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A Review
Henri Louis Bergson's Book
Creative Evolution
Chapter II: The Divergent Directions of the
Evolution of Life, Torpor, Intelligence, Instinct
Topic 24: The Function of the Intellect
by Doug Renselle
Doug's Pre-review Commentary
Start of Review

Chapter I II
Introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Chapter III IV
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45  46 47

Move to any Topic of Henri Louis Bergson's Creative Evolution,
or to beginning of its review via this set of links
says, "You are here!")

Topic 24...............The Function of the Intellect


(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis Bergson, some paraphrased.)

(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.)


"On the other hand, the objects we act on are certainly mobile objects, but the important thing for us to know is whither the mobile object is going and where it is at any moment of its passage. In other words, our interest is directed, before all, to its actual or future positions, and not to the progress by which it passes from one position to another, progress which is the movement itself. In our actions, which are systematized movements, what we fix our mind on is the end or meaning of the movement, its design as a whole—in a word, the immobile plan of its execution. That which really moves in action interests us only so far as the whole can be advanced, retarded, or stopped by any incident that may happen on the way. From mobility itself our intellect turns aside, because it has nothing to gain in dealing with it. If the intellect were meant for pure theorizing, it would take its place within movement, for movement is reality itself, and immobility is always only apparent or relative. But the [classical] intellect is meant for something altogether different. Unless it does violence to itself, it takes the opposite course; it always starts from immobility, as if this were the ultimate reality: when it tries to form an idea of movement, it does so by constructing movement out of immobilities put together. This operation, whose illegitimacy and danger in the field of speculation we shall show later on (it leads to dead-locks, and creates artificially insoluble philosophical problems), is easily justified when we refer it to its proper goal. Intelligence, in its natural state, aims at a practically useful end. When it substitutes for movement immobilities put together, it does not pretend to reconstitute the movement such as it actually is; it merely replaces it with a practical equivalent. It is the philosophers who are mistaken when they import into the domain of speculation a method of thinking which is made for action. But of this more anon. Suffice it now to say that to the stable and unchangeable our intellect is attached by virtue of its natural disposition. Of immobility alone does the intellect form a clear idea."

(Our bold and color.)

Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number.

Our bold and color highlights follow a code:

  • black-bold - important to read if you are just scanning our review
  • green-bold - we see Bergson suggesting axiomatic memes
  • violet-bold - an apparent classical problematic
  • blue-bold - we disagree with this text segment while disregarding context of Bergson's overall text
  • gray-bold - quotable text
  • red-bold - our direct commentary

Bergson belies our classical legacy denial of absolute flux. This is roughly equivalent to Einstein's classical defense, "Quantum reality is absurd!"

Classicists depict objects' mobilities via y=f(t). They depict change as an objective and analytic function of homogeneous time, t.

But, Mr. Bergson, ask any mathematician or scientist whether y=f(t) is real.

But, Mr. Bergson, it is just such import required to speculate regarding as-cen-dance of quantum science and its imminent tsunami. Indeed, Sir, our intellects and their speculations dance their act-ions on quantum stages whose essence is action—absolute flux.

For more on immobility see Bergson's Creative Evolution Topics 40 and 42, and Bergson's Time and Free Will Topic 23. Browser search there on <immobilit>. Doug - 25Feb2006.



"Now, fabricating consists in carving out the form of an object in matter. What is the most important is the form to be obtained. As to the matter, we choose that which is most convenient; but, in order to choose it, that is to say, in order to go and seek it among many others, we must have tried, in imagination at least, to endow every kind of matter with the form of the object conceived. In other words, an intelligence which aims at fabricating is an intelligence which never stops at the actual form of things nor regards it as final, but, on the contrary, looks upon all matter as if it were carvable at will. Plato compares the good dialectician to the skilful cook who carves the animal without breaking its bones, by following the articulations marked out by nature.(1) An intelligence which always proceeded thus would really be an intelligence turned toward speculation. But action, and in particular fabrication, requires the opposite mental tendency: it makes us consider every actual form of things, even the form of natural things, as artificial and provisional; it makes our thought efface from the object perceived, even though organized and living, the lines that outwardly mark its inward structure; in short, it makes us regard its matter as indifferent to its form. The whole of matter is made to appear to our thought as an immense piece of cloth in which we can cut out what we will and sew it together again as we please. Let us note, in passing, that it is this power that we affirm when we say that there is a space, that is to say, a homogeneous and empty medium, infinite and infinitely divisible, lending itself indifferently to any mode of decomposition whatsoever. A medium of this kind is never perceived; it is only conceived. What is perceived is extension colored, resistant, divided according to the lines which mark out the boundaries of real bodies or of their real elements."

