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| Introduction | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | |||
| Chapter | III | IV | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 |
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says, "You are here!")|
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(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis Bergson, some paraphrased.) |
(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.) |
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"This long analysis has been necessary to show that a self-sufficient reality is not necessarily a reality foreign to duration. If we pass (consciously or unconsciously) through the idea of the nought in order to reach that of being, the being to which we come is a logical or mathematical essence, therefore non-temporal. And, consequently, a static conception of the real is forced on us: everything appears given once for all, in eternity. But we must accustom ourselves to think being directly, without making a detour, without first appealing to the phantom of the nought [SOM's wall] which interposes itself between it and us. [Quantonics' use of both animate and inanimate quantons intends to help us, "…accustom ourselves to think being directly."] We must strive to see in order to see, and no longer to see in order to act. Then the Absolute is revealed very near us and, in a certain measure, in us. It is of psychological and not of mathematical nor logical essence. It lives [co-] with [-in] us. Like us, but in certain aspects infinitely more concentrated and more gathered up in itself, it endures. [Here it is late 2006...Doug just renewed one of those metaflashes of, for lack of perhaps better words, quantum epiphany! In May 2006 we made this same epiphany, but in omniffering comtexts. Doug has been wondering about this since Bethahavah sidetracked him onto memes of quantum religion early in 2005. Epiphany: Bergson is a gnostic, a quantum gnostic! Quantum cowithinitness, compenetration, included~middle, etc., are huge tells of quantum gnosticism. From a gnostic perspective an included~middle quantum insight "overcomes the powers of Error." See The Nag Hammadi Library, 'The Gospel of Truth,' Introduction, by Harold W. Attridge and George W. MacRae. It is well for students of Quantonics to view gnostic Error as an analogue of classical dialectical thing-king. Dialectic issi Error! Latter lays bare Heraclitus as gnostic, too! Similarly, Gnostic Christian The Gospel of Truth. Doug - 13-14,17Sep2006.] "But do we ever [as classicists] think true duration? [As classicists, no!] Here again a direct taking possession is necessary. It is no use trying to approach duration: we must install ourselves within it straight away. This is what the [SOM, classical] intellect generally refuses to do, accustomed as it is to think the moving by means of the unmovable. "The function of the intellect is to preside over actions. Now, in action, it is the result that interests us; the means matter little provided the end is attained. [Students of Quantonics may recognize this as close kin of Peirce and James' "consequential" pragmatism. Doug - 13Sep2006.] Thence it comes that we are altogether bent on the end to be realized, generally trusting ourselves to it in order that the idea may become an act [i.e., pragma]; and thence it comes also that only the goal where our activity will rest is pictured explicitly to our mind: the movements constituting the action itself either elude our consciousness or reach it only confusedly. Let us consider a very simple act, like that of lifting the arm. Where should we be if we had to imagine beforehand all the elementary contractions and tensions this act involves, or even to perceive them, one by one, as they are accomplished? But the mind is carried immediately to the end, that is to say, to the schematic and simplified vision of the act supposed accomplished. Then, if no antagonistic idea neutralizes the effect of the first idea, the appropriate movements come of themselves to fill out the plan, drawn in some way by the void of its gaps." [What Bergson has just written here...is one of philosophy's greatest accomplishments. It explains why our current dialectical use of mechanics to describe reality is failure, Error, and incompetence. Our classical approaches using canon, dogma, formal objective analysis are simply wr¤ng. Why? Bergson explains that reality isn't dialectical, it isn't mechanical, it isn't Platonic formal, it isn't classically objective, and so on... Our current approach, as Bergson eloquates so well, is an event-state-event-state...event-stux-event-stux... ideal repetitive tautology: an antithesis of quantum~evolution. Some (e.g., Richard Dawkins, and Einstein) call it a "clockwork mechanism." But reality isn't like that and Bergson explains why: reality isn't classically, dialectically composed of stoppable-analytic and occurrent-recurrent 'event-states!' Reality, instead, is perpetual flux duration. His duration is unstoppable. Faster and much slower, yes. Stoppable n¤! So, given that assumption, ideal classical 'state' is really impossible. Too ideal classical form as immutable and unchanging is impossible. Today we understand, quantumly, "all is waves." Everything changes and evolves, perpetually. There are n¤ 'classical states.' Reality is unstoppable. Reality, quantum~reality, is pure Bergsonian choice~chance~change perpetual duration. When we globally adopt this memeo of quantum~reality, betterment of common Good will explode in ubiquitous Value for all. Why do people resist adoption of Bergson's memes of duration? Its consequences are massive. Every aspect of what we now take for granted changes. People hate change! But Neo sapiens are imminent. Doug believes they will embrace change...and Homo sapiens will gradually accrete auto-extinction. It's already happening n¤wings...can't you sense it? Classical mind is accreting its own extinction. While quantum~angels sing, "Oh Happy Day, Oh Happy Day..." Doug - 7Oct2009.] |
(Our underline, 'it' +2 font size, link, brackets, bold, and color.) Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number. Our bold and color highlights follow a code:
Our quantons commingle Absolute flux and Its created
evolute c¤mplements.
