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A Review
Henri Louis Bergson's Book
Time and Free Will
Chapter III: The Organization of Conscious States - Free Will
Topic 34: Real Duration and Prediction
by Doug Renselle
Doug's Pre-review Commentary
Start of Review




Bibliography Author's
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17


18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 Conclusion Index

Move to any Topic of Henri Louis Bergson's Time and Free Will,
or to beginning of its review via this set of links
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Topic 34...............Real Duration and Prediction


(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis Bergson, some paraphrased.)

(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.)


"But determinism will not admit itself beaten, and, putting the question in a new form, it will say: "Let
Is prediction of an act possible? Probable and infallible conclusions. us [classically schismatically] leave aside actions already performed: let us [classically disconnect and] consider only actions that are to come [i.e., an inaccurate conception of real duration].
The question is whether, knowing from now onwards all the future antecedents, some higher intelligence would not be able to predict with absolute certainty the decision which will result."—We gladly agree to the question being put in these terms: it will give us a chance of stating our own theory with greater precision. But we shall first draw a distinction between those who think that the knowledge of antecedents would enable us to state a probable conclusion and those who speak of an infallible foresight."

(Our links, brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number.

Our bold and color highlights follow a code:

  • black-bold - important to read if you are just scanning our review
  • orange-bold - text ref'd by index pages
  • green-bold - we see Bergson suggesting axiomatic memes
  • violet-bold - an apparent classical problematic
  • blue-bold - we disagree with this text segment while disregarding context of Bergson's overall text
  • gray-bold - quotable text
  • red-bold - our direct commentary

"To say that a certain friend, under certain circumstances, will very probably act in a certain way, is not so much to predict the future conduct of our friend as to pass a judgment on his present character, that is to say, on his past. Although our feelings, our ideas, our character, are constantly altering, a sudden change is seldom observed; and it is still more seldom that we cannot say of a person whom we know that certain actions seem to accord fairly well with his nature and that certain others are absolutely inconsistent with it. All philosophers will agree on this point; for to say that a given action is consistent or inconsistent with the present character of a person whom one knows is not to bind the future to the present. But the determinist goes much further: he asserts that our solution is provisional simply because we never know all the conditions of the problem; that our forecast would gain in probability in proportion as we were provided with a larger number of these conditions; that, therefore, complete and perfect knowledge of all the antecedents without any exception would make our forecast infallibly true. Such, then, is the hypothesis which we have to examine.

"For the sake of greater definiteness, let us imagine a person called upon to make a seemingly free
To know completely the antecedents and conditions of an action is to be actually performing it. decision under serious circumstances; we shall call him Peter. The question is whether a philosopher Paul, living at the same period as Peter, or, if you prefer, a few centuries before, would have been able, knowing all the conditions under which Peter acts,
to foretell with certainty the choice which Peter made." [Pogson's inserted box text we show in bold red. Pogson describes what is real about quantum reality: only quantum reality can completely k-now itself, animately, as it unfolds. This corresponds Pirsig's "direct experience," his "Quality Event," and Platt Holden's "the edge of now." We can only use quantum computers, which are naught more than real, heterogeneous, animate portion-islandic-ensembles of quantum reality, to begin to be k-now-ing quantum reality. Classical, John von Neumann architectured computers, are always dealing with static information from past reality. Literally and radically mechanically they are stuck in an inanimate, frozen, immutable classical past.]

(Our bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)




Bergson wrote this prior Kurt Gödel's being. Gödel showed that "complete and perfect knowledge" is impossible in terms of classical representation of reality. He showed that n¤ classically real, formal system may be both complete (always states the truth...) and consistent (...and states all truths) simultaneously. For significantly more detail, see our Decidable Gödel Meme.

Further, in quantum reality, there are n¤ classically hidden variables, unless one wishes to perceive animate ensemble quantum uncertainty as "hidden variables." From a quantum perspective a call to "hidden variables" is like a call to ideal, pre-existing, previously unknown Platonic concepts. If by hidden variables, one intends infinite precision analogue reality, then we can agree at least partially, but that appears n¤t to be what what Bergson refers as "unknown conditions." He appears to imply that classical determinists assert that previously undiscovered parameters exist which when discovered will permit them to refine their theories of classical determinism. Quantum reality, as currently interpreted, offers only ensemble determinism, i.e., statistical determinism which is by n¤ means a proxy for what classical determinists intend by 1-1 correspondent causal determinism.

