable mysteriousness
of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these extravagant
opinions of Cleanthes? For
what other name can I give them? or,
why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority,
before so young a man as
Pamphilus?
You seem not to apprehend,
replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in
his own way, and, by shewing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope
at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most with
you, I observe, is the representation which Cleanthes has made
of the argument a posteriori;
and finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold
and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you can
scarcely believe it to be set in its true
light. Now, however much
I may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles
of Cleanthes, I must allow that he has fairly represented that
argument, and I shall endeavour so to state
the matter to you, that you will entertain no
further scruples with regard to it.
Were a man to abstract from every thing
which he knows or
has seen, he would be altogether incapable, merely from his own
ideas, to determine what
kind of scene the universe must be, or
to give the preference to one state
or situation of things above another.
[Notice here that Philo emits a very quantum essential. We should
watch to see if he arrives where one finds that is about
all we can (have qua to) do. Quantum reality is, from any classical
conspective, "subjective."] For
as nothing which he clearly
conceives could be esteemed
impossible or implying a
contradiction, every chimera
of his fancy would be upon an equal footing, nor
could he assign any just reason
why he adheres to one idea or
system, and rejects the others which are equally possible. [Clearly,
again in our view, Philo's last sentence assesses Cleanthes as
an intuitive quantum~hermeneuticist, far ahead of Balmer, Bohr,
Schrödinger, et al. Powerful stuff here! Doug - 23Aug2006.
See our What are Sophisms?
page.]
Again, after he opens his eyes, and contemplates
the world as it really is
[i.e., as classicists, SOMites see it...], it would be impossible
for him at first to assign
the cause of any one event, much less of the whole of
things, or
of the universe. He might set his fancy a rambling, and she might
bring him in an infinite variety of reports
and representations. These would all be possible, but being all
equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory account for
his preferring one of them to the rest.
Experience alone can point out to him the true
cause of any phenomenon.
|
If we oversimply categorize Philo, Demea, and Cleanthes we
find Cleanthes as (perhaps) one of 'the elect.' In our opinions,
clearly, Demea is one of 'the called.' Philo straddles both,
which we see in his admission "...in
his own way..."
Philo's "...preferring one of
them to the rest." can be viewed both classically
and quantumly. Former demands classical logic to decide ideally,
bivalently, oppositionally,
'either-or' the
best. Latter uses coquecigrue
to omnivalently BAWAM
select a tentative
better.
Classicists believe there is one right, absolutely true, answer
to any 'choice.' For that belief to hold, reality would have
to be concrete, immutable, stopped. That is why classicists also
believe reality is concrete.
Doug - 23Aug2006.
Page top index.
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20 |
Now, according
to this method of reasoning,
Demea, it follows, (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed by Cleanthes
himself,) that order, arrangement,
or the adjustment of final
causes, is not
of itself any proof of design, but only so far as it has
been experienced to proceed from that principle. For
ought we can know a priori, matter may contain
the source or spring of order originally
within itself as well as mind does, and there is no
more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements,
from an internal unknown
cause, may fall into the
most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive
that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal
unknown cause, fall into
that arrangement. The equal possibility
of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by experience, we
find, (according to Cleanthes,)
that there is a difference between them. Throw several pieces
of steel together, without shape or
form, they will never arrange
themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone, and mortar,
and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the
ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown,
inexplicable economy, arrange
themselves so as to form
the plan of a watch or house.
Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of order
in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar causes.
The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as
in a machine of human contrivance. The causes,
therefore, must be resembling.
I was from the beginning
scandalized, I must own, with this resemblance, which is asserted,
between the Deity and human creatures, and must conceive
it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound theist could endure. [Readers
with some depth of religious qua
may be pleased, and perhaps n¤t, to fathom how Roman 'Catholics,'
and their 'Protestant' progeny's wors[e]hip of Christ's antithesis
would agree with Philo and denounce, as Philo does, Cleanthes
'reasoning.' Quite phenomenally and heterodoxically according
Thomas'
Gospel, Stephen
Hoeller, and Elaine
Pagels, etc., Essene Jesuit Gnosis
and quantum~gn¤stics agree with Cleanthes!