Thus Its flux is in us
and our c¤mplements of It are
cowithin It. Let's take an upgraded view of our quanton
semiotic: Here is an animate example of how we can habitually Here is an analogous 3D (and again, unfortunately analytic) wave flux animation:  Bergson's last sentence describes natural, quantumesque evolute pragma. Pirsig likes to say that if we ride a motorcycle classically, we will crash. Bergson states an analogue: If we moved our bodies analytically, we would appear as non-quantum, digital, robotic, staccato, mimes. Mae-wan Ho tells us in her book, the Rainbow and the Worm, that biological quantum cohesion allows our bodies to move with great smoothness and fluidity. Better, that same quantum cohesion permits our arms and legs to coordinate ~1020 muscle cells and ATP molecules almost instantaneously and with almost zero entropy! Thus, reader, you may intuit how important our phrase "quantumesque evolute pragma" is as an intueme. It is well for you to consider our phrase as it interrelates other quantum memes like: trichotomous entropy (i.e., neg-, zero-, pos-), quatrotomous cohesion (i.e., co-, de-, iso-, and partial), and EEE. |
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| 300 |
"The [classical] intellect, then, only represents to the activity ends to attain, that is to say, points of rest. And, from one end attained to another end attained, from one rest to another rest, our activity is carried by a series of leaps, during which our consciousness is [classically] turned away as much as possible from the movement going on, to regard only the anticipated image of the movement accomplished. "Now, in order that it may represent as unmovable the result of the act which is being accomplished, the intellect must [classically] perceive, as also unmovable, the surroundings in which this result is being framed. Our activity is [classically] fitted into the material world. If matter appeared to us as a perpetual flowing, we should assign no termination to any of our actions. We should feel each of them dissolve as fast as it was accomplished, and we should not anticipate an ever-fleeting future. In order that our activity may leap from an act to an act, it is necessary that matter should pass [classically] from a state to a state, for it is only into a [classical] state of the material world that [classical] action can fit a result, so as to be accomplished. But is it thus that matter presents itself? "A priori we may presume that our [classical] perception manages to apprehend matter with this bias. Sensory organs and motor organs are in fact coordinated with each other. Now, the first symbolize our faculty of perceiving, as the second our faculty of acting. The organism thus evidences, in a visible and tangible form, the perfect accord [e.g., quantum cohesion] of perception and action. So if our activity always aims at a result into which it is momentarily fitted, our perception must retain of the material world, at every moment, only a [classical] state in which it is provisionally placed. This is the most natural hypothesis. And it is easy to see that [quantum, rather than classical] experience confirms it. "From our first glance at the world, before we even make our bodies in it, we distinguish qualities. Color succeeds to color, sound to sound, resistance to resistance, etc. Each of these qualities, taken separately [become classical objective properties, and each], is a [classical] state that seems to persist as such, immovable until another replaces it." |
(Our brackets, bold, and color.)
Answer: No! Instead of reality representing itself as classical objects, it represents itself as quantum flux—both isoflux as nonactuality and latched flux as actuality—which we show as included-middle both animated and inanimate stindyanic quantons(nonactuality,actuality). Add latch link: 31Oct2012 - Doug. Reader, note how classicists treat sensory organs as classically objective, and similarly, they treat motor organs as classical objects. Instead, biological systems are quantum interrelationships which we show as quanton(sensory,motor). As classical objects sensory and motor organs' natural capabilities are inexplicable as Mae-wan Ho, et al., have shown us (e.g. simple flexure of one's arm). As quantons our sensory and motor capabilities act quantum cohesively just as we readily observe in every day experience. |
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| 301 | "Yet each of these qualities resolves itself, on analysis, into an enormous number of elementary [classical] movements. Whether we see in it vibrations or whether we represent it in any other way, one fact is certain, it is that every quality is [quantization~scintillation, link added 5Mar2012 - Doug] change. In vain, moreover, shall we seek beneath the change the thing which changes: it is always provisionally, and in order to satisfy our imagination, that we attach the movement to a mobile. The mobile flies for ever before the pursuit of science, which is concerned with mobility alone. In the smallest discernible fraction of a second [A least quantum pragma.], in the almost instantaneous perception of a sensible quality, there may be trillions of oscillations which repeat themselves. The permanence of a sensible quality consists in this repetition of movements, as the persistence of life consists in a series of palpitations. The primal function of perception is precisely to grasp a series of elementary changes under the form of a quality or of a simple state, by a work of condensation. The greater the power of acting bestowed upon an animal species, the more numerous, probably, are the elementary changes that its faculty of perceiving concentrates into one of its instants. [Bergson hints at an intueme of perceptual/consciousness bandwidth.] And the progress must be continuous, in nature, from the beings that vibrate almost in unison with the oscillations of the ether, up to those that embrace trillions of these oscillations in the shortest of their simple perceptions. The first feel hardly anything but movements; the others perceive quality. The first are almost caught up in the running-gear of things; the others react, and the tension of their faculty of acting is probably proportional to the concentration of their faculty of perceiving. The progress goes on even in humanity itself. A man is so much the more a "man of action" as he can embrace in a glance a greater number of events: he who perceives successive events one by one will allow himself to be led by them; he who grasps them as a whole will dominate them. In short, [classically] the qualities of matter are so many stable views that we take of its instability." |
(Our brackets, bold, and color.)