Classicism is innately (by anthropocentric design) incapable of knowing completely, for a very simple reason: it is analytic! Instead of actually performing progressive process actionings it stops action (Zeno effect). Classical science and its tools do n¤t work on animate, dynamic quantum reality. They only work on inanimate, static classical reality.

As David Bohm said, (paraphrased) "We need a new quantum n¤n-mechanics (a new n¤n radically formal mechanics)." In Quantonics we call what Bohm seeks "quantum emerscence," which is indeed, "quantum computing."

185 "There are several ways of picturing the mental condition of a person at a given moment. We try to do it when e.g. we read a novel; but whatever care the author may have taken in depicting the feelings of his hero, and even in tracing back his history, the end, foreseen or unforeseen, will add something to the idea which we had formed of the character: the character, therefore, was only imperfectly known to us. In truth, the deeper psychic states, those which are translated by free acts, express and sum up the whole of our past history: if Paul knows all the conditions under which Peter acts, we must suppose that no detail of Peter's life escapes him, and that his imagination reconstructs and even lives over again Peter's history. But we must here make a vital distinction. When I myself pass through a certain psychic state, I know exactly the intensity of this state and its importance in relation to the others, not by measurement or comparison, but because the intensity of e.g. a deep-seated feeling is nothing else than the feeling itself. On the other hand, if I try to give you an account of this psychic state, I shall be unable to make you realize its intensity except by some definite sign of a mathematical kind: I shall have to measure its importance, compare it with what goes before and what follows, in short determine the part which it plays in the final act."

(Our bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)




Here, apparently, Bergson experimentally prescribes a methodology of comparative communication twixt two humans. His purpose is to refute classical determinism, but it begs some tangential queries.

Is this method unique? Is it only classical? Why does he say we must transform our psychic intensity into some mathematical measure in order to communicate it? Has he n¤t simply jumped back in SOM's number box?

What about whistling, humming, singing, drumming, dancing, playing a musical instrument, painting, sculpting, carving, et al.? Isn't there an I-cubed analogue of music which we can use to side-step classical analytic symbolics (shades of Close Encounters of a Third Kind)? What do our examples offer vis-à-vis Bergson's proscription? Do our examples increase DQ while decreasing SQ? Is that a valid approach? What do we mean when we say "increase DQ?" How? What do we mean when we say "decrease SQ?" How?

Why is Bergson's approach asking for more SQ (i.e., increased mathematical measurements) in order for us to share a psychic experience?

Note: we are begging a quantum Bergsonian think-being-directly (~400k page), quanton emerscitecture, which Bergson himself suggests in his book, Creative Evolution.

Why cann¤t we share our psychic intensity in a direct quantum c¤mplementary fashion without an intermediate mathematical measure?

We believe we can! Correction! We k-now we can!

"Qubits do it... Birds do it... Even little bees do it..."

Our question then becomes, "How can we tentatively, quantum coherently, as two or more unique psychic quantum entities share any specific psychic experience directly, without going through some actual intermediate mathematical measurement transformation?"

Has Bergson given into a kind of classical inevitability as have Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Newton, Bohr, Einstein, and so many others? Or is he just offering this approach as a gedankenment? If we can directly experience quantum nature, why cann¤t we directly experience another human's own psychic intensity?

186 "And I shall say that it is more or less intense, more or less important, according as the final act is explained by it or apart from it. On the other hand, for my own consciousness, which perceived this inner state, there was no need of a comparison of this kind: the intensity was given to it as an inexpressible quality of the state itself. In other words, the intensity of a psychic state is not given to consciousness as a special sign accompanying this state and denoting its power, like an exponent in algebra; we have shown above that it expresses rather its shade, its characteristic colouring, and that, if it is a question of a feeling, for example, its intensity consists in being felt. Hence we have to distinguish two ways of assimilating the conscious states of other people: the one dynamic [Pirsigean DQ], which consists in experiencing them oneself; the other static [Pirsigean SQ], which consists in substituting for the consciousness of these states their image or rather their intellectual symbol, their idea. In this case the conscious states are imagined instead of being reproduced; but, then, to the image of the psychic states themselves some indication of their intensity should be added, since they no longer act on the person in whose mind they are pictured and the latter has no longer any chance of experiencing their force by actually feeling them."

(Our links, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


N¤, Bergson was n¤t giving in to a kind of classical inevitability!


Showing its quantum included-middle qualitative subjectiveness...its quantum animate process realness.


