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A Review
Henri Louis Bergson's Book
Time and Free Will
Chapter III: The Organization of Conscious States - Free Will
Topic 35: Real Duration and Causality
by Doug Renselle
Doug's Pre-review Commentary
Start of Review




Bibliography Author's
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17


18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 Conclusion Index

Move to any Topic of Henri Louis Bergson's Time and Free Will,
or to beginning of its review via this set of links
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Topic 35...............Real Duration and Causality


(Most quotes verbatim Henri Louis Bergson, some paraphrased.)

(Relevant to Pirsig, William James Sidis, and Quantonics Thinking Modes.)


"Only one course will remain open to the determinist.
The determinist argument that psychic phenomena are subject to the law "same antecedents, same consequent." He will probably give up asserting the possibility of foreseeing a certain future act or state of consciousness, but will maintain that every act is determined by its psychic antecedents, or, in other words, that the facts of consciousness, like the phenomena of nature, are subject to laws.
This way of arguing means, at bottom, that he will leave out the particular features of the concrete psychic states, lest he find himself confronted by phenomena which defy all symbolical representation and therefore all anticipation. The particular nature of these phenomena is thus thrust out of sight, but it is asserted that, being phenomena, they must remain subject to the law of causality. Now, it is argued, this law means that every phenomenon is determined by its conditions, or, in other words, that the same causes produce the same effects. Either, then, the act is inseparably bound to its antecedents, or the principle of causality admits of an incomprehensible exception.

"This last form of the determinist argument differs less than might be
But as regards inner states
the same antecedents will never recur
thought from all the others which have been examined above. To say that the same inner causes will reproduce the same effects is to assume that the same cause can appear a second time on the stage of consciousness.
Now, if duration is what we say, deep-seated psychic states are radically heterogeneous to each other, and it is impossible that any two of them should be quite alike, since they are two different [quantum omnifferent, hetero- pragma-temporal] moments of a life-story."

(Our link, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

Bergson restarts his footnote counts on each page. So to refer a footnote, one must state page number and footnote number.

Our bold and color highlights follow a code:

  • black-bold - important to read if you are just scanning our review
  • orange-bold - text ref'd by index pages
  • green-bold - we see Bergson suggesting axiomatic memes
  • violet-bold - an apparent classical problematic
  • blue-bold - we disagree with this text segment while disregarding context of Bergson's overall text
  • gray-bold - quotable text
  • red-bold - our direct commentary


But as regards both inner and outer quantum phasics the same antecedents can never recur. All actualized quanton FPNs are unique in heterogeneous comtexts of many quantum timings.

And if we adhere Quantonics quanton(mind,body) then any two quantons(mind,body), too, are radically heterogeneous to each other and to their quantum c¤mplements, regardless their 'internality-externality.'

200 "While the external object does not bear the mark of the time that has elapsed and thus, in spite of the difference of time, the [classical] physicist can again encounter identical elementary conditions, duration is something real for the consciousness which preserves the trace of it, and we cannot here speak of identical conditions, because [, due to heterogeneity,] the same moment does not occur twice [no recurrence of past]. It is no use arguing that, even if there are no two deep-seated psychic states which are altogether alike, yet [classical] analysis would resolve these different states into more general and homogeneous elements [external things] which might be compared with each other [objectively, lisrly]. This would be to forget that even the simplest psychic elements possess a personality and a life of their own, however superficial they may be; they are in a constant state of becoming, and the same feeling, by the mere fact of being repeated, is a new [quantum n¤vel] feeling. Indeed, we have no reason for calling it by its former name save that it corresponds to the same external cause or projects itself outwardly into similar attitudes [William James makes an analogous point]: hence it would simply be begging the question to deduce from the so-called likeness of two conscious states that the same cause produces the same effect. In short, if the causal relation still holds good in the realm of inner states, it cannot resemble in any way what we call causality in nature."

(Our links, brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

Bergson shows us how quantum language is always phase-ic and tentative, where classical language is always immutable, fixed, state-ic. Classical objects cann¤t emerge, are n¤n-emersible. Classical objects can be lisr-manufactured (just as all classical mathematics, sciences, ontologies, and philosophies are, indeed, manufactured using word objects-dichons vis-à-vis memes~quantons) but they are innately incapable of quantum emerscenture.