Here, Bergson tumbles to ubiquitous Planck rate flux. This is an ~adequate metaphor. Our quantons condense, at their local level of perceptual aggregation, all quantonic flux which qualitatively changes at faster rates co-within and 'below' any local quanton's perceptual level. Quantons use those condensed conscious perception aggregates to assess Quality at and above their perceptual/consciousness level, i.e., Qualities which commingle and compenetrate their perceptual/consciousness bandwidth.
This classical snapshot view of reality contributes to flawed science, e.g., David Deutsch's Fabric of Reality. |
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| 302 |
"Now, in the continuity of sensible qualities we mark off the boundaries of bodies. [This is classical analyticity; classical boundaries are SOM walls.] Each of these bodies really changes at every moment. In the first place, it resolves itself into a group of qualities, and every quality, as we said, consists of a succession of elementary movements. But, even if we regard the quality as a stable state, the body is still unstable in that it changes qualities without ceasing. The body pre-eminently—that which we are most justified in isolating within the continuity of matter, because it constitutes a relatively closed system—is the living body; it is, moreover, for it that we [classically and analytically] cut out the others within the whole. Now, life is an evolution. We [classically] concentrate a period of this evolution in a stable view which we call a form, and, when the change has become considerable enough to overcome the fortunate inertia of our perception, we say that the body has changed its form. But in reality the body is [quantumly] changing form at every moment; or rather, there is no form, since form is immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is the continual change of form: form is only a snapshot view of a [many quantum both local and nonlocal] transition[s]. Therefore, here again, our [classical] perception manages to solidify into discontinuous images the fluid Continuity of the real. When the successive images do not differ from each other too much, we consider them all as the waxing and waning of a single mean image, or as the deformation of this image in different directions. And to this mean we really [i.e., classically] allude when we speak of the essence of a thing, or of the thing itself. "Finally things, once constituted, show on the surface, by their changes of situation, the profound changes that are being accomplished within the Whole." |
(Our underline, brackets, bold, and color.)
Reader, "relatively closed system" is only an apparition evoked by classicism's blindness to reality's stealthy isoflux. Quantumly, all systems are "relatively open systems" due to their both immersion in and emersion from isoflux. Let's answer, in anticipation of a cogent question by most perspicacious among you, a key classical question here. "Doug, is quantum reality continual or contiguous?" Answer: "Yes!" All quantum flux occurs in Planck quantum least pragma units. We say that quantum change is "quantal." So in that sense, quantum reality appears contiguous. However, that flux occurs at 1043 occurrences per unit reference, which makes reality appear continuous. Indeed, as a Quantonic intueme, we see Planck quanta as Quantonic energy packets whose 'internals' we intuit are/appear ~continuous. Quantum reality is paralogically both continuous and contiguous. This is just one example of quantum reality's intrinsic paralogical sophism. This quantum sophism is what Plato, Aristotle, et al., hated. They developed an inconsistent and incomplete analytic classicism to defeat it. Now we see their effort only as a tentative and vain deign of feign. Also, please note our 'unit reference.' Those of you in science are aware of both temporal and spatial frequencies. We choose to ignore (for our convenience) or unitize/normalize velocity in our frequency statements. Thus we use:
where f is frequency, Students of Quantonics should see our more recent Quantum Sensory Bandwidth Perspicacities and Perspicuities. Study our text there well and carefully. Why? When one taps into reserve energy one enables oneself to move one's quantum perceptual flux higher than folk who are incapable of tapping reserve energy. Not only does one achieve greater quantum stage capabilities, but one commences straddling to a much greater extent both quantum actuality and quantum nonactuality. One becomes more quantum real, like Mr. Messenger in City of Angels and that photographer in Photographing Fairies. X-Files enthusiasts shall recall an episode where young folk entered a hollow tree and were affected there directly by some 'quantum reserve energy' which permitted them to move in a sensory bandwidth above that of normal folk. Some similar memes played out in Crouching Tigers... When we intuit quantum reality in its fullest, Doug believes some of these "miracles" will become actuality. Doug - 20Nov2003. |
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| 303 |
"We say then that they act on one another. This action appears to us, no doubt, in the [classical] form of movement. But from the mobility of the movement we turn away as much as we can; [classically] what interests us is, as we said above, the unmovable plan of the movement rather than the movement itself. Is it a simple movement? We ask ourselves where it is going. It is by its direction, that is to say, by the position of its provisional end, that we represent it at every [classically unitemporal] moment. Is it a complex movement? We would know above all what is going on, what the movement is doing—in other words, the result obtained or the presiding intention. Examine closely what is in your mind when you speak of an action in course of accomplishment. The idea of change is there, I am willing to grant, but it is hidden in the penumbra. In the full light is the motionless plan of the act supposed accomplished. It is by this, and by this only, that the complex act is distinguished and defined. We should be very much embarrassed if we had to imagine the movements inherent in the actions of eating, drinking, fighting, etc. It is enough for us to know, in a general and indefinite way, that all these acts are movements. Once that side of the matter has been settled, we simply seek to represent the general plan of each of these complex movements, that is to say the motionless design that underlies them. Here again knowledge [i.e., know ledge] bears on a state rather than on a change. It is therefore the same with this third case as with the others. Whether the movement be qualitative or evolutionary or extensive, the [classical] mind manages to take stable views of the instability. And thence the mind derives, as we have just shown, three kinds of representations: (1) qualities [rather, classically, quantitative properties], (2) forms of essences, (3) acts. "To these three ways of seeing correspond three categories of words: adjectives, substantives, and verbs, which are the primordial elements of language. Adjectives and substantives therefore symbolize states. But the verb itself, if we keep to the clear part of the idea it calls up, hardly expresses anything else." |