We must question, here, Bergson's apparently classical use of reproduced. To us, reproduction is kin of classical manufacturing. To relive, or perhaps a better way to say this is, "to simulive" another's experiences, we need co-inside-nt vicarious emerscenturing (similar to a Spock mind-meld, and that damnable machine in Brain Waves, with Natalie Wood — BTW, did that "damnable machine" have to be quantum everywhere associative to accomplish what it did?).

Comsider that this is just what next generation quantum computers will do to, animately, included-middle, quantum-measure animate reality! Real quantum computing animate process n¤nanalyticity (e.g., David Bohm's "...quantum n¤nmechanics of reality...") will be qubitally vicarious! But first, we must learn how to permit qubits to have vicarious interrelationships with real quantons. Comsider how this is a query analogue of how qubits in quantum SONs coobsfectively, c¤mplementarily, "everywhere associate."
Doug - 29May2002.

187 "Now, this indication itself will necessarily assume a quantitative character: it will be pointed out, for example, that a certain feeling has more strength than another feeling, that it is necessary to take more account of it, that it has played a greater part; and how could this be known unless the later history of the person were known in advance, with the precise actions in which this multiplicity of states or inclinations has issued? Therefore, if Paul is to have an adequate idea of Peter's state at any moment of his history, there are only two courses open; either, like a novelist who knows whither he is conducting his characters, Paul must [classically] already know Peter's final act, and must thus be able to supplement his mental image of the successive states through which Peter is going to pass by some indication of their value in relation to the whole of Peter's history; or he must [quantumly] make up his mind to pass through these different states, not in imagination, but in reality. The former hypothesis must be put on one side since the very point at issue is whether , the antecedents alone being given, Paul will be able to foresee the final act [classical determinism/causation axiomatically prescribes that he shall]. We find ourselves compelled, therefore, to alter radically the idea which we had formed of Paul: he is not, as we had thought at first, a spectator whose eyes pierce the future, but an actor who plays Peter's part in advance. And notice that you cannot exempt him from any detail of this part, for the most common-place [including most importantly, quantum qualitative, subjective] events have their importance in a life-story; and even supposing that they have not, you cannot decide that they are insignificant [classicism presumes that we must discard all quantum qualitative, subjective 'events'] except in relation to the final act, which, by hypothesis, is not given."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

Quantity implies, classically, a specific, measurable, numerable amount. However, we cann¤t, even though some classicists presume that we can, e-numerate intensity of feeling, intensity of emotion. What scale do we use? What units? Classicists will tell us to invent a scale and units and impose classical analytic measurement on quality. But Bergson has already warned us of that...

188 "Neither have you the right to cut short [as classicists presume we must]—were it only by a second—the different states of consciousness through which Paul is going to pass before Peter; for the effects of the same feeling, for example, go on accumulating at every moment of duration, and the sum total of these effects could not be realized all at once unless one knew the importance of the feeling, taken in its totality, in relation to the final act, which is the very thing that is supposed to remain unknown. But if Peter and Paul have experienced the same feelings in the same order, if their minds have the same history, how will you distinguish one from the other? Will it be by the body in which they dwell? They would then always differ in some respect, viz., that at no moment of their history would they have a mental picture of the same body. Will it be by the place which they occupy in time? In that case they would no longer be present at the same events: now, by hypothesis, they have the same past and the same present, having the same experience. You must now make up your mind about it: Peter and Paul are one and the same person, whom you call Peter when he acts and Paul when you recapitulate his history. The more complete you made the sum of the conditions which, when known, would have enabled you to predict Peter's future action, the closer became your grasp of his existence and the nearer you came to living his life over again down to its smallest details: you thus reached the very moment when, the action taking place, there was no longer anything to be foreseen, but only something to be done." [Something being done, being experienced directly, quantum coherently, together: quantum computing.]

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)






Classicist will say, "Just subtract B from A, dummy! A-B, Peter minus Paul is the absolutely right answer, you idiot!" Of course, 'no' denigration intended.


"Here again any attempt to reconstruct ideally an act really willed ends in the mere witnessing of the act whilst it is being performed or when it is already done.