Note Bergson's own use of 'time' as classically singular, though, thus thrusting it back into SOM's homogeneous box and vicious circle. Also ponder Bergson's classically innate dichon(internal, external) vis-à-vis its quantumly intrinsic quanton(internal,external). Also see our quanton primer.


This is THE classical paradox in any classicist's view of quantum n¤ncausality. Any classicist insists that reality is dichon: either causal or 'not' causal. In any classicist's CTM 'mind' there is absolutely 'no' possibility that reality is quantum animate, heterogeneous, c¤mplementary, included-middle quantonic interrelationships of both.


"For the [classical] physicist, the same cause always produces the same effect [i.e., 1-1 correspondence]: for a psychologist who does not let himself be misled by merely apparent analogies, a deep-seated inner cause [rather, outcome] produces [rather, when stochastically Valued, selects~chooses] its effect [rather, affect] once for all and will never reproduce it. And if it is now asserted that this effect was inseparably bound up with this particular cause, such an assertion will mean one of two things: either that, the antecedents being given, the future action might have been foreseen [classical determinism]; or that, the action having once been performed, any other actions seen, under the given conditions, to have been impossible [which appears ludicrous to us]. Now we saw that both these assertions were equally meaningless [and thus classical reality is meaningless], and that they also involved a false conception of duration [classical reality conceptually misperceives quantum reality].

"Nevertheless it will be worth while to dwell on this latter form of the determinist argument, even though it be only to explain from our point of view the
Analysis of the [mis]conception of cause, which underlies the whole determinist argument. meaning of the two words "determination" and "causality." In vain do we argue that there cannot be any question either of foreseeing a future action in the way that an astronomical
phenomenon is foreseen, or of asserting, when once an action is done, that any other action would have been impossible under the given conditions. In vain do we add that, even when it takes this form: "The same causes produce the same effects," the principle of universal determination loses every shred of meaning in the inner world of conscious states."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


Classical physicists ask, "What happens next?" What and next must 1-1 correspond. Worse, they assume "What causes next."

Quantum physicists who adhere QTMs, ask, "Whatings happenings nextings?" Whatings and nextings are quantum ensembles of quantons (animate, phasic c¤mplementary interrelationships). Better, they assume quantons(whatings,nextings) are making quantal, incrementally~locally better Value choosings of selected nextings. Here is a graphic of what we intend, depicted without animation which we ask you to imagine:

"Each color above shows interrelationshipings of ensemble QLO pairs from four peaqlo triple ensembles.

"We can interrelate any ensemble with any ensemble.

"If we interrelate an ensemble with itself we might see a cylinder of self~reference, self~recursion.

"We can interrelate any partial~element of any ensemble with any partial~element of any ensemble and with any ensemble. Hoffmann viewed our QLO 'ensembles' as crowds.

"Any interrelationship may be m¤daled as a wave~function and as an ensemble of wave~functions. Our cylinder exemplar may make that more apparent."
(Text quoted above is Doug's own, from page linked to by graphic above.)

Quantal valuation requires quantum awareness (see quantum~awareness next appearance on this page). Our description of most rudimentary quantum ontology here is what Pirsig claims makes (quantum) reality intrinsically moral:

"When...patterns of reality [quantons] create life...Metaphysics of Quality postulates that they've done so because it's better and that this definition of betterness—this beginning [quantal] response to Dynamic Quality—is an elementary unit of ethics upon which all right and wrong can be based." Page 157 of 410, Lila, Bantam hardbound 1st ed., 1991. Our bold, brackets, italics, ellipses.

For us, in Quantonics, Pirsig just described what we perceive is quantum reality. We view his "all right and wrong" n¤t as a classical dichon, rather as quantons(rightings,wrongings), where both rightings and wrongings are animate, included-middle, heterogeneous quantum c¤mplements endlessly and ontologically juxtaposed and ensemble quantum uncertainly assessings~Valuings~choosings~selectings — quantally, incrementally — better.
Doug - 1Jun2002.

Any principle of universal determination lacks principle. Causal determinism is a n¤n-general classical concept. It is a specific illusion born of SOMthink and using CTMs to do one's classical thing-king.