Note (1) - Plato, Phae[d]rus, 265 E.

(Our bold and color.)

We view convenience as an aspect of instinct, not of intelligence. Nest-building by birds is convenient. Mathematics is conventional and thus convenient. Science uses mathematics conventionally.


Actually, Bergson refers Plato restating Socrates' comments in a Socrates-Phædrus dialogue. See end of 265, last sentence before 266. Be keenly aware, when reading Plato's dialogues that he is recalling them. Pirsig accuses Plato of putting words into Socrates' and others' mouths. Plato's reputation as child of rhetorical sophism who used his instinctual dialectic to commit philosophic parenticide, is suspect regarding his intentions in transcribing recollected dialogues. Pirsig claims Plato's intent was to destroy sophism once and for all via his newly found puerile dialectic. To our immense joy, quantum reality appeared at 20th century's dawning, and gradually showed itself as a Phoenixesque re-actualization of quantum sophism. Our intent is to assist quantum sophism's rebirth and subsume Platonic and Aristotelian dialectic puerility. For more extensive detail on our comments above, see Pirsig's Birth of SOM.


(Our public domain source had Phae[a]rus.)



"But when we think of our power over this matter, that is to say, of our faculty of decomposing and recomposing it as we please, we project the whole of these possible decompositions and recompositions behind real extension in the form of a homogeneous space, empty and indifferent, [I.e., Newton's classical naïveté.] which is supposed to underlie it. This space is therefore, preeminently, the plan of our possible [classical] action on things, although, indeed, things have a natural [classical, biformal] tendency, as we shall explain further on, to enter into a frame of this kind. It is a view taken by mind. The animal has probably no idea of it, even when, like us, it perceives extended things. It is an idea that symbolizes the tendency of the human intellect to fabrication. But this point must not detain us now. Suffice it to say that the intellect is characterized by the unlimited power of decomposing according to any law and of recomposing into any system.

"We have now enumerated a few of the essential features of human intelligence. But we have hitherto considered the individual in isolation, without taking account of social life. In reality, man is a being who lives in society. If it be true that the human intellect aims at fabrication, we must add that, for that as well as for other purposes, it is associated with other intellects. Now, it is difficult to imagine a society whose members do not communicate by signs. Insect societies probably have a language, and this language must be adapted, like that of man, to the necessities of life in common. By language community of action is made possible. But the requirements of joint action are not at all the same in a colony of ants and in a human society. In insect societies there is generally polymorphism, the subdivision of labor is natural, and each individual is riveted by its structure to the function it performs. In any case, these societies are based on instinct, and consequently on certain actions or fabrications that are more or less dependent on the form of the organs."

(Our link, brackets, bold, and color.)










"So if the ants, for instance, have a language, the signs which compose it must be very limited in number, and each of them, once the species is formed, must remain invariably attached to a certain object or a certain operation: the sign is adherent to the thing signified. In human society, on the contrary, fabrication and action are of variable form, and, moreover, each individual must learn his part, because he is not preordained to it by his structure. So a language is required which makes it possible to be always passing from what is known to what is yet to be known. [This is exactly our impetus in creating a new Quantonics language and symbol set to accompany our QTMs.] There must be a language whose signs—which cannot be infinite in number—are extensible to an infinity of things. This tendency of the sign to transfer itself from one object to another is characteristic of human language. It is observable in the little child as soon as he begins to speak. Immediately and naturally he extends the meaning of the words he learns, availing himself of the most accidental connection or the most distant analogy to detach and transfer elsewhere the sign that had been associated in his hearing with a particular object. "Anything can designate anything;" such is the latent principle of infantine language. This tendency has been wrongly confused with the faculty of generalizing. The animals themselves generalize; and, moreover, a sign—even an instinctive sign—always to some degree represents a genus [an aspect capable of sameness, while incapable of classical identity]. But what characterizes the signs of human language is not so much their generality as their mobility. The instinctive sign is adherent, the intelligent sign is mobile.

