"If one asks what is characteristic of the realm of physical ideas independently of the quantum theory, then above all the following attracts our attention: the concepts of physics refer to a real external world, i.e., ideas are posited of things that claim a "real existence'' independent of the perceiving subject (bodies, fields, etc.). . . . Moreover, it is characteristic of these physical things that they are conceived of as being arranged in a space-time continuum. Further, it appears to be essential for this arrangement of the things introduced in physics that, at a specific time, these things claim an existence independent of one another, insofar as these things ''lie in different parts of space.'' Without such an assumption of the mutually independent existence (the "being-thus") of spatially distant things, an assumption which originates in everyday thought, physical thought in the sense familiar to us would not he possible. Nor does one see how physical laws could be formulated and tested without such a clean separation. Field theory has carried out this principle to the extreme, in that it localizes within infinitely small (four-dimensional) space-elements the elemen-tary things existing independently of one another that it takes as basic, as well as the elementary laws it postulates for them." Albert Einstein, 'QuantenMechanik Wirklichkeit,' 1948, Dialectica 2: 320-324. Our bold.
We found this quotation in Don Howard's 'Holism and Separability,' which appears in Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory, 1989, NDU paperback, pp. 224-253. Specific quotation appears on page 233 of Howard's exceptional paper.
Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory contains 15 papers regarding philosophical issues of Bell's Theorem, presented at a Notre Dame (South Bend, Indiana) conference titled 'Philosophical Lessons from Quantum Theory,' which was held October 1-3, 1987. Following authors presented: Jeremy Butterfield, James T. Cushing (ed.), Arthur Fine, Henry J. Folse, Don Howard, R. I. G. Hughes, Jon P. Jarrett, Ernan McMullin, N. David Mermin, Michael L. G. Redhead, Abner Shimony, Henry P. Stapp, Paul Teller, Bas C. van Fraassen, and Linda Wessels.
See a Jarrett quote, from his conference paper, at page top of our Bell's Theorem study.
Our bold above emphasizes Einstein's own (apparently self-unaware) "naïve realism." His "Nor does one see how physical laws could be formulated and tested without such a clean separation" illustrates his naïve realism most blatantly. It illustrates his dependence on lisrability and Aristotle's naïve syllogisms. Our critical review below, emphasizes it further.
We shall refer Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's paper, which we are critically reviewing, as EPR. We shall refer its authors as EPR.
You may wish to skip directly to our comprehensive tabular review of 170 problematic classical terms used by EPR in their 1935 EPR paper.
Our efforts here, to review Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's 1935 paper, arise from our review of Sylvia Nasar's 1998 biographical documentary book about John Forbes Nash titled A Beautiful Mind. In that book Nasar claims oddly, and we believe incorrectly, that EPR's paper has never been satisfactorily refuted. She says, on page 70 of 459 total pages, "Einstein's 1935 attack on quantum theory produced a front-page headline in The New York Times and has never been satisfactorily refuted; indeed, as of the mid-1990s, the latest experimental evidence has breathed new life into his critique." There have been countless refutations of EPR and EPR's intentions in EPR, (including: Bell, Bohr, Bohm, Clauser-Friedman, Dirac's tourmaline experiment exposing "uncaused affectation,' Satinover's "uncaused causes," Gisin-Zeilinger, Gödel (on system uncertainty: completeness vis-à-vis system consistency indirectly and prior 1935), et al.) and our efforts here extend those refutations significantly.
We think Richard P. Feynman would say about EPR's efforts, "Nobody understands quantum mechanics." He was right, in our view. But...probably not for reasons he would proffer. Our view is that we may n¤t use mechanics to understand reality. Reality is n¤t mechanical! In our view, EPR have n¤ philosophical legs upon which to stand. Fundamentally, their classical beliefs made it impossible for them to fathom quantum reality's depths.
Essence of our review process is to offer some general criticisms of EPR's work. We will do so in terms of our own Quantonic heuristics about our Millennium III views of quantum reality. We will use our own work products, from our efforts to quantum~remediate English language. Those work products and associated quantum memes will enable us to offer more apt descriptions of quantum reality and juxtapose our memes against EPR's classical concepts.
We offer our review in two stages: first, direct quotes from EPR with comments following each quote; second, a table of categorized classical words extracted from EPR with classical interpretations, Quantonics hermeneutics, and relevant links.
Before that, as has become our practice, we will offer EPR's EPR thelogos statistics.
Their paper is short. Excluding mathematical notation, they used 2200 total words. The occurred 236 times out of 2200 words. We did not count formulas and symbols in formulas.
We classically calculated their thelogos as 236/2200 = 0.107 which is utterly astounding! This is our highest level of thelogos for any review we have ever done! An amazing 10.7% of all words in EPR's 1935 paper are 'the!'
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen end their paper, with words which we need to know as we begin our review of their 1935 paper. They end EPR like this:
"Previously we proved that either (1) the quantum-mechanical description of reality given by the wave function is not complete or (2) when the operators corresponding to two physical quantities do not commute the two quantities cannot have simultaneous reality. Starting then with the assumption that the wave function does give a complete description of the physical reality, we arrived at the conclusion that two physical quantities, with noncommuting operators, can have simultaneous reality. Thus the negation of (1) leads to the negation of the only other alternative (2). We are thus forced to conclude that the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality given by wave functions is not complete."