Quantum reality offers only ensemble "many" determinism. "Many qualitative quantum Values" assessed probabilistically (i.e., multi-comtextually, multi-locally -n¤nlocally, multi-temporally, etc.) choose any next affect. Since n¤ one has any means of k-now-ing (thibedir) all those "many qualitative Values" at any particular practically unlimited 'set' of both local and n¤nlocal Planck moments, it is impossible to predict analytically (classically) what will happen next. Better, we k-now that each Planck moment has its own animate quantum phase uncertainty.


"The determinist will perhaps yield to our arguments on each of these three points in particular, will admit that in the psychical field one cannot ascribe any of these three meanings to the word determination, will probably fail to discover a fourth meaning, and yet will go on repeating that the act is inseparably bound up with its antecedents. We thus find ourselves here confronted by so deep-seated a misapprehension and so obstinate a prejudice that we cannot get the better of them without attacking them at their root, which is the principle of causality. By analysing the concept of cause, we shall show the ambiguity which it involves, and, though not aiming at a formal definition of freedom, we shall perhaps get beyond the purely negative idea of it which we have framed up to the present.

"We perceive physical phenomena, and these phenomena obey laws. This means: (1) that causality as phenomena a, b, c, d, previously
Causality as "regular succession" [i.e., history] does not apply to conscious states and cannot disprove free will. perceived, can occur again in the same shape; (2) that a certain phenomenon P, which appeared after the conditions a, b. c, d, and after these conditions only, will not fail to recur as soon as the same conditions are again present. If the principle of causality told
us nothing more, as the empiricists claim, we should willingly grant these philosophers that their principle is derived from experience; but it would no longer prove anything against our freedom."

(Our bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


And attack we do, with vigor, with intensity, with duration.


Bergson shows here how 'cause' and freedom are quantum~complementary at best and dialectically antithetical at worst. Classical 'cause' requires binary thingking, two-valued (bivalent; n¤t omnivalent) thingking, reference frame 'zero momentum' stoppability-absolute-stability, 1-1 correspondence of objective independents (n¤t ensemble nowings and nextings whose middles are wave~energy~including one another), conservation in a classical sense, etc.

As we can readily intuit, classical 'cause,' due its dialectically bogus assumptions, is simply unreal and impossible in a quantum~reality of absolute flux. Doug - 28Feb2008.

In Quantonics, we view empiricism having heterogeneous flavors. Bergson apparently speaks of empiricists as classical determinists. To us, quantum empiricism is an evolutionary, quantum uncertain, Darwinian "selectings" empiricism.


"For it would then be understood that definite antecedents give rise to a definite consequent wherever experience shows us this regular succession; but the question is whether this regularity is found in the domain of consciousness too, and that is the whole problem of free will. We grant you for a moment that the principle of causality is nothing but the summing up of the uniform and unconditional successions observed in the [one and only classical] past [Do we all really, everywhere, share a single OGC-OGT classical past, as determinists and 'regular' cause-effect astronomers claim? Do Cepheusians share a common past with Andromedans and Cancerians?]: by what right, then, do you apply it to those deep-seated states of consciousness in which no regular succession has yet been discovered, since the attempt to foresee them ever fails? And how can you base on this principle your argument to prove the determinism of inner states, when, according to you, the determinism of observed facts is the sole source of the principle itself? In truth, which the empiricists make use of the principle of causality to disprove human freedom, they take the word cause in a new meaning, which is the very meaning given to it by common sense.

"To assert the regular succession of two phenomena is, indeed, to recognize that, the first being given, we already catch sight of the second. But this wholly subjective connexion between two ideas is not enough for common sense. It seems to common sense that, if the idea of the second phenomenon is already implied in that of the first, the second phenomenon itself must exist objectively [E.g., Betelgeuseans, Alpha Centaurians, Rigelians, and Capellaeans all experience an identical, monolithic, homogeneous classical reality! Socially, by 'common sense!.' ], in some way or other, within the first phenomenon."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

As we explained in Bergson's previous topic classical regularity is only an apparition, even in classically homogeneous 'space.' All quantum reality is:

  • ensemble quantum complex~chaotic,
  • ensemble quantum FPN-inertial (manifestation of ½ spin wobble),
  • ensemble quantum n¤ndeterministic~periodic~phasic,
  • ensemble quantum pragmatemporal,
  • ensemble quantum uncertain, and thus
  • ensemble quantum variable~tentative~persistent.