(Our brackets and bold.)
We anticipate Bergson's affirmation of Western language as classical and thus innately (i.e., by anthropodesign) quantum-inept. You may want to see our May and June, 2000 QQAs on Western cultural language problematics. |
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| 304 | "Now, if we try to characterize more precisely our natural attitude towards Becoming, this is what we find. [Quantum-]Becoming is infinitely varied. That which goes from yellow to green is not like that which goes from green to blue: they are different qualitative movements. That which goes from flower to fruit is not like that which goes from larva to nymph and from nymph to perfect insect: they are different evolutionary movements. The action of eating or of drinking is not like the action of fighting: they are different extensive movements. And these three kinds of movement themselves—qualitative, evolutionary, extensive—differ profoundly. The trick of our perception, like that of our intelligence, like that of our language, consists in extracting from these profoundly different becomings the single representation of becoming in general, undefined becoming, a mere abstraction which by itself says nothing and of which, indeed, it is very rarely that we think. To this idea, always the same, and always obscure or unconscious, we then join, in each particular case, one or several clear images that classically represent states and which serve to distinguish all becomings from each other. [Rather than use classical states, we can Quantonically use quantons to distinguish all becomings. That graphic shows least Planck quantum/quanton both proemial emersion and EEE.] It is this composition of a specified and definite state with change general and undefined that we substitute for the specific change. An infinite multiplicity of becomings variously colored, so to speak, passes before our eyes: we manage so that we [classically] see only differences of color, that is to say, differences of state, beneath which there is supposed to flow, hidden from our view, a becoming always and everywhere the same, invariably colorless." |
(Our link, brackets, bold and color.)
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| 305 | "Suppose we wish to portray on a screen a living picture, such as the marching past of a regiment. There is one way in which it might first occur to us to do it. That would be to cut out jointed figures representing the soldiers, to give to each of them the movement of marching, a movement varying from individual to individual although common to the human species, and to throw the whole on the screen. We should need to spend on this little game an enormous amount of work, and even then we should obtain but a very poor result: how could it, at its best, reproduce the suppleness and variety of life? Now, there is another way of proceeding, more easy and at the same time more effective. It is to take a series of snapshots of the passing regiment and to throw these instantaneous views on the screen, so that they replace each other very rapidly. This is what the cinematograph does. With photographs, each of which represents the regiment in a fixed attitude, it reconstitutes the mobility of the regiment marching. It is true that if we had to do with photographs alone, however much we might look at them, we should never see them animated: with immobility set beside immobility, even endlessly, we could never make movement. In order that the pictures may be animated, there must be movement somewhere. The movement does indeed exist here; it is in the apparatus. It is because the film of the cinematograph unrolls, bringing in turn the different photographs of the scene to continue each other, that each actor of the scene recovers his mobility; he strings all his successive attitudes on the invisible movement of the film. The process then consists in extracting from all the movements peculiar to all the figures an impersonal movement abstract and simple, movement in general, so to speak: we put this into the apparatus, and we reconstitute the individuality of each particular movement by combining this nameless movement with the personal attitudes." | |||||||||||||||||||
| 306 |
"Such is the contrivance of the cinematograph. And such is also that of our knowledge. Instead of attaching ourselves to the [compenetrating ourselves with] inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself. Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general. Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us. We may therefore sum up what we have been saying in the conclusion that the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind. "Of the altogether practical [i.e., classical and convenient/conventional] character of this operation there is no possible doubt. Each of our acts aims at a certain insertion of our will into the reality. There is, between our body and other bodies, an arrangement like that of the pieces of glass that compose a kaleidoscopic picture. Our activity goes from an arrangement to a re-arrangement, each time no doubt giving the kaleidoscope a new shake, but not interesting itself in the shake, and seeing only the new picture. Our [classical] knowledge of the operation of nature must be exactly symmetrical, therefore, with the interest we take in our own operation. In this sense we may say, if we are not abusing this kind of illustration, that the cinematographical character of our knowledge of things is due to the kaleidoscopic character of our adaptation to them. "The cinematographical method is therefore the only practical method, since it consists in making the general character of knowledge form itself on that of action, while expecting that the detail of each act should depend in its turn on that of knowledge." |
(Our brackets and bold.)
