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Acronyms and symbols used in the Summary of Buridan's Logic:

 MoQ  - Metaphysics of Quality
 OGC  - One Global Context
 OGT  - One Global Truth
 SOM  - Subject-Object Metaphysics

Summary of Buridan's Logic:

On page 21, Hughes concisely summarizes Buridan's own formal logic. In one short paragraph he shows us how Buridan's formal logic distinguishes itself from others. We can make inferences about how Buridan's formal logic relates to our own work in Quantonics. Here is the paragraph:

"I remarked earlier that, given Buridan's conception of what a proposition is, it is possible for one and the same proposition to be both true and false, in the sense that two people may attach different meanings to it and it may be true under one interpretation but false under the other. It is also possible, without any variation in interpretation, for one and the same proposition to be true at one time but false at another, since the things to which it refers may change in relevant ways; the proposition, 'Socrates is sitting,' for example, becomes false when Socrates stands up. But Buridan holds that, given a fixed interpretation of a proposition, it is quite impossible for it to be both true and false at the same time. Moreover he is also a strict bivalentist in the sense that every proposition is at any given time either true or false (assuming of course that it exists at that time). There is no trace in his thought of any truth value other than truth and falsity, or of any notion that a proposition might exist but have no truth value at all."

From your reviewer's perspective, this is one most telling paragraph in Hughes' book. Let's examine a list of points made in this paragraph and comment on them one at a time.


"...same proposition may be true and false...," i.e., interpretation is a function of context

Buridan, to the good, violates one of many classical axioms. He recognizes truth is relative to context. He uses "interpretation" which we presume means interpretation of one global context by a sentient. This is one vote in favor of Buridan's thinking. His allowance for relative truth moves closer to being consistent with MoQ's many truths and quantum sciences', "isles of truth." However, he does not go all the way.

Note carefully what Buridan appears to assume here. Is he assuming multiple contexts? Or is he assuming one context in which one sentient interprets a proposition differently from another's interpretation? Interesting, eh?

We think he assumes a single context with two different interpretations. He assumes one context, but with relative truth assessed by two different sentients. Further, he apparently assumes sentients are objectively independent observers of OGC and objective propositions evaluated in OGC.

But are sentients themselves contexts? Do not each of their personal contexts interrelate, interpenetrate and commingle with Buridan's surrounding assumed OGC? Buridan apparently assumes not. Are there many contexts here, and do they interrelate? Again, we perceive Buridan assumes not. Does not potential for many truths exist here? We argue to answer, "Yes." For example:

  1. The conventional one global context (OGC)
  2. Sentient 1's personal context
  3. Sentient 2's personal context
  4. New context formed by merger of sentient 1 and OGC
  5. New context formed by merger of sentient 2 and OGC
  6. New context formed by merger of sentients 1 and 2 and OGC
  7. etc.

Your reviewer agrees Buridan's incomplete conventional assumptions may form a limited common context for everyone. But when you merge one sentient's personal context with a single convention, a new context arises. And when you merge another sentient's personal context with a single conventional context a different context arises. One comparison depends on differences twixt personal contexts of sentients and unique interrelationships formed from each sentient and Buridan's common convention.

"...same proposition may be true and false at different times...," i.e., function of time

You, reader, must be keenly aware a predominant concept of time was and still is incoherent in any classical mind. A classical mind presumes time is a continuous and deterministic function.

Time flows in a classical mind and a classical mind interprets it variously as: unstoppable flow, stoppable flow, reversible flow, or combinations of these. But certainly there is nothing stochastic about time's flow perceived by a classical mind. Also, a classical mind has no sense of relativistic affects of any space-time identity. Indeed there was no space-time identity until early in Earth's 20th century.

Even further, a classical mind then and now does not conceive a concurrent infinity of Planck rate quantum flux which surrounds and interpenetrates both nonactual and actual parts of quantum reality, and whose cumulative dynamic change interrelationships with actuality provide an illusion of time flow.

"...given a fixed interpretation of a proposition, it is quite impossible for it to be both true and false at the same time."

From Buridan's perspective this is the problem with sophisms. As a result, he claims sophisms are inconsistent. Any proposition which is inconsistent is false.

Similar to our next quote, an implicit edict here demands one global/conventional context at any time of assessment of a proposition.

bivalence: any proposition is, "...either true or false..." Buridan's assumption here is SOM's classical one global truth. Any proposition, if it exists, must be either true or false, period. Buridan admits different interpretations, but allows only one is absolutely and verifiably correct. Classically, this says a proposition, if it exists, is an object. Classical objects may only exist either in a true state or a false state in one place (one context) at one unique analytic moment (one time).
"...given a fixed interpretation of a proposition..." i.e., any interpretation of a proposition is fixed

By this statement Buridan insists on one outcome of a proposition. He insists a chosen context determines an outcome of a proposition. It appears he denies existence of multiple contexts each evaluating said proposition at one same or different real loci and time. 

This is, again, the classical edict of one truth

Reader, you can see how this happens. Classicists indoctrinate SOM's schism: subject versus object. They declare reality is objective. They declare truth or falsity assessment by formal predicate logic is valid when propositions are real, i.e., they exist objectively. Propositions whose terms stand for real objects become real, existing objects. The proposition is real, so its assessment therefore must be either TRUE or FALSE! Only one way that can happen is if one evaluates the proposition in a single context which produces one truth result, period.

All of this denies quantum reality! All of this implies without assertion quantum science is a sophism.

But we can see Buridan almost arrives. He indirectly admits potential for multiple contexts (multiple interpretations), and he admits truth as a function of time. By these two admissions he relinquishes — he admits truth is relative to time and interpretation. Inarguably, truth in Buridan's logic is somewhat relative! That is at least partial progress.

Yet he makes a profound mistake of assuming singularity of context and time at any moment of assertion. Why? He still has SOM's anchor pulling him back to legacy logic. He wants to retain a classical ideal of one truth, in one context, at one time. Unfortunate implications are: truth is classically objective, context is classically objective, and time is classically objective!

OK, what does all this mean? Your reviewer interprets Buridan's logic as absolute relative truth. Buridan's truth is absolutely relative. Buridan's truth is relatively absolute. Hmmm... Buridan's truth is an oxymoron... Hmmm... No, its relative until and where you want it to be absolute!

As you can see, reader, we are going nowhere fast. This happens when we try to understand our physical world using classical SOM thinking. It does not work! SOMthinkers build towers of Babel. Buridan gives us more Babel!

"...any truth truth value...," i.e., absent truth value? Buridan's insistence on bivalence disallows fuzzy logic or stochastic logic. Buridan handles this with SOM's dialectical knife — he says fuzzy propositions are false, and he says affirmative propositions with 'empty' subjects are false. See p. 18. However his bivalence allows a concept of 'mu' only when any proposition is not real, i.e., when it does not exist. See p. 6. Mu means truth or falsity may not be assessed by any logic because context is locally incomplete or existence may not be established. 

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©Quantonics, Inc., 1998-2011 Rev. 6Feb2009  PDR Created: 17Dec1998  PDR
(6Sep2000 rev - Correct misspelled 'proportion' to 'proposition' in "given a fixed interpretation" cell.)
(7Feb2001 rev - Repair minor typos.)
(19Dec2001 rev - Add top of page frame-breaker.)
(17Jan2005 rev - Typo.)
(26Mar2007 rev - Reformat document.)
(6Feb2009 rev - Make document current.)