Where quantum reality, in Quantonics, is an emergent, n¤vel believing~modeling system, which more generally subsumes classical reality as a naïve and degenerate special case.

Averse what Catholic, Aquinas-based thought proselytizes, human freedom is void of any classical causation; however, in quantum reality humans are partial to their vaster quantum ensembles, and thus are free to choose partially. Ensemble quantum decisions include all their partial comstituents' choosings. In this way better, heretical, moral, ethical quantum outcomes incrementally~quantally evolve physially. Ponder how any notion of absolute objective truth (ESQ) is absent in this process. Notice how classical quantitative reason at each increment metamorphoses and transemerqs into more quantum qualitative quantons(good,reason). In our quantons reason diminishes radically in favor of Ensemble Quantum Value (EQV). Classical 'reason,' as a quantum c¤mplement, loses nearly all its legacy classical moorings, including:

  • real stability, stasis, immutability, permanence, inanimacy, monolithicity, spatial solidity, impenetrability, etc.;
  • objective independence, lisr, excluded-middle, SOM's wall, objective closure, objective conservation, etc.;
  • objective absolute homogeneity, analyticity, numerability, Descartesian spatiality, objective modular induction, analytic deduction, etc.;
  • objective negation, objective absolute verity, objective opposition, objective absolute falsity and falsifiability, objective proof, etc.;
  • objective determinism, objective causality based upon objective cause-effect 1-1 correspondence, monistic historical succession, etc.;
  • objective mathematics, algebra, number theory, differential calculus, integral calculus, spatial geometry, predicate logic, etc.;
  • classical linguistics, see our May2000QQA, Jun2000QQA, QELR and QELP, etc.;
  • etc.

"And common sense was bound to come to this conclusion, because to distinguish exactly between an objective connexion of phenomena and a subjective association between their ideas presupposes a fairly high degree of philosophical culture. We thus pass imperceptibly from the first meaning to the second, and we picture the causal relation as a kind of prefiguring of the future phenomenon in its present conditions. Now this prefiguring can be understood in two very different ways, and it is just here that the ambiguity begins.

"In the first place, mathematics furnishes us with one type of this kind of
Causality, as the prefiguring of the future phenomenon in its present conditions, in one form destroys concrete phenomena. prefiguring. The very movement by which we draw the circumference of a circle on a sheet of paper generates all the mathematical properties of this figure: in this sense an unlimited number of theorems can be said to pre-exist within the definition, although they will be spread out in duration for the mathematician
who deduces them. It is true that we are here in the [classical] realm of pure quantity [pure reason] and that, as geometrical properties can be expressed in the form of equations, it is easy to understand how the original equation, expressing the fundamental property of the figure, is transformed [i.e., classically, radically manufactured] into an unlimited number of new [n¤t n¤vel quantum emergent] ones, all virtually contained in the first. On the contrary, physical phenomena, which succeed one another and are perceived by our senses, are distinguished by quality not less than by quantity, so that there would be some difficulty in at once declaring them equivalent to one another."

(Our bold and color.)






N¤ actuality in quantum reality pre-exists. All actualities in quantum reality may potentially arise~emerge and ensemble quantum variably~tentatively exist~be~persist. All actualities in quantum reality may~eventually do potentially demise~demerge and tentatively~n¤nactually isobe~isopersist. Doug - 26Nov2001.



Bergson disavows classical, Aristotelian identity, again.

205 "But, just because they are perceived through our sense-organs, we seem justified in ascribing their qualitative differences to the impression which they make on us and in assuming, behind the heterogeneity of our sensations, a homogeneous physical universe. Thus, we shall strip matter of the concrete qualities with which our senses clothe it, colour, heat, resistance, even weight, and we shall finally find ourselves confronted with homogeneous extensity, space without body. The only step then remaining will be to [strip 'reality' of concrete qualities] describe figures in space, to make them move according to mathematically formulated laws, and [attempt] to explain the apparent qualities of matter by the shape, position, and motion of these geometrical figures. Now, position is given by a system of fixed magnitudes and motion is expressed by a law, i.e. by a CONstant relation between variable [quantitative] magnitudes; but shape is a mental image, and, however tenuous, however transparent we assume it to be, it still constitutes, in so far as our imagination has, so to speak, the visual perception of it, a concrete and therefore irreducible quality of matter. It will therefore be necessary to make a clean sweep of this image itself and replace it by the abstract formula of the movement which gives rise to the figure. Picture then algebraical relations getting entangled in one another, becoming objective by this very entanglement, and producing, by the mere effect of their complexity, concrete, visible, and tangible reality,—you will be merely draping the consequences of the principle of causality, understood in the sense of an actual [Platonic] prefiguring of the future in the present."