"Hence it is a question devoid of meaning to ask: Could or could not the act be foreseen, given the
Hence meaningless to ask whether an act can be foreseen when all Its antecedents are given. sum total of its antecedents? For there are two ways of assimilating these antecedents, the one dynamic the other static. In the first case we shall be led by imperceptible steps to identify ourselves with the person we are dealing with, to pass through the same series of states,
and thus to get back to the very moment at which the act is performed; hence there can no longer be any question of foreseeing it. In the second case, we presuppose the final act by the mere fact of annexing to the qualitative description of the previous states the quantitative appreciation of their importance. Here again the one party is led merely to realize that the act is not yet performed when it is to be performed, and the other, that when performed it is performed. This, like the previous discussion, leaves the question of freedom exactly where it was to begin with."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
190 "By going deeper into this twofold argument, we shall find, at its very root, the two fundamental illusions of the reflective consciousness. The
The two fallacies involved:
(1) regarding intensity as a magnitude, not a quality;
(2) substituting. material symbol for dynamic process.
first consists in regarding intensity as a mathematical property of psychic states and not, as we said at the beginning of this essay, as a special quality, as a particular shade of these various states. The second consists in substituting for the concrete reality or dynamic progress, which consciousness perceives,
the material symbol of this progress when it has already reached its end, that is to say, of the act already accomplished together with the series of its antecedents. Certainly, once the final act is completed, I can ascribe to all the antecedents their proper value, and picture the interplay of these various elements as a conflict or a composition of forces. But to ask whether, the antecedents being known as well as their value, one could foretell the final act, is to beg the question; it is to forget that we cannot know the value of the antecedents without knowing the final act, which is the very thing that is not yet known; it is to suppose wrongly that the symbolical diagram which we draw in our own way for representing the action when completed has been drawn by the action itself whilst progressing, and drawn by it in an automatic manner."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


1. Quality is n¤t classically mathematical.



2. Classical objective symbols cann¤t represent quality.

But, reality is predominantly qualitative!


"Now, in these two illusions themselves a third one is involved, and you will see that the question whether the act could or could not be foreseen always comes back to this: Is time space? You begin by setting side by side in some
Claiming to foresee in action always comes back to confusing time with space. ideal space the conscious states which succeed one another in Peter's mind, and you perceive his life as a kind of path M 0 X Y traced out by a moving body M in space. You then blot out in thought
the part 0 X Y of this curve, and you inquire whether, knowing M 0, you would have been able to determine the portion 0 X of the curve which the moving body describes beyond 0.
Such is, in the main, the question which you put when you bring in a philosopher Paul, who lives before Peter and has to picture to himself the conditions under which Peter will act. You thus materialize these conditions;
[classical mind, in effect does 'freeze frames' of reality — Doug 18Feb2001] you make the time to come into a road already marked out across the plain, which we can contemplate from the top of the mountain, even if we have not traversed it and are never to do so. But, now, you soon notice that the knowledge of the part M 0 of the curve would not be enough, unless you were shown the position of the points of this line, not only in relation to one another, but also in relation to the points of the whole line M OX Y; which would amount to being given in advance the very elements which have to be determined."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


3. Time is n¤t space!

Space is classically stoppable, and thus drawable/graphable in situ, state-ically. Time is unstoppable. Time has duration: it is process, and that is why Bergson tells us process is classically n¤nanalyzable! It is a mistake to claim space-time an identity.

For over four years now, we in Quantonics have been showing our students that time and space (plus gravity, et al.) are both derivatives of absolute quantum flux. In our animate quantum world, space and time both have duration; both emerse at (up to) Planck rates. In that sense, we could say that they are analogous. But all quantum flux, n¤t just space and time are analogous via their absolute fluxings. Too, there is n¤t just one (OGC/OGT) unilogical space and one unilogical time, rather there are unlimited (at least) quatrotomous (in entropy, coherence, etc.) pragmalogical spaces and times and gravities and temperatures, and pressures, and colors, and rates, and smells, and sounds, and balances, and equilibria, etc., and all their quantum complements too. These are quantum reality's animate, included-middle, qualitative heterogeneities of qualogos.


"So you then alter your hypothesis; you realize that time does not require to be seen, but to be lived; and hence you conclude that, if your knowledge of the line M 0 was not a sufficient datum, the reason must have been that you looked at it from the outside instead of identifying yourself with the point M, which describes not only M 0 but also the whole curve, and thus making its movement your own. Therefore, you persuade Paul to come and coincide [also comsider "coinside"] with Peter; and naturally, then, it is the line M 0 X Y which Paul traces out in space, since, by hypothesis, Peter describes this line. But in no wise do you prove thus that Paul foresaw Peter's action; you only show that Peter acted in the way he did, since Paul became Peter. It is true that you then come back, unwittingly, to your former hypothesis, because you continually confuse the line M 0 X Y in its tracing [animate process] with the line M 0 X Y already traced [analyzable state-icity], that is to say, [con-fuse-ing] time with space. After causing Paul to come down and identify himself with Peter as long as was required, you let him go up again and resume his former post of observation. No wonder if he then perceives the line M 0 X Y complete: he himself has just been completing it.