That quote offers an example of how we plan to proceed in our review of EPR's paper. Our approach is to question and doubt any general valihdity of their classical use of terms which we highlight in red. Further, we claim that highlighted terms which they use are, in general, currently invalihd as they are classically and formally defined in common academic and scientific references. Simply stated, both highlighted terms EPR use and EPR's uses of those terms are, in our view, generally invalihd. We claim, simply, that their uses of generally invalihd classical terms invalihdates their claim that quantum theory is incomplete.
We take a position that EPR presume reality is classical. Therefore they implicitly presume that classical reality is substantial (e.g., their uses of "physical reality" and "physical quantities") and thus objective. Further, they implicitly presume that Aristotle's syllogistic logic applies in their formal predicate logic descriptions of the problem of quantum theory's incompleteness, and they presume that they can use Aristotle's syllogistic logic to prove their claim that quantum theory is incomplete, i.e.,
We claim that EPR's application of classical Aristotelian syllogisms in their proof is generally invalihd because Aristotle's three syllogisms are generally invalihd.
Our claims follow Henri Louis Bergson's lead in his statement that practitioners of classical philosophy and science suffer two illusions: 1) Reality is stable, and 2) Objects in reality are independent of one another. See Bergson's Creative Evolution topic 39 beginning, pp. 272-274. Look for our bold red highlights of stable and independent read surrounding words.
We further claim as natural and confirmable fact that reality is instable (i.e., classically instable; reality is always in abs¤lute quantum flux) in all scales. Reality is unstoppable for convenience of classical observation and measurement. To presume reality is stable is, in general, invalihd. Reality is always changing and reality changæs all. No atom has inanimate nuclei and inanimate electron shells. No aggregation of atoms has inanimate nuclei and electron shells.
We further claim as natural and confirmable fact that objects are n¤t independent of one another. We offer two notably observable physi: everywhere associativity of gravity, and everywhere associativity of atomic and subatomic probability distributions. Latter we can extend to show real instability and real included~middle c¤mplementary dependence as: everywhere animate associativity of gravity, and everywhere animate associativity of atomic and subatomic probability distributions. To presume reality's middle is excluded is, in general, invalihd.
These latter claims, following Bergson's prescient lead, permit us to deny any general valihdity of Aristotle's three syllogisms when those syllogisms are used as defined to classically describe natural reality! How?
So our claims can now be used to show how all those red highlighted words are profoundly, 'define'-ately invalihd and EPR used them invalihdly because of their invalihd classical presumptions:
With that, we have shown you a more articulated step-by-step version of our approach in this, our critical review of EPR's 1935 paper.
We will continue in a more casual manner and make comments about selectively quoted statements, EPR make in their paper, with which we disagree. However, we will be less exegetic in our detractions. Subsequently, in a table of ~170 unique words extracted from EPR we will offer recurring and reutile details to back up our detracting claims.
Here is a quote of their EPR beginning abstract:
"In a complete theory there is an element corresponding to each element of reality.1 A sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity is the possibility of predicting it with certainty, without disturbing the system. In quantum mechanics in the case of two physical quantities described by non-commuting operators, the knowledge of one precludes the knowledge of the other. Then either (1) the description of reality given by the wave function in quantum mechanics is not complete or (2) these two quantities cannot have simultaneous reality. Consideration of the problem of making predictions concerning a system on the basis of measurements made on another system that had previously interacted with it leads to the result that if (1) is false then (2) is also false. One is thus led to conclude that the description of reality as given by a wave function is not complete."
As you can see this is nearly identical to a near-closing paragraph we quoted, first, above.
To put both quotes in a later, 1950, perspective, here is Einstein in a letter to Schrödinger:
"It is rather rough to see that we are still in the stage of our swaddling clothes, and
it is not surprising that the fellows struggle against admitting it (even to themselves)."
Quote taken from Jammer's The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, p. 187, 1st ed., Wiley, 1974.
Einstein's candor belies 'modern science's' current, 2004, claims that it does know how to depict and 'model' reality as 3D-1T, objective, materially independent and 'stoppable.'
Doug - 3Nov2004.
Their first sentence offers us classical science's most cherished presumption: 1-1 correspondence. Its sibling kin is another classical presumption: causation. We claim both classical notions are, in general, invalihd. 1-1 correspondence is most fundamentally impossible due reality's animate, heterogeneous included~middle. Reality's included~middle denies any classical notion of absolute certainty. Too, reality's animacy/instability denies any possibility of stable correspondence, let alone specific 1-1 correspondence. To make matters even worse natural reality is heterogeneous, n¤t as EPR presumed: classically homogeneous. Reality only offers us heterogeneous, animate, included~middle, ensemble quantum umcærtainty interrelationships n¤t classically objective 'interactive' 1-1 correspondences! Absence of any classical notion of 1-1 correspondence disables a concomitant classical notion of causation, i.e., "A causes B." As John von Neumann found after great effort, there is n¤ such thing as a singular, solitary, localable, isolable, separable, reducible, classical, objective cause "A." Doesn't exist. Cannot exist! To claim it does exist is to delude, classically! For similar reasons, there is n¤ singular,..., reducible, classical effect "B." And, neither can A n¤r B hold still n¤r be classically, conveniently stopped.