(Our brackets, bold, all caps, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

Astute readers may recognize this classically homogeneous, objective assumption as an analytic (i.e., radically mechanistic) calculus precursor where classical heterogeneity becomes, as Mae-wan Ho showed us, "infinite divisibility (i.e., arbitrary reducibility)."

206 "The scientists of our time do not seem, indeed, to have carried abstraction so far, except perhaps Lord Kelvin. This acute and profound physicist assumed that space is filled with a homogeneous and incompressible fluid in which vortices move, thus producing the properties of matter: these vortices are the constituent elements of bodies; the atom thus becomes a movement, and physical phenomena are reduced to regular movements taking place within an incompressible fluid. But, if you will notice that this fluid is perfectly homogeneous, that between its parts there is neither an empty interval which separates them nor any difference whatever by which they can be distinguished, you will see that all movement taking place within this fluid is really equivalent to absolute immobility, since before, during, and after the movement nothing changes and nothing has changed in the whole. The movement which is here spoken of is thus not a movement which actually takes place, but only a movement which is pictured mentally: it is a relation between relations. It is implicitly supposed, though perhaps not actually realized, that motion has something to do with consciousness, that in space there are only simultaneities, and that the business of the physicist is to provide us with the means of calculating these relations of simultaneity for any moment of our duration."

(Our brackets, bold and color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


Lord Kelvin's "incompressible fluid" ~corresponds Quantonics' VES~n¤nactuality. His "vortices," our quantons. His "regular movements" our quantum Planck rate least action~pragma~process~time. His "perfect homogeneity" our blue-dotted comtrarotating isocoherent isoc¤mplementary isoflux isotropicity. His "indistinguishability" our isofluxes' self-canceling stealth. His "motion has something to do with consciousness" our quantum awareness (see quantum~awareness next appearance on this page). His "relation between relations" our quantons(quantons(quantons(...)).

His "absolute immobility," "nothing changes," and "in space there are only simultaneities," all do n¤t correspond any Quantonics n¤tions. Latter sound, to us, like, now quite notably, unoriginal Julian Barbourisms!


"Nowhere has mechanism been carried further than in this system, since the very shape of the ultimate elements of matter is here reduced to a [classical, analytical] movement. But the Cartesian physics already anticipated this interpretation; for if matter is nothing, as Descartes claimed, but homogeneous extensity, the movements of the parts of this extensity can be conceived through the abstract [classical] law which governs them or through an algebraical equation between variable magnitudes, but cannot be represented under the concrete form of an image [thus violating a classical requirement of non-contradiction twixt abstract models of- and concrete-reality]. And it would not be difficult to prove that the more the progress of mechanical explanations enables us to develop this conception of causality and therefore to relieve the atom of the weight of its sensible qualities, the more the concrete existence of the phenomena of nature tends to vanish into algebraical smoke.

"Thus understood, the relation of causality is a necessary relation in the sense
It thus leads to Descartes' physics and Spinoza's metaphysics, but cannot bind future to present without neglecting duration. that it will indefinitely approach the relation of identity, as a curve approaches its asymptote. The principle of identity is the absolute law of our consciousness: it asserts that what is thought is thought at the moment when we think it: and what gives this principle its
absolute necessity is that it does not bind the future to the present, but only the present to the present: it expresses the unshakable confidence that consciousness feels in itself, so long as, faithful to its duty, it confines itself to declaring the apparent present state of the mind."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

Compare our Quantonics' absolute semper flux to Bergson's "[radical] mechanism...reduced to [radical analytical, unitemporal, unidirectional] movement." Quantonics' isoflux takes its quantum fractal Chautauquas, its peregrinations, n¤nanalytically and quantum stochastically in all 'directions' simultaneously! See Irving Stein's Schrödinger Quantum Object. Quantons' n¤nactual c¤mplements associate n¤nanalytically superpositionally everywhere simultaneously in quantum isoflux.