Anti-Christ OGC SOMitic wors[e]shipers
of 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' persuasion believe, as Philo,
that "God is separate, objectively separable, from humanity."
Quantum gn¤stics will tell you and show you that Essene
Jesus taught his disciples bettershipings that "B¤th G¤d issi ihn
uhs amd wæ aræ
ihn G¤d." Similarity
of G¤d and all creation issi intrinsic,
quantum~really intrinsic! Doug - 23Jul2007.] With your assistance,
therefore, Demea, I shall endeavour to defend what you
justly call the adorable
mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of Cleanthes, provided
he allows that I have made a fair representation of it.
|
If you believe in classical causation, you are lost
to any understanding, any comprendre, of quantum reality.
If you believe in classical causation, you are wasting
your time in Quantonics.
Of course your belief makes us very happy since it assures
more rapid extinction of you and folk of your ilk. We shall n¤t
have to appease your classically 'logical' sillygisms much longer.
However, those of you who understand
why causation is invalid and crippled thing-king can and will
benefit from your persistence in Quantonics.
But Doug, "What is your answer to 'why?' "
- quantum predication begets quantum~likelihood~omnistributions,
QLOs,
- QLOs are n¤t single valued, n¤r 'probabilistically'
bivalent,
- QLOs are animate recursive self~and~other referent ensembles
of QLOs,
- QLOs are massively, holographically~phasistically~networked
pr¤cesses
of pr¤cesses,
- etc.
Classical cause requires uniparametric, scalarbative,
stoppable measurement, which is simply impossible in quantum
reality. Much akin how Einstein's desire to measure position
and momentum 'simultaneously' and with "probability one"
is impossible in quantum reality. Much akin how eigenstates may
not have classical ideal probabilities of 'zero' and 'one.' Zero
and one do n¤t 'exist scalarbatively, stoppably in quantum
reality.
Doug.
We also find these phrases potentially problematic and sometimes
oxymoronic:
- unknown cause (doesn't
'cause' imply 1-1 correspondence, so classically, if that is
so, all causes are classically discoverable),
- equal possibility (when,
where, how, why, what, who? equality and identity are essentially
impossible in quantum reality),
- original principle (issues
of classical notions of radical beginism and finalism; principle
as 'law' is clearly a bogus notion in any reality which is absolutely
changing),
- From similar effects we infer similar
causes. (Doesn't classical 'similarity' break a classical
notion of 1-1 correspondence; one cause one effect? Is Philo
saying causes and effects are heterogeneous? Pluralism breaks
classical logic...! How can we classically find best if there
are many bests? Can we conclude, classically from an assumption
of similars that a Christian
God is omniffering a Muslim God is omniffering a Gn¤stic
God is omniffering...? Do similars
permit assessment of which one is 'true,' and 'best?' Are you
certain?)
Classical determinism requires unvarying specificity (analytic
formal, measurable 'properties' are specifically 'state'
ic) declared as genericity,
e.g., "f = m·a." If we classically observe products
of masses and accelerations as similar "causes" of
"effects'" "forces," then we can say classically
that "similar specificities" are in general "general."
But are they? No 'mass' in quantum reality is or can be at rest!
All accelerations in quantum reality are absolutely varying.
In quantum reality we may not assume any classical notions of
inertial reference frames "at rest," having classically
"zero momentum."
Ihn
quantum ræhlihty
genærihcihty
issi abs¤lutæ changæ
which
¤mnisahll¤ws, precludæs
any classical notions of specificity as concrete
immutability of objective
measurement. See Zeno of Elea's
first paradox. See measurement.
Doug - 26,28Aug2006.
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Philo's last paragraph notably elicits a classical notion
that God is not in us and we are not in God.
Doug - 23Aug2006.
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21 |
When Cleanthes had assented, Philo, after a short
pause, proceeded in the following
manner.