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| 307 |
"In order that action may always be enlightened, intelligence must always be present in it; but intelligence, in order thus to accompany the progress of activity and ensure its direction, must begin by adopting its rhythm. Action is discontinuous, like every pulsation of life; discontinuous, therefore, is knowledge. The mechanism of the faculty of knowing has been constructed on this plan. Essentially practical, can it be of use, such as it is, for speculation? Let us try with it to follow reality in its windings, and see what will happen. "I take of the continuity of a particular becoming a series of views, which I connect together by "becoming in general." But of course I cannot stop there. What is not determinable is not representable: of "becoming in general" I have only a verbal knowledge. As the letter x designates a certain unknown quantity, whatever it may be, so my " becoming in general," always the same, symbolizes here a certain transition of which I have taken some snapshots; of the transition itself it teaches me nothing. Let me then concentrate myself wholly on the transition, and, between any two snapshots, endeavor to realize what is going on. As I apply the same method, I obtain the same result; a third view merely slips [classically] in between the two others. I may begin again as often as I will, I may set views alongside of views for ever, I shall obtain nothing else. The application of the cinematographical method therefore leads to a perpetual recommencement, during which the mind, never able to satisfy itself and never finding where to rest, persuades itself, no doubt, that it imitates by its instability the very movement of the real. [Bergson just described classicism's façade of analytic reducibility.]" |
(Our brackets and bold.)
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| 308 |
"'But though, by straining itself to the point of giddiness, it may end by giving itself the illusion of mobility, its operation has not advanced it a step, since it remains as far as ever from its goal. In order to advance with the moving reality, you must replace yourself within it. Install yourself within change, and you will grasp at once both change itself and the successive states in which it might at any instant be immobilized. [I.e., as he said previously, "think being directly." We see this as a very useful meme, so we want to coin a new contraction of it: 'thibedir.'] But with these successive states, perceived from without as real and no longer as potential immobilities, you will never reconstitute movement. Call them qualities, forms, positions, or intentions, as the case may be, multiply the number of them as you will, let the interval between two consecutive states be infinitely small [I.e., apply classical analytic calculus as Newton and Leibnitz did.]: before the intervening movement you will always experience the disappointment of the child who tries by clapping his hands together to crush the smoke. The movement slips through the interval, because every attempt to reconstitute change out of states implies the absurd proposition, that movement is made of immobilities. "Philosophy perceived this as soon as it opened its eyes. The arguments of Zeno of Elea, although formulated with a very different intention [I.e., analytic sums 'never' arrive.], have no other meaning. [Bergson tells us that Zeno's arguments are implicit indictments of analytic classical thought. We agree.] "Take the flying arrow. At every moment, says Zeno, it is motionless, for it cannot have time to move, that is, to occupy at least two successive positions, unless at least two moments are allowed it. At a given moment, therefore, it is at rest at a given point. Motionless in each point of its course, it is motionless during all the time that it is moving. [Classical analyticity and its colluding 'state,' mandate an inept calculus of progressive incremental staticity (i.e., state-icity). Again, imagine driving a car whose accelerator may only be either totally on or totally off. See funny aside in comments. Doug.] "Yes, if we suppose that the arrow can ever be in a point of its course. Yes again, if the arrow, which is moving, ever coincides with a position, which is motionless. But the arrow never is in any point of its course. The most we can say is that it might be there, in this sense, that it passes there and might stop there." |
(Our underlines, link, brackets, bold, and color.) Think being directly, thibedir, is a powerful Bergsonian metaphor for what Quantonics calls "Tapping Into Reserve Energy," i.e., quanton(DQ,you)! Notice how mentally immobilized SOMite DIQheads disable their own abilities and capabilities to Tap Into Reserve Energy. Doug - 25Feb2006. Classicism separates observer and observed objectively. Observer is from without observed. Further, it assumes observer unilaterally observes observed and that a converse statement is absolutely false. Further, it assumes observer and observed obey Aristotle's three syllogistic laws and as a result objectively have no included-middles. By now, reader, you should be able to see in rather clear and simple terms how classicism's 'laws' fly in quantum reality's face. Consider its phenomenal impact when