208 "But the principle of causality, in so far as it is supposed to bind the future to the present, could never take the form of a necessary principle; for the successive moments of [classical] real time are not bound up with one another [this is not easy for classicists to understand, yet it is key to understanding heterogeneous quantum reality - Doug, 18Feb2001], and no effort of logic will succeed in proving that what has been will be or will continue to be, that the same antecedents will always give rise to identical consequents. Descartes understood this so well that he attributed the regularity of the physical world and the continuation of the same effects to the constantly renewed grace of Providence; he built up, as it were, an instantaneous physics, intended for a universe the whole duration of which might as well be confined to the present moment. And Spinoza maintained that the indefinite series of phenomena, which takes for us the form of a succession in time, was equivalent, in the absolute, to the divine unity: he thus assumed, on the one hand, that the relation of apparent causality between phenomena melted away into a relation of identity in the absolute, and, on the other, that the indefinite duration of things was all contained in a single moment, which is eternity. In short, whether we study Cartesian physics, Spinozistic metaphysics, or the scientific theories of our own time, we shall find everywhere the same anxiety to establish a relation of logical necessity between cause and effect, and we shall see that this anxiety shows itself in a tendency to transform relations of succession into relations of inherence, to do away with active duration, and to substitute for apparent causality a fundamental identity."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)







Actual fermionic quantum reality has n¤ decoherent identities. Why? It is quantum prime! No fermion (c¤mplex or simple) has any factors (including itself and one), and each fermion is a unique quantum FPN.

"Now, if the development of the notion of causality, understood in the sense of
The necessary determination of phenomena implies nonduration; but we endure and are therefore free. necessary connexion, leads to the Spinozistic or Cartesian [inaccurate] conception of nature [duration], inversely, all relation of necessary determination established between successive phenomena
may be supposed to arise from our perceiving, in a confused form, some mathematical mechanism behind their heterogeneity. We do not claim that common sense has any intuition of the [molecular] kinetic theories of matter, still less perhaps of a Spinozistic mechanism; but it will be seen that the more the effect seems necessarily bound up with the cause, the more we tend to put it in the cause itself, as a mathematical consequence in its principle, and thus to cancel the effect of duration. That under the influence of the same external conditions I do not behave to-day as I behaved yesterday is not at all surprising, because I change, because I endure. But things considered apart from our perception do not seem to endure; and the more thoroughly we examine this idea, the more absurd it seems to us to suppose that the same cause should not produce to-day the effect which it produced yesterday."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)



Bergson tells us that dichons' copula are classically successive bi-connective piece-wise excluded-middle determina.

Compare our quantons' copula as quantumly coherent everywhere-associative durational included-middle c¤mplementa.


"We certainly feel, it is true, that although things do not endure as we do ourselves [Bergson did n¤t k-now this 113 years ago, but in quantum reality all 'things' do endure.], nevertheless there must be some reason why phenomena are seen to succeed one another instead of being set out all at once. And this is why the notion of causality, although it gets indefinitely near that of identity, will never seem to us to coincide with it, unless we conceive clearly the idea of a mathematical mechanism or unless some subtle metaphysics removes our very legitimate scruples on the point. It is no less obvious that our belief in the necessary determination of phenomena by one another becomes stronger in proportion as we are more inclined to regard duration as a subjective form of our consciousness.

Begin reviewer aside:

This is why Pirsig dyslexically said,

"Quality decreases subjectivity. Quality takes you out of yourself, makes you aware of the world around you. Quality is opposed to subjectivity."

ZMM, p. 214 of 373 total, Bantam paperbound, 1980.

Taken literally, Pirsig apparently says, "Quality decreases itself."

Pirsig speaks n¤t of natural~physial~subjectivity here. Rather, in our view, he speaks of anthropocentric subjectivity: human-centered, humanistic subjectivity ( Do you see how 'dialectical' either subjective or objective imposes 'objectivity' on subjectivity? ). Multiversal Quality is multiversal quantum qualitative subjectivity, and there is n¤ philosophical way around that, n¤r do we seek any philosophical way around that. However, we are comfident Pirsig's words have been misinterpreted by some objectivists, some SOMites.

End reviewer aside.