Without 1-1 correspondence and causation, EPR cann¤t valihdly define and use "predicting," and "certainty," as they have in our quote above.
Now ponder how EPR require 1-1 correspondence and causation in their second sentence as, "A sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity is the possibility of predicting it with certainty, without disturbing the system." Their classical presumption of certain prediction is invalihd, in general, due our claim that their presumptions of 1-1 correspondence and causation are invalihd foundational classical presumptions. Their classical presumption of nonsystemic disturbance is invalihd, in general, due a natural fact of everywhere animate associativity of real systems (gravity is an example of countless natural everywhere animate associations).
We find their ostensible definition and use of "knowledge" intriguing too. To us it elicits 'know' and 'ledge.' It deludes definers and users that knowledge can be stable and placed on a ledge or shelf or in a computer data base. Reality's physical flux is absolute! It changæs all (c¤mplete) and always changæs (comsistent). Classicists' presumptions and 'laws' delude them into believing that they can cinematographically sample and store reality. But as Bergson also warned us, absolute animate process is n¤nanalytic. If we sample it, stop it, and save it, our pictures are n¤t real. Why? They are classically inanimate! Our stable drawings are n¤t real. Our state-ic, symbolic equations are n¤t real. To genuinely represent reality, we may n¤t stop it! Perhaps our best near term effort might be to use animate reality itself to directly experience itself (As Richard Feynman, et al., presciently suggest.). And that is what living, bio~n¤n~logical entities do (i.e., n¤n~classically, n¤n~radically~formally, n¤n~predicate~logical bion¤ns: coined here, in Quantonics, 20Jun2002). But as we know from our own living experiences of reality, reality is instable and included~middle c¤mplementary (vis-à-vis classically and objectively stable and independent). More, reality's outcomes are never globally, generally predictable and certain. Reality is always, by direct experience, generally unpredictable and umcærtain. Even more, by direct experience, reality's stochastic conditions and affects/outcomes are always ensemble heterogeneous. Finally, by direct experience, we know that reality offers its players modica of free will and choice/choosings. We have at least to a limited extent something to say about whatings happenings nextings.
Similarly, and as Bergson explains so well in his Time and Free Will, EPR's definitions and uses of "quantity" and "quantities" are suspect. Classical notions of quantity depend upon classical notions of measurement. Their classical notions of measurement quantity depend upon notions of scalar magnitude which further depend, again, on invalihd classical notions of a stable, stoppable, inanimate reality. Scalar magnitudes constitute what classicists refer as "knowledge." Bergson tells us that reality is animate processes unreally unrenderable in scalar magnitudes since classical scalar magnitudes, by definition, are n¤t animate processes (see our QELR of monitor - Doug - 22Apr2005. Zeno showed us how ludicrous classical reasoning about reality is, using classical notions and presumptions of stoppability, in his ½ of remaining distance and Achilles and tortoise race paradoxes. Bergson's cure for this invalihd classical presumption is simple: realize that real motions (e.g., walking, running, etc.) are n¤nanalytic processes. See Bergson on relevant Zeno memes in his TaFW topics 19, 22, and 23.
EPR's definition and uses of either and or in their EPR abstract are invalihd, in general. Either-or presumes Aristotle's 'law' of excluded-middle and objective independence is valihd. See our remediation of either.
In Quantonics we would alter EPR's EPR abstract's last sentence from, "One is thus led to conclude that the description of reality as given by a wave function is not complete," to, "One is thus led to conclude that any classical description of reality as given by a classically inanimate, excluded-middle wave function is not complete." Now we can agree with their conclusion. Why? In our altered version we show how classical thing-king methods, classical definitions, and classical presumptions about reality are invalihd. A perfect example is a classical presumption about completeness: no classical equation can be classically complete, i.e., no classical equation can state all truths about reality.
There is much more we can criticize about EPR's EPR abstract, but we choose to move on to relevant problems in their text's body which refer back to invalihd statements and terms in their abstract.
EPR write, "In attempting to judge the success of a physical theory, we may ask ourselves two questions : (1) 'Is the theory correct?' and (2) 'Is the description given by the theory complete?'"
We answer that if we use classical methods of science, we can answer neither. (1) We cannot classically know if a theory is correct. Why? We have no valihd classical means of proof. (2) We cannot classically develop a complete theory! Why? No classical theory can state all truths about reality. And if we could state all truths about reality, our 'set' of truths would be mutually inconsistent, incommensurable, and contrafactual (See: Gödel, Bell, Foulis, Clauser-Friedman, Zeilinger-Gisin, et al.).
Too, EPR write, "The elements of the physical reality cannot be determined by a priori philosophical considerations, but must be found by an appeal to results of experiments and measurements."