That all inferences, Cleanthes, concerning
fact, are founded on experience,
and that all experimental reasonings
are founded on the supposition
that similar causes prove similar effects,
and similar effects similar
causes, I shall not at present much dispute with
you. But observe, I entreat you, with
what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring
of experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases
be exactly similar, they
repose no perfect confidence in applying their past
observation to any particular
phenomenon.
Every alteration of circumstances occasions
a doubt concerning the event, and it requires new experiments to prove certainly,
that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation,
arrangement, age, disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies
any of these particulars may be attended with the most
unexpected consequences: and unless
the objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity
to expect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to
that which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate
steps of philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from
the precipitate march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude,
are incapable of all discernment or consideration.
But can you think, Cleanthes, that your usual phlegm and philosophy
have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when
you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their similarity
in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design,
intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is
no more
than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well
as heat or cold, attraction
or repulsion, and a hundred
others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular
parts of nature, we find,
produce alterations on other parts.
But can a conclusion, with any propriety,
be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion
bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of
a hair, can we learn any thing
concerning the generation
of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly
known, afford
us any instruction concerning
the vegetation of a tree? [In a SOrON
quantum~holographic reality, indeed, yæs! In a quantum
SOrON holographic reality said leaf
is sææn by and sææs all of
its actual l¤cal quantum c¤mplæmænt!
Doug - 2Aug2007.]
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On fact, see our QELR
of fact.
Philo, justly and righteously, warns on issues of classically
apparent similarity.
Again, due absolute change and intrinsic EIMA,
exact similarity, in quantum
reality, is impossible: an oxymoron.
Too, notice that classical induction, rests on similar
notions of similarity, e.g., Peano's counting axiom.
Classical similarity excuses and abdicates classically-certain
identity 'perfection.' Thus protoclassical admission of notions
of similarity are actually, though ubiquitously unrecognized
as such, quantum tells. Manifestly, admission of similarity
begs admission of macroscopic uncertainty which has just become
embarrassingly lucid, do you agree?
Philo's quantum genius erupts here, in that long bold green
paragraph, excepting his violet classicisms. What Philo may be
missing here is that events themselves and all reality are ensemble
stochastic processes. We'll see. Anyway, it appears to us that
Philo expected quantum reality, perhaps only dimly, but genuinely
so many years ago. Like so many others, though, he appears incapable
of using his intuitions to tear down SOM's wall. We adore how
he compares philosophers as 'the elect' and scientists
as only 'the called,' "vulgar."
Scientific 'sense' is common sense AKA vulgar
sense. Quantum Philo sophic sense is extraordinary sense, aritos,
martus aritos.
°
°
°
"Applied to the world as representative
of all the world, become superstitions."
by Julian Jaynes,
The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral
Mind ,
p. 443, 1976, HMCO
(paperback, total 493 pages including 'The Drawings')
Doug's pulldown on 'facts' added - 2Aug2007.
Doug - 24Aug2006.
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22 |
But, allowing that we were to take the operations of
one part of nature upon another, for
the foundation of our judgment concerning
the origin
of the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select so
minute, so weak, so bounded a principle,
as the reason and design of animals is found to be
upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little agitation
of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus
make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality
in our own favour does indeed present it on all occasions, but
sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural
an illusion.
So far from admitting, continued
Philo, that the operations of a part
can afford us any just conclusion concerning
the origin of the whole,
I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part,
if the latter be very remote from the former.
Is there any reasonable ground to conclude,
that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence,
reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When
nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in
this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies
herself throughout so immense a universe? And if thought, as
we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner,
and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety
can we assign it for the original cause of all things?
The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for
the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable sophism.