"What makes the confusion a natural and almost an unavoidable one is that [classical] science seems to
Confusion arising from prediction of astronomical phenomena. point to many cases where we do anticipate the future. Do we not [classically, incorrectly] determine beforehand the conjunctions of heavenly bodies, solar and lunar eclipses,
in short the greater number of astronomical phenomena? [Yes!] Does not, then, the human intellect [classically, incorrectly] embrace [classically, immutably-state-ically] in the present moment immense intervals of duration still to come? [Yes!]"

(Our link, brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


A problematic: Bergson apparently dichotomizes, classically, either inside or outside. We noticed this elsewhere too. We think it is pretentious classicism.



It is of utmost importance for students of Quantonics to see here how our QTMs eliminate this classical con-fuse-ion. We do it by saying that quantum reality's only absolute is flux! Flux is crux! Quantum flux is absolute by being both comsistent (always changes) and c¤mplete (changes all). Quantum reality has n¤ classically ideal: state-icity, immutability, stability, etc. When we talk about Pirsig's Static Quality, we are speaking of decoherent quantum flux which has quantum variable/tentative persistence (QVP). Quantum variable/tentative persistence shows students of Quantonics that all quantum reality changes, heterogeneously, asynchronously, serially, and in parallel from imperceptibly slowly up to Planck's incredibly fast rate. Apples spoil. Paint peels. Galaxies are born, live and die. Biologicals emerge and cycle. Memes evolve.

Compare our QTMs to what Plato (divine 'ideas' pre-exist, are immortal and immutable), Aristotle (his three "sillygisms;" Plato's and Aristotle's hatreds of (quantum) 'sophisms'), and Maxwell (e.g., 2nd 'law' of thermodynamics) said about classical reality.

In Quantonics our comcepts of quantum variable/tentative persistence have many brethren, including:

  • Fermionic Primæ N¤mbær (FPN); all fermions in quantum reality are quantum primæ: n¤ two are identical, they are n¤nfactorable, and they are quintessentially odd (all c¤mplex fermions wobble: they have aggregate spin ½, which together, all fermions in quantum reality emerq RH's ½ critical line (a Quantonics heuristic hermeneutic)),
  • Ensemble Quantum C¤mplexity (EQC); we can view quantonic c¤mplexity as both any fermion's quantum primæ n¤mbær and its classical prime number (CPN), e.g., Earth's quanton(FPN,CPN) is much more c¤mplex than a human's quanton(FPN,CPN); stated more classically, c¤mplexity grows with mass/energy/flux,
  • Ensemble Quantum Inertia (EQI); larger FPNs have larger ensemble quantum inertia,
    and our own unique meme of, and
  • Ensemble Quantum Uncertainty.

Allow us to introduce some other n¤vel, supporting quantonics quantum variable/tentative persistence memes and their acronyms:

  1. FPN - Fermionic Primæ N¤mbær; expressed recursively in terms of itself and its quantum c¤mplementary Classical Prime Number,
  2. IPAC - Inertial Persistence of Apparent Certainty,
  3. MTBUE - Mean Timings Between Uncertainty Ævæntings, and
  4. PSIUE - Potential Scope of Impactings of Uncertainty Ævæntings.

Our use of "Uncertainty" in our latter two memes assumes our unique Quantonics Ensemble Quantum Uncertainty, which further assumes Bergson's heterogeneous timings. Our use of "Apparent Certainty" implies apparent classical certainty.

Very simply, then, as Ensemble Quantum C¤mplexity grows, CPN, FPN, IPAC, MTBUE, and PSIUE grow.

Our intent here is to disclaim a classical dialectical belief that quantum uncertainty only applies to mesoatomic, atomic, and subatomic realms. As an example here, we offer a quote from F. S. C. Northrop's 'Introduction' to Werner Karl Heisenberg's Physics and Philosophy:

"When the quantum numbers of the system being observed are small, as in the case with subatomic phenomena, then the uncertainty specified by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of the positions and momenta of the masses of the system becomes significant. Then also, the probability numbers associated with the position-momentum numbers in the state-function become significant. When, however, the quantum numbers of the system are large, then the quantitative amount of uncertainty specified by the Heisenberg principle becomes insignificant [a mechanical, mathematical apparition] and the probability numbers in the state-function can be neglected." Page 18. Our brackets.