EPR's definition and use of "a priori" here is apparently, "Judgment without experiment; unsupported by scientific research." Their problem here, as we see it is that judgment depends upon:
What is another way we can interpret what EPR have said? Aren't they saying analogously that 'physical reality' has no, and can find no bases in "a priori philosophical considerations?" And if that is what they are analogously saying, what can we then say about 'physical reality' vis-à-vis "a priori philosophical considerations?" An alternate view is that 'physical reality' from EPR's classical perspective has no philosophical bases, no legs upon which to stand. And with that, we can agree. But what does it "mean?" If our philosophy is quantum and n¤nclassical, then we may choose to say that classical 'physical reality' is a generally invalihd model of reality. And today, in early Millennium III, we k-now from a quantum perspective, that is a valihd judgment. If results of experiments and measurements are borne of classical Gedankenments and classical experimental setups, then they too are generally invalihd.
These are philosophical considerations without which EPR have gotten themselves in a great deal of difficulty. If your experiments and measurements presume reality is classically objective and inanimate when indeed reality is n¤t classically objective and inanimate, one gets in major trouble as EPR have, indeed.
Since we wrote this, several years ago, we have accumulated additional helpful information on issues of a priori. We can show now how quantum reality is indeed an a priori reality. EPR missed this, in spades; they denied it, in spades!
See our May, 2004 What is Wrong with Probability as Value. You will discover there how Henry Margenau shows there are a posteriori probabilities and a priori likelihoods. Former is a classical pastistic "scalar (stoppable-) measurement retrospective," amd lattær issi a quantum n¤wistihc "¤mniht¤rmænt qubihtal~ømniht¤ring pr¤spæctihvæ."
Doug - 16May2004
An unstated, but apparent to us, presumption EPR make is that classically interpreted results of experiments and measurements can fully describe reality. But if all their results are objectively inanimate and excluded-middle independent, and reality is animate and included~middle c¤mplementary, have EPR's methods fully described reality?
And what about reality's spectrum of animacy? Today, assisted, scientists capabilities to bandwidth sense and measure reality are limited to one part in ~1022 of reality's total (classically transverse, 2D sinusoidal, modeled) spectrum.
In EPR's time this capability was worse by at least four orders of magnitude! How can they even begin to believe that any classical theory could fully describe reality? (It is worth your while to ponder how EPR and their ilk turn reality's spectrum of animacy into a classical spectrum of inanimacy: by turning real unstoppable flux into unreal stopped space! Again, we refer Zeno. Also see James, Bergson, et al.)
They immediately continue, "A comprehensive definition of reality is, however, unnecessary for our purpose. We shall be satisfied with the following criterion, which we regard as reasonable. If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity. It seems to us that this criterion, while far from exhausting all possible ways of recognizing a physical reality, at least provides us with one such way, whenever the conditions set down in it occur. Regarded not as a necessary, but merely as a sufficient, condition of reality, this criterion is in agreement with classical as well as quantum-mechanical ideas of reality."
[They, their] EPR's "Regarded not as a necessary, but merely as a sufficient, condition of reality, this criterion is in agreement with classical as well as quantum-mechanical ideas of reality." is, from any quantum~reality perspective, incorrect. Indeed this is what is wrong with EPR's classical view. This CTM Error also explains why classical 'scientists' have been unable to unify Einsteinian Relativity and Quantum Mechanics.
HotMeme EPR's criterion, bluntly, does n¤t agree with quantum~mechanical 'ideas' of reality. HotMeme.
Simply, Einstein's SR and GR 'theories' are purely dialectical via their "probability is either one or zero." Those SR and GR theories deny quantum~mechanics' requisite for general stochastics. They turn off Planck's reality clock. They disable quantum~reality! Any meme of general stochastics demands a wave theoretical approach, i.e., a n¤n dialectical approach to relativity. They vigorously deny that in their EPR paper.
SR: Special Relativity
GR: General Relativity
Einstein, it becomes clearer and clearer, like Newton, was n¤t a genius. By today's standards of quantum~metaphysics, quantum~philosophy, and quantum~thinkq~ing...Einstein was an idiot! A damned socially-ennobled fool! Apparently, both Einstein and Newton were actually idiot savants...at best. Sort of like USA's current (CeodE 2001-2009) Bu()sh() disadministration.
I mean that, seriously!
Doug - 7Aug2008.
Here they tell us that their classical box is the only box in which scientists may acceptably reason. If we accept our newly introduced natural facts of absolutely animate reality and everywhere associative included~middle interrelationships of all reality, then there is no classical way for us to classically, analytically, "...predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity..." And their conclusion, "...there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity..." we must say is invalihd which denies their classical axiom of 1-1 correspondence.
Allow us to quote Bruno de Finetti on this very issue:
"It is a question of showing that there is no need
to admit, as it is currently held [e.g., by EPR above],
From Bruno de Finetti's 'Foresight:
Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources.'