"Now, this mobility of words, that makes them able to pass from one thing to another, has enabled them to be extended from things to ideas. Certainly, language would not have given the faculty of reflecting to an intelligence entirely externalized and incapable of turning homeward. [We believe that SOMthink (i.e., use of CTMs) has done exactly that. Modern Western language is mostly ESQ. It has mostly lost its DQ.]"

(Our links, brackets, bold, and color.)


We believe our choice of 'quanton' as our most fundamental actual constituent of reality accomplishes this Bergsonian requirement. We have not shown you yet, but we find that our new Quantonic language and notation is extensible in quantum science. We are currently adapting them to QCD. Quarks and gluons may be quite readily modeled using our Quantonic symbols, notation, and language. For a glimmer of our efforts on a new Quantonics language see these links:


Our quantons, when animated, are mobile. We ask our students of Quantonics to visualize our inanimate quantons as animate on their quantum stages.



159 "An intelligence which reflects is one that originally had a surplus of energy to spend, over and above practically useful efforts. It is a consciousness that has virtually reconquered itself. But still the virtual has to become actual. Without language, intelligence would probably have remained riveted to the material objects which it was interested in considering. It would have lived in a state of somnambulism, outside itself, hypnotized on its own work. Language has greatly contributed to its liberation. The word, made to pass from one thing to another, is, in fact, by nature transferable and free. It can therefore be extended, not only from one perceived thing to another, but even from a perceived thing to a recollection of that thing, from the precise recollection to a more fleeting image, and finally from an image fleeting, though still pictured, to the picturing of the act by which the image is pictured, that is to say, to the idea. Thus is revealed to the intelligence, hitherto always turned outwards, a whole internal world—the spectacle of its own workings. It required only this opportunity, at length offered by language. It profits by the fact that the word is an external thing, which the intelligence can catch hold of and cling to, and at the same time an immaterial thing, by means of which the intelligence can penetrate even to the inwardness of its own work. Its first business was indeed to make instruments, but this fabrication is possible only by the employment of certain means which are not cut to the exact measure of their object, but go beyond it and thus allow intelligence a supplementary that is to say disinterested work. From the moment that the intellect, reflecting upon its own doings, perceives itself as a creator of ideas, as a faculty of representation in general, there is no object of which it may not wish to have the idea, even though that object be without direct relation to practical action."

(Our bold and color.)


Words whose definitions and semiotics are rigid and final are not, " nature transferable and free."

Our Quantonics view is that Western SOM languages are not extensible, except within SOM's own dialectic, objective, closed Church of Reason. We cannot leave this dialectic church without basal alterations of philosophical memes. Our current languages depend upon and continuously reinforce basal dialectic and objective ideas and concepts.


We think words should be thought of as quantons, not dichons (things). In fact, our simple solution to our current language problem is to: innovate a new dictionary whose constituents are all Quantonic. But of course our general approach is to declare all of reality's actual constituents "quantons."

We think Bergson's description of a word is dichonic, i.e. dichon(immaterial, material). In other words, we hear Bergson saying that a word's materiality and immateriality are disjoint and not coinsident. We hear him saying that they are both/and, but retain Aristotle's syllogistic excluded-middle.

Reader, please recognize that ideas are Platonic forms, and thus they are either objective or subjective and thus implicitly dichonic and disjoint.



"That is why we said there are things that intellect alone can seek. Intellect, alone, indeed, troubles itself about theory; and its theory would fain embrace everything—not only inanimate matter, over which it has a natural hold, but even life and thought.

"By what means, what instruments, in short by what method it will approach these problems, we can easily guess. Originally, it was fashioned to the form of matter. Language itself, which has enabled it to extend its field of operations, is made to designate things, and nought but things: it is only because the word is mobile, because it flies from one thing to another, that the intellect was sure to take it, sooner or later, on the wing, while it was not settled on anything, and apply it to an object which is not a thing and which, concealed till then, awaited the coming of the word to pass from darkness to light. But the word, by covering up this object, again converts it into a thing. So intelligence, even when it no longer operates upon its own object, follows habits it has contracted in that operation: it applies forms that are indeed those of unorganized matter. It is made for this kind of work. With this kind of work alone is it fully satisfied. And that is what intelligence expresses by saying that thus only it arrives at distinctness and clearness.