We believe that this view is incorrect mainly due its classical legacy underpinnings. In our Quantonics perspective, this is an improper interpretation.

Rather, we believe, and believe we have shown, that Ensemble Quantum Umcærtainty is n¤t an 'event' or classical analytic measurable which has stoppable state-ic scalar magnitude, but rather is a variable durati¤n pr¤cess which inv¤lves p¤tentially vast ensembles of quantum reality and applies to all scales of quantum reality! For more detail, see our recent (July, 2002) Quantonic Ensemble Quantum Interrelationships graphic and text.

A great classical mistake of analytic reason is to delusionally view c¤mplexity and comcomitant inertia of apparent certainty, plus c¤mplexity and presumed absence of eventual impact of uncertainty as classical historical, predicable, unitemporal, deterministic stability.


"No doubt it does; but an anticipation of this kind has not the slightest resemblance to the anticipation of a voluntary act. Indeed, as we shall see, the reasons which render it possible to foretell an astronomical phenomenon are the very ones which prevent us from determining in advance an act which springs from our free activity. For the future of the material universe, although contemporaneous with the future of a conscious being, has no analogy to it.

"In order to put our finger on this vital difference, let us assume for a moment that some mischievous genius, more powerful still than the mischievous
Illustration from hypothetical acceleration of physical movements. genius conjured up by Descartes, decreed that all the movements of the universe should go twice as fast. There
would be no change in astronomical phenomena [Poincaré also made this observation in roughly close 19th century chronology.], or at any rate in the equations which enable us to foresee them, for in these equations the symbol t does not stand for a duration, but for a relation [an unreal relation; unreal in its assumption time is spatial and thus may be stopped] between two durations, for a certain number of units of time, in short, for a certain number of simultaneities: these simultaneities, these coincidences would still take place in equal number: only the intervals which separate them would have diminished, but these intervals never make their appearance in our calculations. Now these intervals are just duration lived, duration which our consciousness perceives, and our consciousness would soon inform us of a shortening of the day if we had not experienced the usual amount of duration between sunrise and sunset."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


This, due his quantum ignorance, is a faux pas on Bergson's part. Our quantum multiverses share an animate, but comparatively very low level analogy, of awareness with "conscious beings." Rather, we should say, "We are in our quantum multiverses and our quantum multiverses are in us." We are everywhere associative cowithin our quantum multiverses! Bergson should have said, " spatial analogy to it." They are, indeed, durational/quantum_flux analogies of one another. Doug - 29May2002.


"No doubt it would not measure this shortening, and perhaps it would not even perceive it immediately as a change of quantity; but it would realize in some way or other a decline in the usual storing up of experience, a change in the progress usually accomplished between sunrise and sunset.

"Now, when an astronomer foretells e.g. a lunar eclipse, he merely exercises in his own way the
Astronomical prophecy
such an acceleration.
power which we have ascribed to our mischievous genius. He decrees that time shall go ten times, a hundred times, a
thousand times as fast, and he has a right to do so, since all that he thus changes is the nature of the conscious intervals, and since these intervals, by hypothesis, do not enter into the calculations. Therefore, into a psychological duration of a few seconds he may put several years, even several centuries of astronomical time: that is his procedure when he traces in advance the path of a heavenly body or represents it by an equation. What he does is nothing but establishing a series of [homogeneous, state-ic, analytic] relations of position between this body and other given bodies, a series of simultaneities and coincidences, a series of numerical relations: as for duration properly so called, it remains outside the calculation and could only be perceived by a consciousness capable of living through the intervals and, in fact, living the intervals themselves, instead of merely perceiving their extremities."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


It is extraordinarily easy to discount astronomers as predictors. If astronomers were capable of analytic prediction in a wholly spatial state-ic reality, they would have predicted Shoemaker-Levy's strikes on Jupiter.

Actually, we have n¤ analytical access to an absolute certainty that a lunar eclipse, which has occurred regularly prior, will happen again! It may be quantum stochastically probable, but n¤t absolutely certain.