We must remember that quantum theory was born, arose, and received its nurturing at hands of classically trained scientists who were willing to accept some phenomenally novel memes. We must also remember that classical concepts and idea(l)s are firmly entrenched and very difficult to extinguish using quantum percepts. Niels Bohr suffered a terrible experience with Einstein when Einstein called Bohr's quantum complementarity "subjective." Bohr acquiesced by explaining that his Copenhagen brand of quantum complementarity is "exclusive," and by saying that "opposites are complementary." In doing this, Bohr only jumped back into classicism's box. But he had little choice then. His apparent alternative was total loss of face and reputation among a then predominately classical physics community led by Albert Einstein whose classical special and general relativity theories were unreproachable.
Also try to imagine how physicists and scientists and mathematicians attempted to approach n¤vel quantum memes in those days. There were two main thrusts: matrix mechanics and wave mechanics. What is common under those two appellations? Mechanics! What is common to classical theory and quantum theory? Mechanics! And voilà! We may choose to see that mechanics is our problem! This is what David Bohm meant when he said we need a n¤vel n¤n~mechanical quantum approach to studying quantum reality. As we have said over and over, mechanics assumes reality is: 1) stable, and 2) objects in reality are independent of one another. Again, as we may choose to see, mechanics is fundamentally incapable of describing a real quantum reality. And this is a major problem in our review and critique of this EPR paper. EPR are criticizing a theory of quantum mechanics, n¤t a Bohmian quantum n¤nmechanics!
This puts us in a difficult position of having to criticize quantum mechanics! However, our bases for criticism remain unchangæd/variably-persistent and quantum~comsistent. They are simply that quantum reality is an animate, included~middle, c¤mplementary, everywhere associative, heterogeneous ensemble, stochastic reality. By comparison mechanical reality is an inanimate, excluded-middle, schismatic, everywhere dissociative, homogeneous singular, determinate reality.
To proceed without any philosophical considerations of vast implications of these two completely unlike descriptions of reality is foolhardy to understate. But that is what classicists do today: proceed as EPR recommend: proceed without , "...a priori philosophical considerations."
So expect to see us quote quantum mechanical descriptions and criticize them (due their mechanical tenor) just as we criticize EPR's own purely mechanical classicisms.
Next, EPR say of quantum mechanics, "The fundamental concept of the theory [of quantum mechanics] is the concept of state, which is supposed to be completely characterized by the wave function , which is a function of the variables chosen to describe the particle's behavior. Corresponding to each physically observable quantity A there is an operator, which may be designated by the same letter." Our brackets.
EPR presume fundamental concept means a fundamental classical objective concept where reality is inanimate and objects in reality are independent of one another.
EPR presume state describes stopped objective properties or measurables in classical reality.
EPR presume particles are classically objective, independent, and analytically stoppable for purposes of convenient unilateral and undisturbed/undisturbing/undisturbable observation.
EPR presume that analytically stopped particles have property states which are physically observable (physically measurable quantifiable 'steady state' scalar magnitudes) quantities.
As you may choose to perceive, EPR have just put quantum reality back into their classical box. Their wave function equations too, as they classically define and use them, are classically mechanical. Their functional behavior is classical unitemporal motion. They presume classical time is space/space (i.e., space-time is a naïve Einsteinian/Minkowskian classical identity; classicists have n¤ coherent analogue of physial, absolutely animate, heterogeneous, n¤nanalytic, durational quantum timings), and thus mechanically and analytically stoppable and classically observable too.
EPR's classical presumptions are simply enormous philosophical and thus scientific/physical errors of judgment! We worry that it will probably take most of Millennium III to remediate these massive errors of classical thought. Regardless as with W. Edwards Deming's memes of Total Quality Management Orient, Japan, et al., will figure it out, to their extreme advantage, before classically entrenched Western culture does. They already are!
Quantum reality is a vast ensemble of animate interrelationships. Instead of asking classically, "what happens next?" instead, in quantum reality we must ask "whatings happenings nextings?" Instead of thing-king with classicism's singular active/passive voice grammar we must learn to begin think-king with a more remediative quantum heterogeneous present participle grammar.
And this is where probability enters, and this explains why quantum reality refuses to bow to classicism's 1-1 correspondent, causal and analytic dogma. ("Probability is everything!!!" John Forbes Nash, recall-quoted in Sylvia Nasar's A Beautiful Mind, p. 243, from Nasar's 23Mar1996 interview with Jerome Neuwirth.) F. S. C. Northrop agrees with Nash in his 1958 Introduction to Werner Karl Heisenberg's Physics and Philosophy thus:
|"Put more concretely, this difference between quantum mechanics and previous physical theories may be expressed as follows: In Newton's and Einstein's theory, the state of any isolated mechanical system at a given moment of time is given precisely when only numbers specifying the position and momentum of each mass in the system are empirically determined at that moment of time; no numbers referring to a probability are present. In quantum mechanics the interpretation of an observation of a system is a rather complicated procedure. The observation may consist in a single reading, the accuracy of which has to be discussed, or it may comprise a complicated set of data, such as the photograph of the water droplets in a cloud chamber; in any case, the result can be stated only in terms of a probability distribution concerning, for instance, the position or momentum of the particles of the system. The theory then predicts the probability distribution for a future time. The theory is not experimentally verified when that future state arrives if merely the momentum or position numbers in a particular observation lie within the predicted range. The same experiment with the same initial conditions [problematic] must be repeated [problematic] many times, and the values of position or momentum, which may be different in each observation, must similarly be found to be distributed according to the predicted probability distribution. In short, the crucial difference between quantum mechanics and Einstein's or Newton's mechanics centers in the definition of a mechanical system at any moment of time, and this difference is that quantum mechanics introduces the concept of probability into its definition of state and the mechanics of Newton and Einstein does not." Pages 6-7. Our bold, brackets, and color. (This quote added 29Jul2002 - Doug. Caveat: Northrop offers us some problematic classicisms of his own, but we choose n¤t to criticize them here, e.g., 'time,' 'state,' 'particle,' 'predict,' 'verifiy,' 'observation,' 'same,' 'different,' 'define,' 'mechanical,' 'phasicity (only by Doug's inference),' and 'probability' as classically homogeneous, stable, independent and n¤n quantum c¤mplementary. Animate, heterogeneous, included~middle timings, too, like positionings and momentumings have their own quantum c¤mplementary pr¤bability distributions.)