In other words, the more we tend to set up the causal relation as a relation of necessary determination, the more we assert thereby that things do not endure like ourselves. This amounts to saying that the more we strengthen the principle of causality, the more we emphasize the difference between a physical series and a psychical [and thus physial] one. Whence, finally it would result (however paradoxical the opinion may seem) that the assumption of a relation of mathematical inherence between external phenomena ought to bring with it, as a natural or at least as a plausible consequence, the belief in human free will. But this last consequence will not concern us for the moment: we are merely trying here to trace out the first meaning of the word causality, and we think we have shown that the prefiguring of the future in the present is easily conceived under a mathematical form, thanks to a certain conception of duration which, without seeming to be so, is fairly familiar to common sense."

(Our links, brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)


A Quantonics heuristic of both causality and identity makes this issue moot. We deny classical causality (we admit only an apparition of it which we explain via quantum ensemble stochastic 'determinism' which is n¤t absolute classical one-to-one correspondent determinism n¤r is it classical single effect causality). We deny classical identity (n¤ quanton is identical to itself longer than a Planck moment).


An enlightening epiphany here, is to understand what Bergson says, then realize that our quantum reality, our quantum multiverses are all enduring processes. Too, those processes are n¤t unlike our psychic duration! Thence, we may say that our quantum~reality (quantum~flux hologramings) cann¤t be analyzed — just as he tells us and shows us our psychic processes may n¤t be analyzed. This is one of our major indictments of classical and postmodern thing-king.


Re: Pirsig's "Quality decreases subjectivity," and "Quality is opposed to subjectivity," please compare:

If Quality is dynamic, that implies to Doug that Quality is quantum~flux. All quantum waves are stochastic in all timings, and thus implicitly subjective (I.e., n¤t stoppable, n¤t scalarbative, n¤t analyzable by classical dialectical thingking...all quantum~reality is flux and all flux self~other~referently, fractally mixes and our end result is a quantum~hologramic reality; our thoughts are quantum~hologramic, our minds are quantum~hologramic, our bodies are quantum~hologramic, and all that is known, unknown, knowable, unknowable has qua to make reality quantum~hologramic...Doug - 21Dec2008.). We would agree with Pirsig if he said "SQ decreases subjectivity," since SQ is what dialecticians mean by "classically objective." We would agree with Pirsig if he said, "DQ is opposed to objectivity." Ideal dialectical objectivity corresponds Pirsig's ESQ. Pure quantum~subjectivity corresponds Pirsig's DQ, and partial~enthymemetic~quantum~subjectivity corresponds all quantons(DQ,SQ).

Why do people have trouble grasping this? Doug believes it is a simple fact that most of reality humans are aware of appears to us as posentropic, decoherent quantum~reality. It is omnifficult to intuit a rock as flux. However, all 'solid' material-appearing reality is made mostly of fermions whose flux is spin 1/2. That flux wobbles. Wobble gives fermions a feel of 'solidity.' But fermions are still flux! Their flux rate is so high it is almost impossible for us to understand that rocks are fluxing fermions. Fact is, they are! Flux is subjective be it spin 2, 1, zero, and 1/2! So qualitatively, rocks are subjective! They appear to SOMites as objective, but when we really understand them, we grasp their essence, their quantum~essence: flux! Try emerscenturing a rock, atoms up! Then you will understand! Doug - 21Dec2008.

Doug - 28Feb2008.

"But there is a prefiguring of another kind, still more familiar to our mind,
Prefiguring as having an idea of a future act which we cannot realize without effort, does not involve necessary determination. because immediate consciousness gives us the type of it. We go, in fact, through successive states of consciousness, and although the later was not contained in the earlier, we had before us at the time a more or less confused idea of it.
The actual realization of this idea [rather, quantum expectation], however, did not appear as certain but merely as possible. Yet, between the idea [expectation] and the action [quantum stochastic outcome], some hardly perceptible intermediate processes come in, the whole mass of which takes for us a form sui generis [one of a kind, unique], which is called the feeling of effort. And from the idea to the effort, from the effort to the act, the progress has been so continuous that we cannot say where the idea and the effort end, and where the act begins. Hence we see that in a certain sense we may still say here that the future was [quantum-] prefigured [expected] in the present; but it must be added that this prefiguring is very imperfect, since the future action of which we have the present idea is conceived as realizable but not as realized, and since, even when we plan the effort necessary to accomplish it, we feel that there is still time to stop. If, then, we decide to picture the causal relation [classical prefiguring] in this second form, we can assert a priori that there will no longer be a relation of necessary determination between the cause and the effect, for the effect will no longer be given in the cause."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

Prefiguring, here, as both Bergson and Pogson use it correlates what we call "quantum expectation." In Quantonics we never predict, rather we always expect. Quantum expectation attends quantum awareness (see quantum~awareness first appearance on this page) and its choosings among k-now-ing current outcomings thus selecting~Valuing nextings' outcomings.