Here, if we call Pirsig's DQ pure duration, and Pirsig's SQ pure analytic spatial extensity, we can see that Bergson places an astronomer's written and drawn machinations completely in SQ. Books are like this. Pictures are like this. They only become one with DQ when we enlighten them on our quantum stages. When we do that we get quantons(DQ,SQ). As Mae-wan Ho might say, "That is one of quantum reality's greatest miracles!" Humans are quantum beings, animate quantum 'computers' if you will. Humans are quantons(DQ,SQ).

195 "Indeed it is even conceivable that this consciousness could live so slow and lazy a life as to take in the whole path of the heavenly body in a single perception, just as we do when we perceive the successive positions of a shooting star as one line of fire. Such a consciousness would find itself really in the same conditions in which the astronomer places himself ideally; it would see in the present what the astronomer perceives in the future [Keep reminding yourself that CTMs claim time identical to space, so "present" and "future" are to a classicist just spatial extensities on a numerable, analytic, homogeneous, infinitely divisible, quantitative 'real' space line. Time, to any classicist, in order to be analyzable, must be space.]. In truth, if the latter foresees a future phenomenon, it is only on condition of making it to a certain extent a present phenomenon, or at least of enormously reducing the interval which separates us from it. In short, the time of which we speak in astronomy is a number, and the nature of the units of this number cannot be specified in our calculations; we may therefore assume them to be as small as we please, provided that the same hypothesis is extended to the whole series of operations, and that the successive relations of position in space are thus preserved. We shall then be present in imagination at the phenomenon we wish to foretell; we shall know exactly at what point in space and after how many units of time this phenomenon takes place; if we then restore to these units their psychical nature, we shall thrust the event again into the future and say that we have foreseen it, when in reality we have seen it."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

If our natural, physial, intrinsic sensory bandwidth centered roughly at Planck's rate, almost all reality would classically appear to us to stand still. As we mentioned earlier, light itself would classically appear to stand still!


In genuine quantum reality, time is (timings are) n¤t space. Time is (timings are) n¤t singular. Time is (timings are) n¤t analytically inanimate; as Bergson tells us, time (timings) may n¤t be stopped by classical analysis in homogeneous space. Indeed, we should n¤ longer refer time as singular. Instead, we should say "timings." We should use plural/heterogeneous participle grammatics. Timings are processings: "whatings happenings nextings." Quantum timings are as May-wan Ho interpreted Bergson, "indivisiblings (i.e., quantum coherings, everywhere associatings, superpositionings), heterogeneous qualities/qualityings. Quantum timings are n¤nquantifiable! Quantum timings are n¤nanalyzable (Bergson: "processings are n¤nanalyzable")! Quantum timings are n¤nlisr! And so on... Ultimately, quantum timings are classically n¤nconceptual.

We may n¤t use spatial equivalents of Earth's rotation and Earth's solar orbit as singular, monistic, OGC/OGT, homogeneous, quantitative, analytic, classical unitime!!! That classical object is n¤t, cann¤t be quantum timings. Quantum timings are n¤t space! Again, quoting Mae-wan Ho, quantum timings are n¤t "a quantitative, infinitely divisible homogeneity." To understand quantum timings we would all be better watching water boil, or a stream's rapids, or Niagara Falls, or contemplate trillions of life emerqings swimming chaotically in Earth's oceans. Quantum timings are burblings, roilings! They follow n¤ classical arrow. They have n¤ spatial direction. They consume n¤ classical space. They are happenings. They are pure DQ-mediated, ubiquitous, everywhere associative, included-middle, animate, heterogeneous quantum processings.

So, when classicists write in standard classical mathematical notation, y=f(t), we know their time is only a space proxy; it is 'not' genuine quantum timings!

196 "But these units of time which make up living duration, and which the astronomer can dispose of as he pleases because they give no handle to science,
In dealing with states of consciousness we cannot vary their duration without altering their nature. are just what concern the psychologist, for psychology deals with the intervals themselves and not with their extremities. Certainly pure consciousness does not perceive time as a sum of units of duration: left to itself, it has no means and even no reason to
measure time; but a feeling which lasted only half the number of days, for example, would no longer be the same feeling for it; it would lack thousands of impressions which gradually thickened its substance and altered its colour. True, when we give this feeling a certain name, when we treat it as a thing, we believe that we can diminish its duration by half, for example, and also halve the duration of all the rest of our history: it seems that it would still be the same life, only on a reduced scale. But we forget that states of consciousness are processes, and not things; [we would say "flux" in place of "processes" Doug 18Feb2001] that if we denote them each by a single word, it is for the convenience of language; that they are alive and therefore constantly changing; that, in consequence, it is impossible to cut off a moment from them without making them poorer by the loss of some impression, and thus altering their quality. I quite understand that the orbit of a planet might be perceived all at once or in a very short time, because its successive positions or the results of its movement are the only things that matter, and not the duration of the equal intervals which separate them."
(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