Per our immediately previous discussion regarding a priori, we apprise readers that we should reread Northrop's paragraph while substituting quantum prospective "likelihood" for classical retrospective 'probability.'
Too we should remediate 'time' to 'timings,' 'result' to 'affectings,' 'predicts' to 'anticipates~expects,' 'verified' to 'tentative,' 'difference' to 'omnifferencings,' 'definition' to 'descriptionings,' etc.
Isn't it fascinating to fathom whether Nash wondered about classical-probability's ascension as quantum~likelihood?
Doug - 16May2004.
EPR complain about this aspect of their view of 'quantum mechanics.' Since a quantum particle's coordinate location is probabilistic, "A definite value of the coordinate, for a particle...is thus not predictable, but may be obtained only by a direct measurement. Such a measurement however disturbs the particle and thus alters its state. After the coordinate is determined, the particle will no longer be [where it was formerly classically located]. The usual conclusion from this in quantum mechanics is that when the momentum of a particle is known, its coordinate has no physical reality."
What EPR say here, even though they use classical language and classical definitions, describes 'what happens' in quantum reality quite well.
Let's start on this quote by looking at those last three words: "no physical reality." What do EPR mean when they say that? They mean that classical physical reality is ('only') actual and observable reality. EPR reality is classical reality: reality which is known and known to exist. Any phenomena which are not known and not known to exist do not exist in EPR's reality. Only objective reality classically 'exists' in EPR's version of reality. They throw out subjective reality as non-existent!
Now it is time for us to establish an affine nexus of vast importance in understanding differences (for students of Quantonics, we should use omnifferences here) twixt EPR's views of classical reality and how we must learn to view quantum reality. Recall Einstein's denigration of Bohr's complementarity. Einstein called Bohr's complementarity subjective! Since Aristotle Western science, philosophy, culture, language, etc. have depended upon a view of reality which is substantial and objective. That view further depends upon Aristotle's insistent position which rejects any notion of a subjective reality. Classical reality, EPR-style, is only (viz. 'onely,' monistically) an objective reality. Trouble is, quantum reality is more subjective than it is objective. Quantum reality is a qualitative, affective reality. Quantum reality is a commingling of subjective memes and only an apparency of wholly objective classical idea(l)s and concepts. Quantum reality is an emergent, fluxing reality. EPR's view of classical reality depends upon reality being a stable, state-ic, objectively independent reality.
Quantum reality demands that we re-define, or better, re-describe what we mean when we say 'reality.' Where classicism insists that reality is just objective and classicists can oppositionally decide ideally between either good objective concepts or bad subjective phenomena, quantum reality demands that we start viewing reality as a quantum co-inside-nce of both subjectives and objectives, both waves and particles, both qualities and quantities, etc. In Quantonics we do that by distinguishing classical dichon(subjective, objective) vis-à-vis quantum quanton(subjectives,objectives), and classical dichon(quality, quantity) vis-à-vis quantum quanton(qualities,quantities), etc.
|(Students of Quantonics are k-nowings that we should be sayings, "...quanton(subjectivings,objectivings), and quanton(qualityings,quantityings), etc." I.e., quantum reality issi processings and thus quantum reality requirings our nominal usagings of plural present(ings) participle(ings) grammarings. Note added 26Aug2002 - Doug.)
Now we can offer a quantum explanation of 'what happens' in quantum reality when a classicist says what EPR said above that, "The usual conclusion from this in quantum mechanics is that when the momentum of a particle is known, its coordinate has no physical reality."
EPR's no physical reality corresponds pure quantum subjectivity, which we in Quantonics call "n¤nactuality." We partition quantum reality into two open, c¤mpenetrating/overlapping/included~middle/quantum~holism/quantum~indivisibility memes which we appellate: n¤nactuality and actuality. We can now describe a larger quantum reality which subsumes EPR's define-it classical 'reality:'
When EPR say that quantum theory claims that a particle's coordinate under special quantum circumstances "has no physical reality," we interpret what they say using our mental, quantum stage modeling of quantum reality as shown above. What our quantum reality modeling shows is that quantum n¤nactuality and quantum actuality are included~middle quantum umcærtainty c¤mplements of one another! When we measure any quanton, we impose ensemble quantum umcærtainty interrelationships on that quanton's c¤mplements' ensemble. In this specific case of a 'particle' quanton's position and momentum, when we measure momentum, our 'particle' quanton's position spreads out everywhere-associatively in quantum n¤nactuality, while our 'particle' quanton's momentum localizes specifically in quantum actuality. Position did n¤t quantumly disappear (it did classically 'disappear'), it just isn't where EPR thought it should be since their classical reality has n¤ quantum meme for quantum n¤nactuality.