"It must, therefore, in order to think itself clearly and distinctly, perceive itself under the form of discontinuity. Concepts, in fact, are outside each other, like objects in space; and they have the same stability as such objects, on which they have been modeled. Taken together, they constitute an "intelligible world," that resembles the world of solids in its essential characters, but whose elements are lighter, more diaphanous, easier for the intellect to deal with than the image of concrete things: they are not, indeed, the perception itself of things, but the representation of the act by which the intellect is fixed on them."

(Our bold.)











"They are, therefore, not images, but symbols. Our logic is the complete set of rules that must be followed in using symbols. As these symbols are derived from the consideration of solids, as the rules for combining these symbols hardly do more than express the most general relations among solids, our logic triumphs in that science which takes the solidity of bodies for its object, that is, in geometry. Logic and geometry engender each other, as we shall see a little further on. It is from the extension of a certain natural geometry, suggested by the most general and immediately perceived properties of solids, that natural logic has arisen; then from this natural logic, in its turn, has sprung scientific geometry, which extends further and further the knowledge of the external properties of solids.(1) Geometry and logic are strictly applicable to matter; in it they are at home, and in it they can proceed quite alone. But, outside this domain, pure reasoning needs to be supervised by common sense, which is an altogether different thing.

"Thus, all the elementary forces of the intellect tend to transform matter into an instrument of action, that is, in the etymological sense of the word, into an organ. Life, not content with producing organisms, would fain give them as an appendage inorganic matter itself, converted into an immense organ by the industry of the living being. Such is the initial task it assigns to intelligence. That is why the intellect always behaves as if it were fascinated by the contemplation of inert matter. It is life looking outward, putting itself outside itself, adopting the ways of unorganized nature in principle, in order to direct them in fact. Hence its bewilderment when it turns to the living and is confronted with organization."

Note (1) - We shall return to these points in the next chapter.

(Our bold and color.)

It is extremely important to understand that "…our logic…" is but one of an unlimited number of possible logics. Classicists speak of the truth using their one unilogic. They claim it offers absolute assessment of truth. To make that claim, they must assume that their logic is the logic. We call that "classical arrogance." Aristotle's syllogistic logic is pure arrogance. Now, too, we know it is inept and highly misleading. Modern formal propositional predicate logic shares that Aristotelian legacy. We use phrases to characterize that arrogant classical legacy: "One Global Truth (OGT), and One Global Context (OGC)." In Quantonics, we substitute, "Many truths, and many contexts." Concordantly, Bergson hints that he is about to tell us of "Many times."







"It does what it can, it resolves the organized into the unorganized, for it cannot, without reversing its natural direction and twisting about on itself, think true continuity, real mobility, reciprocal penetration—in a word, that creative evolution which is life.

"Consider continuity. The aspect of life that is accessible to our intellect—as indeed to our senses, of which our intellect is the extension—is that which offers a hold to our action. Now, to modify an object, we have to perceive it as divisible and discontinuous. From the point of view of positive science, an incomparable progress was realized when the organized tissues were resolved into cells. The study of the cell, in its turn, has shown it to be an organism whose complexity seems to grow, the more thoroughly it is examined. The more science advances, the more it sees the number grow of heterogeneous elements which are placed together, outside each other, to make up a living being. Does science thus get any nearer to life? Does it not, on the contrary, find that what is really life in the living seems to recede with every step by which it pushes further the detail of the parts combined? There is indeed already among scientists a tendency to regard the substance of the organism as continuous, and the cell as an artificial entity.(1) But, supposing this view were finally to prevail, it could only lead, on deeper study, to some other mode of analyzing of the living being, and so to a new discontinuity—although less removed, perhaps, from the real continuity of life. The truth is that this continuity cannot be thought by the intellect while it follows its natural movement. It implies at once the multiplicity of elements and the interpenetration of all by all, two conditions that can hardly be reconciled in the field in which our industry, and consequently our intellect, is engaged."

Note (1) - We shall return to this point in chapter iii., p. 259.

(Our bold and color.)








Bergson thus declares classical intellect as non-quantum. He describes classical intellect which appears more to us like instinct than intellect.

