| Longmans Green and Co. Page Numbers |
T.H. Green's Original Critique
Introduction of Hume's AToHN Text. Introduction has 299 total pages. |
Doug's Comments. Relevance: Doug's Review of T.H. Green's Critique Introduction of Hume's AToHN. See our or C¤l¤r C¤dæs. |
| Pages 207-209 |
Page 207: Paragraph 250. If words have any meaning, the above must imply that the disposition of points is at least a different idea from either colour or tangibility, however impossible it may be for... Page 208: ...us to experience it without one or other of the latter. [Green appears to be hinting that colour was considered 'intangible' in both Hume's and Green's time... Doug is uncertain about that.] Nor can we suppose that this impression, other than colour, is one that results from the composition of colour, even if we admit that such composition could yield a result different from colour. According to Hume, the components of the compound impression are already impressions of coloured , points, atoms, or corpuscles,' and such points imply just that limitation by mutual externality, which is already the disposition in question. Is this 'disposition,' then, an impression of sensation? If so, 'through which of the senses is it received? If it be perceived by the eyes it must be a colour,' &c. &c.; 1 but from colour, the impression with which Hume would have identified it if he could, he yet finds himself obliged virtually to distinguish it. It is a relation, and not even one of those relations, such as resemblance, which in Hume's language, 'depending on the nature of the impressions related,'2 may plausibly be reckoned to be themselves impressions. The 'disposition' of parts and their 'situation' he uses interchangeably, and the situation of impressions he expressly opposes to their 'nature'3— [Green has this note refer back to AToHN text which refers this paragraph in Green's Introduction to AToHN.] that nature in respect of which all impressions, call them what we like, are 'originally on the same footing' with pain and pleasure. Consistently with this he pronounces the 'external position' of objects— their position as bodies external to each other and to our body—to be no datum of sense, no impression or idea, at all.4 [Green has this note refer back to AToHN text which refers this paragraph in Green's Introduction to AToHN.] Our belief in it has to be accounted for as a complex result of 'propensities to feign.' How, then, can there be an impression of that which does not belong to the nature of any impression? What difference is there between 'bodies' and 'corpuscles endowed with colour and solidity,' that the outwardness of the latter to each other—also called then... Page 209: ...distance' from each other1 —should be an impression, while it is admitted that the same relation between 'bodies' cannot be so? [Doug does not show Green's footnotes' text. We show text gap ellipses at intrapage original page boundaries. Green's use of &c. is a dual of today's etc. ] |
Time from Hume's publication of AToHN to Green's review is roughly 1898 minus 1739 which is about 160 years. Huge opportunity here to assess claimed accretion of 'scientific' knowledge, at least it appears that way to Doug. What fascinates Doug most about this paragraph and its successor is Green's juxtaposition of colour and space. Why? During Hume's time on Earth and Green's time here time and space were held by some to be identical if not similar. But has colour shared that 'elite' status with 'time' since then? If so, Doug has not been aware of it. Of course, in Quantonics' version of quantum philosophy and its non mechanical modalings colour is quantum flux! Colour is quantum flux just like space, time, mass, energy, gravity and all of reality are quantum fluxings. See our QELR of wave. It's all too obvious now! But was that fundamental tether so obvious nearly 300 years ago? Doug doubts it, but is partially uncertain. If you know an answer to this we would really appreciate your input. Doug Renselle Green does a marvelous job of critiquing Hume. We agree with Green's criticisms. Green's came 160 years after Hume's narrative. Quantonics' arrive 109 years after Green's. Evolutionary progress is evident: palpable. We hate to oversimplify, but problematics which Green finds in Hume's narrative just find immediate solubility when we apply Quantonics' version of quantum philosophy to them. A great example is "...'external position' of objects...as bodies external to each other and to our body—to be no datum of sense, no impression or idea, at all..." In quantonics, all of that is simply quantons of phase~encodings of quantum flux. Hume is accidentally right, though, in his 'feign' of absence of scalarbative data and classically state-ic impressions. Phase~encodings are absolutely animate and evolving at up to Planck rates, so their 'impressions' are non analytical phase~changings. But those phase~encoding~changings still holographically SOrON 'impress' our quantum stages with all senses of which we are quantumly aware (actually, nonactually, and n¤nactually) today (2006). That is unbelievably simpler to grasp than our current classical approach using subject-object metaphysics and formal, dialectical, analytic thing-king and scalar 'measurement.' Doug - 17Dec2006. Green's critique shows us that similar as we have done with other authors we need to prepare a list of Hume's terms and juxtapose them other authors, SOM, CR, and quantum philosophy. We have started that list... At first blush Hume's "...situation of impressions he expressly opposes to their 'nature'..." appears as what we today (CeodE 2006) classically refer as "nurture vis-à-vis nature." In quantonics that becomes quanton(nature,nurture) where nurture issi ihn nature and nature issi ihn nurture. If Hume had access to quantum memes and memeos, we sense he would have generated far less Babel for which his successors now need vicariously apologize. Doug - 17Dec2006. |