Notice that what we describe here is just how holograms and quantum associative self-organizing networks behave! Quantum SON's do just what we described! Our quantum stage 'minds' do an analogous quanton(enhance_l¤cal_association,attenuate_n¤nl¤cal_everywhere_associations) quantum c¤mplement when we focus on a particular quanton while we necessarily defocus on said focused quanton's c¤mplements and those c¤mplements' other quantons and their c¤mplements!
As you may choose to understand, our Quantonically scripted Quantum_Reality quanton is a vast ensemble of quantum umcærtainties.
Similarly, any quanton has potentially uncountable animate, OEDC ensemblings of quantum c¤mplements, thus denying any capability of assessing classical independent "physically real" objective 1-1 correspondence. In our specific EPR example we can show a particle's uncertainty interrelationship like this:
where said particle's quantum real animacy has OEDC ensembling quantum c¤mplements of countless other varieties than just position and momentum, and all of which have affective quantum c¤mplementary interrelationships in "real time" with said particle. To offer a good philosophical gedankenment of what we are imagining here, use Pirsig's squirrel-man quanton pair circling a tree in a forest. Think of these c¤mplementary interrelationships in Bergsonian durational animation: quanton(squirrel,tree), quanton(squirrel,man), quanton(man,tree), quanton(man,other_trees), quanton(squirrel,other_trees), quanton(man,Earth), quanton(squirrel,Earth), ..., moon, solar_system, galaxy, et al. Classicists tell us to ignore everything but man and squirrel! Another superb example is a human's (any mammal's) cellular apoptosis 170 day cycles vis-à-vis mammalian life cycle. Another is animate c¤mplementary interrelationships: quanton(moon,Earth), quanton(Earth,solar_system), quanton(solar_system,galaxy), quanton(galaxy,local_cluster), quanton(local_cluster,super_cluster), quanton(super_cluster,universe), quanton(universe,multiverses), et al.
EPR intend something entirely different, and offer their mental model of reality something like this:
Their definition and use of a classical equal sign presumes that classical reality is analytically stable and objects in it are independent and their classical position/momentum 'interactions' are absolutely independent but simultaneously certain and 1-1 causally correspondent. Our depiction of a classical dichon with a comma-space intentionally shows classical objective independence via Aristotle's 'law' of excluded-middle.
By comparison, our use of a Quantonics equals semiotic accepts that quantum reality is animate. Our depiction of a quantum quanton with a comma-n¤space intentionally illustrates a quantum everywhere-associative included-middle among all actuality and n¤nactuality in quantum reality.
For more details on comparisons among classical and quantum realities see our: Aristotle Connection, Quantum Connection, SOM Connection, and Sophism Connection.
It is important to understand that EPR's classical reality as we have shown it above, is just a tiny subset of what we call "quantum actuality." Reasons for this are n¤n trivial, but we can use a Kuhnian notion of paradigm to partially explain. EPR's belief system which we call "classical science" is uni-paradigmatic. It allows only one common 'normal scientific' community "disciplinary matrix-" approved view of reality. Classicists and EPR claim that theirs is 'the' only view possible, but that is a lie. We can arbitrarily contrive an unlimited number of belief systems any one of which would be just as effective as paradigms, as substitute paradigms for EPR's classical science, if we could take 2500 years to convince and proselytize nearly everyone that a new paradigm is 'the' belief system. In fact, as Kuhn shows, classical science is schizophrenically doing just that, now mid 2002, as we write this.
That is why we say that EPR's classical reality model is only a tiny subset of quantum actuality. For more on this issue, see A Map of a New Reality, and A Map of Millennium III Reality.
EPR say that if we cannot measure any two quantum 'particle's' complements commutatively, then they do not exist in classical reality simultaneously, and any attempt to measure one complement 'disturbs' said quantum 'particle's' other complement, "in such a way as to destroy the knowledge of the first," then,
"From this follows that either (1) the quantum-mechanical description of reality, given by the wave function is not complete or (2) when the operators corresponding to two physical quantities do not commute the two quantities cannot have simultaneous reality. For if both of them had simultaneous realityand thus definite valuesthese values would enter into the complete description, according to the condition of completeness. If then the wave function provided such a complete description of reality, it would contain these values; these would then be predictable. This not being the case, we are left with the alternatives stated."
Note EPR's either/or classical dichon.
Now, permit us to reword that long red, bold text segment like this, "two comjugal quantum c¤mplements of a specific quanton cann¤t, in general, have simultaneous actuality." Reworded, in our own remediated language, we can accept our version of their statement as valihd. Further ponder, "any two quantum c¤mplements of any quanton do, in general, have simultaneous quantum reality!" I.e., our quantum particle's everywhere associative position c¤mplement has simultaneous n¤nactuality with our quantum particle's locally dissociative, decoherent, currently under measurement actuality c¤mplement: momentum.