But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling the human, were
to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its activity
elsewhere vastly greater and more
commanding than it appears in this globe, yet I cannot
see, why the operations of a world
constituted, arranged, adjusted,
can with any propriety be extended to a world
which is in its embryo state,
and is advancing towards that constitution
and arrangement. By observation, we know
somewhat of the economy,
action, and nourishment of
a finished animal, but we must transfer with great caution that
observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still
more in the formation
of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, we
find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite
number of springs and principles, which incessantly discover
themselves on every change of her position and situation. And
what new and unknown principles
would actuate her in so new and unknown
a situation as that of the formation
of a universe, we cannot,
without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine.
|
Why does a classical notion of similarity bear such weight
on our psyches as natural, even real?
Nature's evolutionary processings appear to use both self-reference,
other-reference and fractal recursion to emerse nextings' betterings.
If that phasement may be used as at least partial guidance
in our quantum~think~king, we can see how similarity appears
real. And for us, in Quantonics, that brand of quantum~similarity
issi nowings, provisionally, tentatively, real.
However, objective, immutable, static, holds-still, EEMD
classical reality by canon 'law' cannot formally self-refer while
adaptively (n¤n mechanically) self-other recursing.
Our last few paragraphs narrate why, in Quantonics, we believe
QTMs are vastly superior
to CTMs.
If we classify Philo's thinking here, it appears that it is
more CTMethodic than QTModal. When he, Cleanthes and Demea broach
QTModalities we show their words in bold green.
Allow us to QELR our bold green here: "I lack qua to allow any [] quanton to
emerq a [classical] 'rule' for another quanton ..."
Emerq is QELR for classical 'form.'
Are you amazed that classical scientists have so ignored Philo's
queries in that large bold green paragraph?
This demonstrates for us why Philo refers scientists as vulgar.
Then Philo, as so many others, uses 'sophism'
in a denigrating manner. Oh well! Would that he somehow intuited
quantum reality is sophisms.
Quantum reality, at its most
primitive levels and scaling from there, appears to have quantum~awareness~co~awareness "built-in."
It takes awhile to get to grasping these exemplars, but photons
and detectors make primitive "choices." Isoflux and
Higgs bosons make primitive "choices." They do n¤t
exhibit formal, determinate, mechanical interactions.
Yet Philo, in our view,
is correct that similarity itself is indeterminate and thus n¤n
global, n¤n universal.
A Dugger Aside on Similarity:
Doug has recently come to enjoy work of two famous actors,
one with hugely more experience and four years age advantage,
other apparently getting a late start, but both outstanding actors,
in Doug's view.
To look at these two, you would say, at any outset, "...
they are wholly dissimilar."
Which actors? Philip Seymour Hoffmann (former) and Michael
C. Hall.
Both of these men, in Doug's opine, are simply fab at their
chosen art. Recently Beth and Doug have become enamored of Michael
Hall in Dexter. This young man can send chills to neverlands
and warm one's heart as a miraculous subsetting, subcon(m)texting
both~and which we seldom see. (Doug admits this
happens routinely with gestures, but not in more detailed con(m)sequences
we both experienced here. This felt more like simile~synaesthesia
of sorts. It startled Doug, literally, emotionally, and physically.
Maybe this happens with most people and they seldom mention it?)
Of course Hoffmann has "covered the waterfront so to
speak," in definite cliché.
Tammy Jenkins (Doug used to know a Tammy Page Jenkins long
ago.) wrote and directed her The Savages. Excellent! Excellence!
Hoffmann and his sister are Savages (last name) who go through
trials of a dysfunctional family and eventual loss of a parent
who doesn't and didn't care.
Doug was amazed in a scene in The Savages where Hoffmann
is entering a car. For a moment ( a millisecond, perhaps less
) Doug saw, in just a portion of Hoffmann's left jaw, extreme
similarity to Hall as Dexter. It was so powerful that
Doug's quantum~stage momentarily changed Hoffmann into Hall,
and only as he turned his head back in acknowledgement was that
brief 'spell' broken.
I turned to Beth and said, "Did you see that?" She
responded, "Yes!" I said, "You mean Dexter?"
She said, "Yes!"
These two men look nothing, even remotely, alike, yet Beth
and I both saw it!