intellectual dawn in minds of quantum scientists and philosophers emerse, "all quanta are mobile in quantum reality." No classical, immobile states 'exist' in quantum reality! Consider how fundamentally and deeply 'mechanics' depend upon the classical idea of immobile 'state.' Now we may perhaps understand why David Bohm said, "The underlying structure of matter, however, is not mechanical." See Bohm's Quantum Theory, Chapter 8, Section 26, p. 167, last sentence of Section 26. Also see Bohm's asterisk footnote. Bohm tells us we need an entirely new set of memes to dwell successfully in quantum reality. He tells us we need new nonclassical language, new nonclassical intuemes, etc. We agree! Wholeheartedly, we agree! Let's get on with it! Funny aside: This actually happened to Doug almost twenty years ago (early
1980s) when a squirrel stored its black walnuts under Doug's
auto's carburetor (1978 Pontiac -- last GM unQuality auto ever
purchased). On way to a client, a walnut jiggled into a position
which forced accelerator to full on. Doug had to drive that Pontiac
for a couple of miles by turning its ignition switch off, then
on. Go imagine... :End funny aside. Notice how Bergson is showing us in that last paragraph how quantum uncertainty manifests itself macroscopically. Any quanton's 'locus' and momentum are always in quantum uncertainty interrelationships with one another (and others of their many anihmatæ EIMA quantum c¤mplements too). Doug - 16Nov2002. |
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| 309 | "It is true that if it did stop there, it would be at rest there, and at this point it is no longer movement that we should have to do with. The truth is that if the arrow leaves the point A to fall down at the point B, its movement AB is as simple, as indecomposable, in so far as it is movement, as the tension of the bow that shoots it. As the shrapnel, bursting before it falls to the ground, covers the explosive zone with an indivisible danger, so the arrow which goes from A to B displays with a single stroke, although over a certain extent of duration, its indivisible mobility. Suppose an elastic stretched from A to B, could you divide its extension? The course of the arrow is this very extension; it is equally simple and equally undivided. It is a single and unique bound. You fix a point C in the interval passed, and say that at a certain moment the arrow was in C. If it had been there, it would have been stopped there, and you would no longer have had a flight from A to B, but two flights, one from A to C and the other from C to B, with an interval of rest. A single movement is entirely, by the hypothesis, a movement between two stops; if there are intermediate stops, it is no longer a single movement. At bottom, the illusion arises from this, that the movement, once effected, has, laid along its course a motionless trajectory on which we can count as many immobilities as we will. From this we conclude that the movement, whilst being effected, lays at each instant beneath it a position with which it coincides. We do not see that the trajectory is created in one stroke, although a certain time is required for it; and that though we can divide at will the trajectory once created, we cannot divide its creation, which is an act in progress and not a thing. To suppose that the moving body is at a point of its course is to cut the course in two by a snip of the scissors at this point, and to substitute two trajectories for the single trajectory which we were first considering." |
(Our bold and color.) Poincaré has shown us, elsewhere, that 'at rest' is unattainable in reality. Earth rotates. Earth orbits Sun. Sun and its Solar System orbit Milky Way. And so on... From a quantum perspective, quantons are never 'at rest.' All quantons consist of Planck quanta which change absolutely at Planck and subharmonic flux rates. See Doug's CeodE 2011 QVH Table. See Doug's CeodE 2012 'A Reservoir of Wave Functions' at his A Quantum Cuneiform Primer.
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| 310 |
"It is to distinguish two successive acts where, by the hypothesis, there is only one. In short, it is to attribute to the course itself of the arrow everything that can be said of the interval that the arrow has traversed, that is to say, to admit a priori the absurdity that movement coincides with immobility. "We shall not dwell here on the three other arguments
of Zeno. We have examined them elsewhere. It is enough to point
out that they all consist in applying the movement to the line
traversed, and supposing that what is true of the line is true
of the movement. The line, for example, may be divided into as
many parts as we wish, of any length that we wish, and it is
always the same line. From this we conclude that we have the
right to suppose the movement articulated as we wish, and that
it is always the same movement. We
thus obtain a series of absurdities that all express the same
fundamental absurdity. But the possibility of applying the
movement to the line traversed exists only for an observer who,
keeping outside [i.e., as a classical unilateral observer] the
movement and seeing at every instant the possibility of a stop,
tries to reconstruct the real movement with these possible immobilities.