"But when we have to do with a feeling, it has no precise result except its having been felt; and, to estimate this result adequately, it would be necessary to have gone through all the phases of the feeling itself and to have taken up the same duration. Even if this feeling has finally issued in some definite action, which might be compared to the definite position of a planet in space, the knowledge of this act will hardly enable us to estimate the influence of the feeling on the whole of a life story, and it is this very influence which we want to know. All foreseeing is in reality seeing, and this seeing takes place when we can reduce as much as we please an interval of future time while preserving the relation of its parts to one another, as happens in the case of astronomical predictions. But what does reducing an interval of time mean, except emptying or impoverishing the conscious states which fill it? And does not the very possibility of seeing an astronomical period in miniature thus imply the impossibility of modifying a psychological series in the same way, since it is only by taking this psychological series as an invariable basis that we shall be able to make an astronomical period vary arbitrarily as regards the unit of duration?

"Thus, when we ask whether a future action could have been foreseen, we unwittingly identify that time with which we have to do in the exact
Difference between past and future duration in this respect. sciences, and which is reducible to a number, with real duration, whose so-called quantity is really a quality, and which we
cannot curtail by an instant without altering the nature of the facts which fill it."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

But what if our universe is conscious, as Kafatos, Nadeau, Marcer, et al., describe? Doesn't our universe feel? We claim feeling is n¤t just anthropocentric.

198 "No doubt the identification is made easier by the fact that in a large number of cases we are justified in dealing with real duration as with astronomical time. [i.e., as differences between past and future analytical time] Thus, which we call to mind the past, i.e. a series of deeds done, we always shorten it, without however distorting the nature of the event which interests us. The reason is that we know it already; for the psychic state, when it reaches the end of the progress which constitutes its very existence, becomes a thing which one can picture to oneself all at once. Here we find ourselves in the same position as the astronomer, when he takes in at a glance the orbit which a planet will need several years to traverse. In fact, astronomical prediction should be compared with the recollection of the past state of consciousness not with the anticipation of the future one. But when we have to determine a future state of consciousness, however superficial it may be, we can no longer view the antecedents in a static condition as things; we must view them in a dynamic condition as processes [i.e., flux], since we are concerned with their influence alone. Now their duration is this very influence. Therefore it will no longer do to shorten future duration in order to picture its parts beforehand; one is bound to live this duration whilst it is unfolding. As far as deep-seated psychic states are concerned, there is no perceptible difference between foreseeing, seeing, and acting." (Our brackets, bold and color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
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To contact Quantonics write to or call:

Doug Renselle
Quantonics, Inc.
Suite 18 #368 1950 East Greyhound Pass
Carmel, INdiana 46033-7730

©Quantonics, Inc., 2001-2011 Rev. 15Jan2009  PDR Created: 23Feb2001  PDR
(7Jun2002 rev - Change quantum 'prime' to quantum 'primæ' in p. 192 comments.)
(7Jun2002 rev - Extend p. 192 comments to introduce both classical prime and quantum primæ comcepts.)
(8Jun2002 rev - Extend p. 192 comments to introduce quantum n¤mbær comcept.)
(24Jun2002 rev - Add p. 192 comments 'Quantum Variable Persistence' (QVP) acronym and anchor. Add CPN acronym. Extend FPN.)
(21Jul2002 rev - Change QELR links to A-Z pages.)
(30Jul2002 rev - Add page 192 red text comments on EQC.)
(27Aug2002 rev - Correct 'QEC' phrasing to 'EQC' phrasing in p. 192 comments.)
(9Jan2003 rev - Add Zenos_Paradice link under page 184 comments.)
(19May2003 rev - Add indices for 'intellect...')
(17Jun2003 rev - Add Chapter Title link to Pogson's Index item on 'Duration.')
(29Oct2004 rev - Reset red text.)
(11Dec2005 rev - Add 'qubit' links to pages 185-6 comments.)
(9Jan2006 rev - Change all occurrences of 'proscribe' to 'prescribe.' Release table width constraints.)
(19Apr2007 rev - Minor reformat. Massive respell.)
(15Jan2009 rev - Make page current.)

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