And this latter, implies exquisitely, our view of quantum intellect, with which we concur. And, too, we agree that classical intellect can "hardly…reconcile" quantum simultaneity (due simultaneity's classical problematics, as of early 2007 Doug would use simulphasicity here - Doug - 3Apr2008) of both "elemental multiplicity…and interpenetration of all by all." This insight, once seen, we refer as a quantum epiphany. It lifts one out of SOM's Church of Reason. It is a kind of ascension out of Aristotle's syllogistic logic, out of formal propositional predicate logic, out of Newtonian mechanics, out of 'modern' classical 'objective science and mathematics,' into: quantum logic (coquecigrues), quantum wave (non-)mechanics, and Quantonics language/symbols/notation. And in our opinion, one may not do this without cogent discrimination (rather omniscrimination - Doug - 21Feb2009) twixt passé classical philosophy and emergent quantum philosophy. 



"Just as we separate in space, we fix in time. The [classical] intellect is not made to think evolution, in the proper sense of the word—that is to say, the continuity of a change that is pure mobility. We shall not dwell here on this point, which we propose to study in a special chapter. Suffice it to say that the intellect represents becoming as a series of [temporally homogeneous] states, each of which is homogeneous with itself and consequently does not change. [I.e., classical y=f(t) motion is change.] Is our attention called to the internal change of one of these states? At once we decompose it into another series of states which, reunited, will be supposed to make up this internal modification. Each of these new states must be invariable, or else their internal change, if we are forced to notice it, must be resolved again into a fresh series of invariable states, and so on to infinity. Here again, thinking consists in reconstituting, and, naturally, it is with given elements, and consequently with stable elements, that we reconstitute. [Note that our quantons are innately dynamic and mobile (indeed, we visualize them as "purely mobile.").] So that, though we may do our best to imitate the mobility of becoming by an addition that is ever going on, becoming itself slips through our fingers just when we think we are holding it tight. [Such are effects of classical reason.]

"Precisely because it is always trying to reconstitute, and to reconstitute with what is given, the intellect lets what is new in each moment of a history escape. It does not admit the unforeseeable. It rejects all creation. That definite antecedents bring forth a definite consequent, calculable as a function of them, is what satisfies our intellect. That a definite end calls forth definite means to attain it [and thus outright rejects and denies real quantum~uncertainty], is what we also understand. In both cases we have to do with the known which is combined with the known, in short, with the old which is repeated."

Please consider seriously what this paragraph says about Einstein's classical objective foundation of his Special Relativity and General Relativity: "Invariant Geometrical Interval." IGI.

IGI "does not change." IGI is classical.

Bergson's pure mobility, AKA quantum~durable~change, is evolution. Pure mobility is durable, absolute motion.

Dark red text update in first line of this paragraph - Doug - 21,25Feb2009.

(Our link, brackets, bold, and color.)

Reader, Bergson hints strongly at what is to come. This is his most important page so far, building upon his first 162 pages magnificently!









"Our intellect is there at its ease; and, whatever be the object, it will abstract, separate, eliminate, so as to substitute for the object itself, if necessary, an approximate equivalent in which things will happen in this way. But that each instant is a fresh endowment, that the new is ever upspringing, that the form just come into existence (although, when once produced, it may be regarded as an effect determined by its causes) could never have been foreseen—because the causes here, unique in their kind, are part of the effect, have come into existence with it, and are determined by it as much as they determine it—all this we can feel within ourselves and also divine, by sympathy, outside ourselves , but we cannot think it, in the strict sense of the word, nor express it in terms of pure understanding. No wonder at that: we must remember what our intellect is meant for. The causality it seeks and finds everywhere expresses the very mechanism of our industry, in which we go on recomposing the same whole with the same parts, repeating the same movements to obtain the same result. [I.e., nature's great delusion posed to us esoterically and enigmatically without exegetic.] The finality it understands best is the finality of our industry, in which we work on a model given in advance, that is to say, old or composed of elements already known. As to invention properly so called, which is, however, the point of departure of industry itself, our intellect does not succeed in grasping it in its upspringing, that is to say, in its indivisibility, nor in its fervor, that is to say, in its creativeness. Explaining it always consists in resolving it, it the unforeseeable and new, into elements old or known, arranged in a different order. The intellect can no more admit complete novelty than real becoming; that is to say, here again it lets an essential aspect of life escape, as if it were not intended to think such an object.