The absurdity vanishes as soon as we adopt by thought the continuity
of the real movement [I.e., quantum commingling, compenetration,
quantum cohesive coinsidence, and a recently described quantum
'inverse quantum Zeno' phenomenon; viz. a quantum Zeno phenomenon
as an apparency of stopping local motion of a quanton; viz. an
inverse quantum Zeno phenomenon as an agent of cascading quanton
motion/evolution. See JohnJoe McFadden's Quantum Evolution,
a very classical quantum treatise. Also search WWW for "quantum
Zeno effect." It is quite remarkable in its quantum both/and
depiction of quanton(unstoppability,stoppability).], a continuity
of which every one of us is conscious whenever he lifts an arm
or advances a step. We feel then indeed that the line passed
over between two stops is described with a single [quantum cohesive]
indivisible stroke, and that we seek in vain to practice on the
movement, which traces the line, [classical] divisions corresponding,
each to each, with the divisions [classically] arbitrarily chosen
of the line once it has been traced. The <-
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(Our brackets, bold, and color.)
We can see absurdities to which Bergson refers in this graphic:  Were Zeno's arrow to stop as classical analyticity insists
it must, we see that it would have to accelerate, at an almost
unlimited rate, to restore an illusion of continuous motion.
As Bergson declares, "This is absurd." But this is
what classical science and mathematics do. Classicism
calls quantum reality "absurd." Actually, classicism
is absurd. Classicism
is a fool calling quantum reality a "fool." (We
depict classical stoppability as an analytical, instantaneous
discontinuity; We depict restartability as a nearly infinite
rate analogue continuity.) Be aware
that if classicism denies what we have shown, then it has to
deny its use of classical 'state,'
AKA "zero momentum." Zeno's
stoppability is classicism's only means of achieving position's
'state.' See Aristotle's
Apple. See too, our more recent A
Quantum Pendulum and ponder classicists' misperceptions of
stoppability there. <- Bergson's last sentence requires some very careful thought. He says movement's quantum duration is indivisible. He is saying that a classical perspective finds it classically 'obvious' that what is 'really quantum indivisible' is 'classically quite easily divisible.' This exemplifies nicely SOM's naïve rudeness and arrogance, plus a notable innate crudity in those practitioners of CTMs. |
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| 311 |
"But all movement is articulated inwardly. It is either an indivisible bound (which may occupy, nevertheless, a very long duration) or a series of indivisible bounds. Take the articulations of this movement into account, or give up speculating on its nature. "When Achilles pursues the tortoise, each of his steps must be treated as indivisible, and so must each step of the tortoise. After a certain number of steps, Achilles will have overtaken the tortoise. There is nothing more simple. If you insist on dividing the two motions further, distinguish both on the one side and on the other, in the course of Achilles and in that of the tortoise, the sub-multiples of the steps of each of them; but respect the natural articulations of the two courses. As long as you respect them, no difficulty will arise, because you will follow the indications of experience. But Zeno's device is to reconstruct the movement of Achilles according to a [classical] law arbitrarily chosen. Achilles with a first step is supposed to arrive at the point where the tortoise was, with a second step at the point which it has moved to while he was making the first, and so on. In this case, Achilles would always have a new step to take. But obviously, to overtake the tortoise, he goes about it in quite another way. The movement considered by Zeno would only be the equivalent of the movement of Achilles if we could treat the movement as we treat the interval passed through, decomposable and recomposable at will. Once you subscribe to this first absurdity, all the others follow.(1) Note (1) - That is, we do not consider the sophism of Zeno refuted by the fact that the geometrical progression a( 1 + 1/n + 1/n2 + 1/n3 +…, etc.)—in which a designates the initial distance between Achilles and the tortoise, and n the relation of their respective velocities—has a finite sum if n is greater than 1. On this point we may refer to the arguments of P. Evellin, which we regard as conclusive (see Evellin, Infini et quantité, Paris, 1880, pp. 63-97; cf. Revue philosophique, vol. xi., 1881, pp. 564-568). The truth is that mathematics, as we have tried to show in a former work, deals and can deal only with lengths. It has therefore had to seek devices, first, to transfer to the movement, which is not a length, the divisibility of the line passed over, and then to reconcile with experience the idea (contrary to experience and full of absurdities) of a movement that is a length, that is, of a movement placed upon its trajectory and arbitrarily decomposable like it. |
(Our link, brackets, bold, and color.)