Notice how this kind of quantum~similarity is partial,
and yet we as quantum~beings are capable of detecting that similarity
in only a few Planck moments (It is important to grasp here,
as Mae wan Ho did
regarding arm muscle flexure, that light doesn't travel fast
enough to mechanically explain what happened!). For Doug, this
provides an exemplar of how humans routinely recognize genuinely
quantum~coherent ...while quasi~superluminal ... quantum~partial~similarities,
and routinely use them without grasping their underlying qua essences to
'di' scriminate (classically) and omniscriminate
(learn and interpret quantumly) their surroundings. Compare Doug's
experience with one where some classical scientists insist moon
is only 'there' when we look at it. How could Dexter be
left jaw facially cowithin Hoffmann? Fascinating! What about
legal issues in any court of dialectical 'law?' Can acting be
so good that you see someone else? Is what happened important?
Is what we think happened important? Who decides? Is it better
Value to experience this quasi quantum~synaesthesia?
For Doug it was a one of many "firsts." And for
Doug, "It was and still is exciting." A wow!
This anecdotal evidence supports what Doug has been writing
lately about quantum~awareness,
about systemic occurrences as processings which are includings
occurrencings of peaQLO Value
cognition, re cognition and pattern omniscrimination. Further
it helps Doug see how only flux and fractal interrelationshipings
of flux in real h¤l¤grams
can do (pragma) this.
It is further evidence that reality issi quantum and all processings
in quantum~reality at all scalings of quantum~reality are holographic,
from nearly n¤ flux to Planck's rate, all is holographic,
even quantum~realities' apparent hidings in quantum~isoflux.
Thank you for reading.
Doug - 22Dec2008
End Dugger Aside on Similarity.
Doug - 24Aug2006.
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23 |
A very small part of this great system, during a very short time,
is very imperfectly discovered to us, and do we then pronounce
decisively concerning the origin of the whole?
Admirable conclusion!
Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not,
at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order
or arrangement without human
art and contrivance, therefore the universe could not
originally attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. But is
a part of nature a rule for another
part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for
the whole? Is a very small part
a rule for the universe?
Is nature in one situation, a certain
rule for nature in another situation vastly different
from the former?
And can you blame me, Cleanthes, if I here imitate the prudent
reserve of Simonides, who, according
to the noted story,
being asked by Hiero, What God was? desired a day to think
of it, and then two days more,
and after that manner continually
prolonged the term, without ever bringing in his definition or description? Could you even blame
me, if I answered at first, that
I did not know, and was sensible that this subject lay vastly
beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out
sceptic and rallier, as much as you pleased: but having
found, in so many other subjects much more
familiar, the imperfections and even contradictions
of human reason, I never
should expect any success from its feeble conjectures,
in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the sphere of our
observation. When two species of objects
have always been observed to be conjoined
together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one
wherever I see the existence of the other, and this I
call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have
place, where the objects,
as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel,
or specific resemblance,
may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a
serious countenance, that an orderly
universe must arise from some thought and art like the human,
because we have experience
of it? [Classically,]To ascertain
this reasoning, it were requisite
that we had experience of the origin
of worlds, and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have
seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance.
Doug's brackets, bold, and color.
|
Bravo! Even more important as qualifiers, our very small 'part' is absolutely changing and
all its 'parts' middlings
are includings. From that we infer 'parts' aren't classical in
any objective 'common sense' of separability and state.
°
°
°
°
°
°
"I answered at first, that
I did not know..."
"Uncertainty is the principal feature of intelligence."
Paraphrased. Paul Pietsch in his Shufflebrain.
That humans learn and think similarly as we observe our surroundings
does not boot: "human like intelligence designed our universe."
Doug - 24Aug2006.
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24 |
Philo was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between
jest and earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some
signs of impatience in Cleanthes, and then immediately stopped
short. What I had to suggest,
said Cleanthes, is only that you would not
abuse terms, or make use
of popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings.