For a superb example of this quantum comjugation of n¤nactuality-actuality see our Stairways of Evidence for Quantum Stages' Affects co-with-in Perceptual Changes, and view our stairway quantum tells there.
Also see comjugate: quantum c¤mplementary comjugation implies quanton(n¤nactuality,actuality); quantum c¤mplementary conjugation implies quanton(actuality,actuality). Former assumes a single quanton and all its potential everywhere-associative n¤nactual c¤mplements. Latter assumes multiple actual quantons' quantum-actual c¤mplementary interrelationships.
Also see our What Are Laundry Lists? text segment at our review of 'Act II' of Banesh Hoffmann's The Strange Story of the Quantum. That segment explains simply what is at issue in EPR's complaint about incompleteness of quantum theory. Laundry lists (...essentially 2D rectangular arrays of classically 'paired' data; e.g., from-to 'distances' in Road Atlases...) neatly uncloak reality's intrinsic macroscopic quantum uncertainty in a very straightforward manner. One quantum~exemplar: due Earth's natural evolutionary geological processings and our solar system's journeyings around our Milky-Way, those 'distances' are dynamic and macroscopically~uncertainly inconstant. Also fathom weather, clouds, temperatures, road conditions on trip to destination vis-à-vis weather from destination. Doug - 30Jun2008.
As we said earlier in this review, EPR's problem is that they see reality with classical (theoretical and dialectical) blinders on. If they take their classical blinders off and install n¤vel quantum pince nez, they might be able to accept quantum theory as vastly superior to and incredibly more complete than classical mechanics. Perhaps Einstein should have paid more attention to his own 1926 statement to Heisenberg, "Only the theory decides what one can observe."
EPR continue their criticisms of quantum theory for several more paragraphs, but they offer no new classical issues, and simply continue rehashing their arguments and terms.
EPR conclude their paper thus, "While we have thus shown that the wave function does not provide a complete description of the physical reality, we left open the question of whether or not such a description exists. We believe, however, that such a theory is possible."
What EPR showed is that when one uses classical means to understand,
describe, and criticize any aspect of physical reality, one may
expect to achieve incomplete effects. They did. Had we adhered
their classical concepts, ideas, and dogma, we would have to conclude
as they did: classical reality, classical concepts
and any classical "...wave function
not provide a complete description of the physical reality..."
But when we use quantons, we can provide quantum c¤mplementary
descriptions of physial reality.
Doug - 12-19Jun2002.
Sylvia Nasar did not tell us her source of that New York Times article. Max Jammer does tell us: Saturday issue, May 4, 1935 [prior to Physical Review's May 15, 1935 publication of EPR], Vol. 84, No. 28,224, p. 11.
Niels Bohr summarized his views [this is a mix of Jammer and Bohr, with Bohr in single quotes] thus, "...Bohr compared the quantum mechanical observation with that in classical physics. To endow classical laws with experimental significance we must be able to determine the exact state of all the relevant parts of the system. This requires a correlation between the system of interest and the measuring apparatus subject to the condition that the state of the system can be inferred by observing the large-scale measuring apparatus. Now, in classical physics, in spite of such an interrelation between object and measuring apparatus the two systems can be distinguished by an appropriate conceptual analysis. In quantum physics, on the other hand, no such analysis is possible: object and measuring device form an unanalyzable [i.e., Bergsonian durational] unity. Whereas in classical physics the interaction between object and measuring device may be neglected or compensated for, in quantum mechanics it forms an inseparable [i.e., EIMA] part of the phenomenon. Hence, as Bohr expressed in an essay which [he] regarded as a particularly lucid presentation of his view:
'The unambiguous account of proper quantum phenomena must, in principle, include a description of all relevant features of the experimental arrangement... In the case of quantum phenomena, the unlimited divisibility of events implied in such an account is, in principle, excluded by the requirement to specify the experimental conditions. Indeed, the feature of wholeness typical of proper quantum phenomena finds its logical expression in the circumstance that any attempt at a well-defined subdivision [i.e., classical analyticity] would demand a change in the experimental arrangement incompatible with the definition of the phenomena under investigation' [From Bohr in his Quantum Physics and Philosophy, which appeared in Philosophy in the Mid-Century, R. Klibansky, editor.]
"The result of any quantum mechanical measurement informs us consequently not of the state of the object as such but of the whole experimental situation in which it is immersed. The completeness of quantum mechanical description, challenged by Einstein and his collaborators, was thus saved, in Bohr's view, by the [quantum] feature of wholeness." Our brackets. Quoted from Jammer's 1st ed., The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Ch. 6, pp. 196-197, Wiley, 1974.
For a superb coverage of history of EPR read all of Jammer's TPoQM Chapter 6.
Doug - 20May2004.
Note 1 - Just taken literally, students of Quantonics may see that this first sentence is practically, from a classical perspective, impossible. It demands that a complete theory must have a formal counterpart to every classically objective "element" of reality.