Notice how Zeno's sophism arises from adherence to Aristotle's three syllogistic laws. Zeno's logic when viewed classically is "absurd." However, when we view Zeno's logic as quantum sophism, there is nothing absurd about it. What makes Zeno's classical logic "absurd," is SOM's wall, its insistence on absolute objective either/or physical divisibility, separability, and staticity of classical 'things.' Also, notice how our analogous classical terms above assume Aristotle's laws hold, and that physical reality's classically divisible 'parts' may be treated logically, at will and arbitrarily, by any of those red terms. Those classical terms assume reality's parts whether separate or apart always have SOM's wall or box separating them in an ideal objective fashion. |
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| 312 | "Nothing would be easier, now, than to [classically] extend Zeno's argument to qualitative becoming and to evolutionary becoming. We should find the same [classical] contradictions in these. That the child can become a youth, ripen to maturity and decline to old age, we understand when we consider that vital evolution is here the reality itself. Infancy, adolescence, maturity, old age, are mere views of the [classical] mind, possible stops imagined by us, from without, along the continuity of a progress. On the contrary, let childhood, adolescence, maturity and old age be given as integral [classical] parts of the evolution, they become real stops, and we can no longer conceive how evolution is possible, for rests placed beside rests will never be equivalent to a movement. How, with what is made, can we reconstitute what is being made? How, for instance, from childhood once posited as a [classical] thing, shall we pass to adolescence, when, by the hypothesis, childhood only is given? If we look at it closely, we shall see that our habitual manner of speaking, which is fashioned after our habitual manner of thinking, leads us to actual [classical] logical deadlocks—deadlocks to which we allow ourselves to be led [e.g. by Aristotle's syllogistic 'laws'] without anxiety, because we feel confusedly that we can always get out of them if we like: all that we have to do, in fact, is to give up the cinematographical habits of our intellect. When we say "The child becomes a man," let us take care not to fathom too deeply the literal meaning of the expression, or we shall find that, when we posit the subject "child," the attribute "man" does not yet apply to it, and that, when we express the attribute "man," it applies no more to the subject " child." [Bergson's "child" vis-à-vis "man" metaphor is analogous our modern quantum measurement problem.]" |
(Our brackets, bold, and color.)
Bergson asks a most key pragmaphysial question.
You may wish to see our links on 'measurement:'
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| 313 | "The reality, which is the transition from childhood to manhood, has slipped between our fingers. We have only the imaginary stops "child" and "man," and we are very near to saying that one of these stops is the other, just as the arrow of Zeno is, according to that philosopher, at all the points of the course. The truth is that if language here were molded on reality, we should not say "The child becomes the man," but "There is becoming from the child to the man." [Note how Bergson just solved science's quantum measurement problem—simply, philosophically.] In the first proposition, "becomes" is a verb of indeterminate meaning, intended to mask the absurdity into which we fall when we attribute the state "man" to the subject "child." It behaves in much the same way as the movement, always the same, of the cinematographical film, a movement hidden in the apparatus and whose function it is to superpose the successive pictures on one another in order to imitate the movement of the real object. In the second proposition, "becoming" is a subject. It comes to the front. It is the reality itself; childhood and manhood are then only possible stops, mere views of the mind; we now have to do with the objective movement itself, and no longer with its cinematographical imitation. But the first manner of expression is alone conformable to our habits of language. We must, in order to adopt the second, escape from the cinematographical mechanism of thought. [Consider Bergson's last sentence re: David Deutsch's and Julian Barbour's analogues of reality.]" |
(Our brackets, bold, and color.) Where transition is duration of quantum pr¤cess. Colloquially, "paint peeling" is duration of quantum pr¤cess. Aging is duration of quantum pr¤cess. Being is duration of quantum pr¤cess. Living and dying are durations of quantum pr¤cess. Notice Bergson's natural, instinctive, intuitive use of becoming to lingually quantum-correct more classical 'becomes.' Quantum reality as we show and tell in our QELP and QELR is a present-participle reality — it is an animate semper flux reality. Too, it is, as Bergson shows elsewhere, plural. Students of Quantonics, by now, should be applying Bergson's plural present-participle solution to our comments above about measurement, like this: "measurementings," and "interpretationings." Indeed, our quantum stages should animately transpose all singular state-ic classicisms into plural animate quantumese, e.g., "...ifings languagings hereings wereings moldings onings realityings..." Taken to excess thosings areings whatings we needings to be doings. "Think[ings] being directly," amd beings describings "reality itself."
We must escape SOM! We must leave SOM's mythos, its Church of Reason, its Church of State. Be sure to read a page worth of text at that mythos link! Doug - 17March2008. Doug - 21Jan2003. |
Our graphic
shows a Tao quanton in Absolute flux and Absolute flux in our
Tao quanton. Thus, we say It is in us and we are in It.
Remember, this graphic is an inanimate representation
of animate quantum reality which Bergson implores us to
"…accustom ourselves to think
being (animate) directly."
When we learn to intellectually/consciously/instinctively/intuitively
accomplish habituated "think
being..." animate 
instead of more common
flux), or quanton(flux,flux) interrelationship.
(Our Quantonic heuristic is that mass, length, time, and gravity
are all quantons(flux,flux).) Thus velocity is always macro~,
meso~, and microscopically quantum uncertain and dependent upon
local 