"All our analyses bring us to this conclusion. But it is hardly necessary to go into such long details concerning the mechanism of intellectual working; it is enough to consider the results."

(Our brackets, bold, and color. Bergson's parentheses.)



Again, as a reminder, we mention Bergson's apparent either/or of intellectual sympathy—previously he refers our either/or sympathy as being either inside an object (sympathetically) or outside it (unsympathetically)—here he refers our being either inside (unsympathetically) ourselves or divinely outside (sympathetically) ourselves. Your awareness of this issue is important, since quantum reality offers only an apparition of excluded-middle, not an actuality of it. Thus Bergson's sympathetic switchability carries legacy Aristotelian syllogistic baggage.


We agree that classical intellect limits itself in this way. But to say that intellect is stopped dead in its tracks and cannot ever admit complete novelty is, for us, a radical position. Bergson appears to foreclose his own intuitions of evolution regarding human intellect. We think quantum science already commences an evolutionary change of human intellect which makes relentless progress toward a goal of admitting complete novelty. We think our efforts here in Quantonics further that goal. It would be interesting to see whether Bergson would agree were he here with us today.



"We see that the intellect, so skilful in dealing with the inert, is awkward the moment it touches the living. Whether it wants to treat the life of the body or the life of the mind, it proceeds with the rigor, the stiffness and the brutality of an instrument not designed for such use. The history of hygiene or of pedagogy teaches us much in this matter. When we think of the cardinal, urgent and constant need we have to preserve our bodies and to raise our souls, of the special facilities given to each of us, in this field, to experiment continually on ourselves and on others, of the palpable injury by which the wrongness of a medical or pedagogical practise is both made manifest and punished at once, we are amazed at the stupidity and especially at the persistence of errors. We may easily find their origin in the natural obstinacy with which we treat the living like the lifeless and think all reality, however fluid, under the form of the sharply defined solid. We are at ease only in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead. The [classical Parmenidean, Platonic, Aristotelian, Newtonian, SOMitic] intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life.

"Instinct, on the contrary, is molded on the very form of life. While [classical Parmenidean, Platonic, Aristotelian, Newtonian, SOMitic] intelligence treats everything mechanically, instinct proceeds, so to speak, organically. If the consciousness that slumbers in it should awake, if it were wound up into knowledge instead of being wound off into action, if we could ask and it could reply, it would give up to us the most intimate secrets of life. For it only carries out further the work by which life organizes matter—so that we cannot say, as has often been shown, where organization ends and where instinct begins. When the little chick is breaking its shell with a peck of its beak, it is acting by instinct, and yet it does but carry on the movement which has borne it through embryonic life."

(Our brackets, bold, and color.)








What Bergson describes here is our quanton(instinct,intelligence). Quantonics offers that bridge (a la Robert Plant, "Where's the bridge?" Oh! Where oh where is that Zeppelin Bridge?). We found a quantonic bridge twixt instinct and intelligence! Indeed, quantons offer bridges among all reality's complements!


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Doug Renselle
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©Quantonics, Inc., 2000-2011 Rev. 21,25Feb2009  PDR Created: 20Sep2000  PDR
(6Aug2001 rev - Repair p. 158 'must' to 'most' typo. Add more p. 158 comment links.)
(14Dec2001 rev - Add top of page frame-breaker.)
(25Aug2002 rev - Add 'consensus' link to common sense above.)
(4Mar2005 rev - Add p. 162 link to 2005 QELR of simultaneity. Update page format. Add some other 2005 pertinent links.)
(25Feb2006 rev - Add p. 155 anchor. Update p. 155 comments with more Bergson links on immobility.)
(22Mar2007 rev - Adjust format and colors.)
(3,16Apr2008 rev - Minor page red text updates. Add p. 162 commentary 'coquecigrues' link. Add index links to all page's comments.)
(21,25Feb2009 rev - Add 'omniscrimination' refinement to p. 162 comments. Update p. 163 intra text commentary re: Einstein's SR and GR. Add 'discriminate' link to it 'omniscriminate' QELR. Add p. 163 brackets and anchor.)

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