You know, that the vulgar
often distinguish reason from experience,
even where the question relates only to matter of fact
and existence, though it is found, where that reason
is properly analyzed, that it is nothing
but a species of [quantum~]experience. To prove
by experience the origin
of the universe from mind, is not
more contrary
to common speech, than to prove
the motion of the earth from the same
principle. And a caviller might raise all the same
objections to the Copernican
system, which you have urged against my reasonings.
Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move?
Have . . . . . .
Yes! cried Philo, interrupting him, we have other earths.
Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn
round its centre? Is not
Venus another earth, where
we observe the same phenomenon?
Are not the revolutions of
the sun also a confirmation,
from analogy, of the same
theory? All the planets,
are they not earths, which
revolve about the sun? Are not
the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and
along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies
and resemblances, with others which I have not
mentioned, are the sole proofs
of the Copernican system, and to you it belongs to consider,
whether you have any analogies of the same
kind to support your theory.
In reality, Cleanthes, continued
he, the modern system of astronomy
is now so much received by
all enquirers, and has become so essential a part
even of our earliest education, that we are not
commonly very scrupulous in examining the reasons
upon which it is founded. It is now
become a matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers
on that subject, who had the full force
of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn their arguments
on every side in order to
render them popular and convincing.
But if we peruse Galilæo's famous Dialogues2 concerning
the system of the world,
we shall find, that that great genius, one of the sublimest that
ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove,
that there was no foundation
for the distinction commonly
made between elementary and celestial substances. The schools,
proceeding from the illusions of sense, had carried this distinction
very far, and had established the latter substances to be ingenerable,
incorruptible, unalterable,
impassible, and had assigned all the opposite qualities to the
former. But Galilæo,
beginning with the moon, proved
its similarity in every particular
to the earth, its convex
figure, its natural darkness when not
illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid,
the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the
earth and moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the
lunar surface, etc. After many instances of this kind, with regard
to all the planets, men plainly saw that these bodies became
proper objects of experience,
and that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend
the same arguments and phenomena from one to the other.
[Dialogo dei due Massimi Sistemi del Mondo (1632).]
Hafner Library footnote.
[Doug note 9Aug2006: This reference is to Galileo's
Dialogue of the Two Principle Systems of the World. He
published it just prior to being accused by 'catholic' church's
Inquisition which labeled him, "vehemently suspected
of heresy." Be careful here. Galileo also published Dialogues
Concerning the Two New Sciences, in 1638. Galileo recanted
to idiot Aristotelian-Ptolemaic(Claudius) earth-centric-rope-a-dope-war-mongering
Urban VIII 'catholics' rather than being tortured and possibly
killed (burned at stake) like Giordano Bruno by Clement VIII
in 1600. We do not know much about Galileo, but being accused
of "heresy" essentially labels him as a "gnostic."]
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Cleanthes' argument on behalf of experience
works well in quantum~actuality, however, quantum~n¤nactuality
is vaster than actuality and currently and for any foreseeable
futurings outside of human sensibility other than indirection
and inference.
Therefore, quantum~reason must
be omnistinguished from actual experience.
Do you see where Pirsig may have desnoured his, paraphrased
and inferred, "...truth is a subspecies of Quality,"
from Hume here and James' "Truth is one species of good,
and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good,
and coordinate with it?" Also James said, "The true
is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of
belief." You may find James' quotes in Pirsig's Lila
on page 363 of its first edition. Similar quotes appear here.
Doug - 24Aug2006.
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25 |
In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own condemnation, Cleanthes, or rather may see, that the subject
in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason
and enquiry. Can you pretend to shew any such similarity between
the fabric of a house, and the generation of a universe? Have
you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first
arrangement of the elements? Have worlds
ever been formed under your
eye, and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of
the phenomenon,
from the first appearance of order
to its final consummation?
If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory. |
Does Humankind Have Qua to Describe God Using Astronomy?
Doug is wholly confident of his own uncertainty on this one.
Doug - 24Aug2006.
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