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Buridan's explicit assumptions:

  1. substance exists
  2. nonsubstance does not exist
  3. classical objects are substantial and exist
  4. classical objects possess attributes or properties
  5. truth value may be assessed only by propositions which exist
  6. truth may take only three values: true, false, unknown/undefined
  7. propositions may exist or not exist and may alternate existence in time
  8. propositions take four different truth condition forms:
    1. For the terms of the truth conditions listed here, A, E, I, and O, use:
      1. s for subject
      2. p for predicate
      3. s and p may stand for objects which:
        1. exist
        2. exist not
        3. are empty
    2. The truth conditions are:
      1. A - Every s is (a) p.
        1. if s stands for something, and
        2. everything s stands for p stands for
      2. E - No s is (a) p.
      3. I - Some s is (a) p.
      4. O - Some s is not (a) p.
    3. Buridan offers extensions to these truth conditions, other forms of them, and unique jargon for other terms in the truth conditions. Reader, please investigate these on your own.
    4. Buridan calls the connective 'is' a copula. Copulae are connectives of the verb form 'be.' We take 'is' grammatically equivalent to 'iso,' or 'equal.' I.e., A is B + C is equiform A = B + C.
  9. propositions are written, spoken, or mental
  10. written and spoken propositions represent mental propositions
  11. objects of belief are propositions (p. 16)
  12. propositions must be asserted declaratively or indicatively
  13. propositions are sentence tokens that are either true or false (logic is bivalent)
  14. proposition meaning may change upon change of conventional global context Note 1:
  15. equiform propositions differ only when their truth conditions differ
  16. equiform propositions may not be true and false simultaneously (e.g., p. 47 - parity, universality)
  17. propositions which exist include terms whose suppositions stand for substance, objects, object properties, personal suppositions, or material suppositions
  18. truth value is either true or false
  19. true premises never entail a false conclusion Note 2:
  20. suppositions exist
  21. suppositions adapt the terms of a proposition to the details of the global context
  22. signification is an insubstantial dialectical concept where supposition is a substantial concept
  23. significative (indirect) supposition is similar to modern logic's 'use'
  24. material (direct) supposition is similar to modern logic's 'mention' (a la Latin's ly prefix/sign)
  25. signification 'within the mind' is material supposition
  26. contexts exist
  27. selected context is conventional, established by both consensus and propositions under evaluation
  28. once selected, the context becomes global for propositions and entailments under evaluation
  29. a proposition's truth value is true in the global context when the proposition's subject is non-empty, and the proposition is consistent, and the proposition satisfies all of its:
    1. truth conditions
    2. suppositions
    3. entailments
  30. a proposition's truth value is false in the global context when the proposition's subject is empty, or the proposition is inconsistent, or the proposition contradicts any of its:
    1. truth conditions
    2. suppositions
    3. entailments
  31. a proposition is consistent if its truth value recurs in the global context (notice a classical canonic edict that classical 'reality' must hold still in order for 'consistent' 'truth' to be assessed - Doug - 17Dec2007)
  32. a proposition is inconsistent if its truth value changes in the global context (notice that, classically judged, quantum~reality (QR) is always classically inconsistent since QR always changes all - see coquecigrues)
  33. an inconsistent proposition's truth value is false (Classical 'reality' says "quantum~reality is 'false'.")
  34. every true proposition is contextually consistent
  35. self-contradictory propositions are false (Classical 'reality' says "quantum animate EIMA fractal self~other~reference" is false; quantum~process is 'false!' Ugh!)
  36. self-contradictory propositions appear both true and false simultaneously (note: both~and is natural in quantum~reality; indeed, both~all~while~and~many is natural in quantum~reality...)
  37. self-referent propositions exist
  38. non-self-referent propositions exist
  39. sophisms exist (Buridan concluded "all sophisms are 'false';" therefore, quantum~reality is 'false.')
  40. sophisms are self-referential propositions
  41. some sophisms are directly self-referential
  42. some sophisms are indirectly self-referential
  43. some sophisms are paradoxical
  44. some sophisms are contextually inconsistent
    1. the context in which a sophism is uttered either makes the sophism true, or
    2. makes the sophism contextually inconsistent (p. 149). Note 3:
    3. contexts which make the sophism contextually inconsistent make the sophism false Note 3:
  45. some sophisms are self-contradictory (p. 149)
  46. paradox arises only if we can prove a proposition false, then it follows that the proposition is true
  47. dialecticians may declare certain concepts non-existent, for example:
    1. chimeras (p. 15)
    2. a proposition whose suppositions stand for nothing
    3. empty subclasses of object categories Note 4:
  48. dialecticians may declare certain results of propositions absurd, for example:
    - see discussion on signification on p. 13


Note 1: Buridan admits the existence of multiple contexts. But they may not exist simultaneously! One global context must be conventionally accepted, or it is impossible to assess truth value either true or false. Return 1:

Note 2: See p. 20; this is ever so close to an edict for absolute truth — major problems here — in quantum reality; also in classical reality this assumption/edict demands either unchanging truth, absence of time flux, or demands that the global context remains unchanged if a premise is stable or that the global context changes synchronously with changes in a premise' entailment — this generates implied assumptions — clearly, we see here, classical reality's innate inability to classify and define change — we also see the insistence upon impossible classical objects: objects that are isolable, separable, individuistic, observable in isolation, observable in one conventional and unchanging context, and hold still, and do not change Return 2:

Note 3: Here we see again Buridan's insistence on One Global Truth. Return 3:

Note 4: This has huge philosophical ramifications, i.e., if we have not categorized something, it by assumption does not exist Return 4:

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©Quantonics, Inc., 1998-2009 Rev. 10Nov2007 PDR — Created: 3Nov1998 PDR
(10Nov2007 rev - Reformat slightly. Red bold occurrences of signification.)