"It will be there only in the state of pure possibility and as a vague idea which perhaps will not be followed by the corresponding action. But we shall not be surprised that this approximation is enough for common sense if we think of the readiness with which children and primitive people [correctly] accept the idea [rather, quantum meme] of a whimsical Nature, in which caprice plays a part no less important than necessity. Nay, this way of conceiving causality will be more easily understood by the general run of people, since it does not demand any effort of abstraction and only implies a certain [quantum, included-middle, c¤mplementary, animate, i.e., quantonic!] analogy between the outer and the inner world, between the succession of objective phenomena and that of our subjective states.

"In truth, this second way of conceiving the relation of cause to effect is more natural than the
This second conception of causality leads to Leibniz as the first led to Spinoza. first in that it immediately satisfies the need of a mental image. If we look for the phenomenon B within the phenomenon A, which regularly precedes it, the reason
is that the habit of associating the two images ends in giving us the idea of the second phenomenon wrapped up [and emergent from], as it were, in that of the first. It is natural, then, that we should push this objectification to its furthest limit and that we should make the phenomenon A itself into a psychic state, in which the phenomenon B is supposed to be contained as a very vague idea."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)




For 2500 years we have been formally, carefully trained n¤t to view reality this natural~physial way.


Bravo! Bergson!

213 "We simply suppose, thereby, that the objective connexion of the two phenomena resembles the subjective association which suggested the idea of it to us. The qualities of things are thus set up as actual states, somewhat analogous to those of our own self; the material universe is credited with a vague personality which is diffused through space and which, although not exactly endowed with a conscious will, is led on from one state to another by an inner impulse, a kind of effort. Such was ancient hylozoism, a half-hearted and even contradictory hypothesis, which left matter its extensity although attributing to it real conscious states, and which spread the qualities of matter throughout extensity while treating these qualities as inner i.e. simple states. It was reserved for Leibniz to do away with this contradiction and to show that, if the succession of external qualities or phenomena is understood as the succession of our own ideas, these qualities must be regarded as simple states or perceptions, and the matter which supports them as an unextended monad, analogous to our soul. But, if such be the case, the successive states of matter cannot be perceived from the outside any more than our own psychic states; the hypothesis of pre-established harmony must be introduced in order to explain how these inner states are representative of one another. Thus, with our second conception of the relation of causality we reach Leibniz, as with the first we reached Spinoza. And in both cases we merely push to their extreme limit or formulate with greater precision two half-hearted and confused ideas of common sense."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)




Reader, consider that 'matter' is in a quantum heuristic, alive. Hardest steel is literally burgeoning with quantum flux and its own relentless interrelationships with quantum isoflux. Reality is, in a valid sense, quantum hylozoistic! In Quantonics, we say, "All quantons are quantum-aware." Quantum Planck rate flux is crux, and "flux interrelationships make quantum ensemble choices which affect quantum ensemble nextings outcomings." See our "Whatings Happenings Nextings." Given what you learned there, we can use quantum language now to re-express our previously quoted clause, "fluxing (quantum aware) interrelationshipings making quantum ensembling choosings which affectings quantum ensembling nextings outcomings." Yes, we know, from a classical unremediated grammatical perspective, this is atrocious! However, from a stindyanic view of quantum reality it is right on! It is Quantonics' Millennium III English Language Remediation. Doug. 11Nov2001.

"Now it is obvious that the relation of causality, understood in this second way,
It does not involve necessary determination. does not involve the necessary determination of the effect by the cause. History indeed proves it. We see that ancient hylozoism, the first
outcome of this conception of causality, explained the regular succession of causes and effects by a real deus ex machina: sometimes it was a Necessity external to things and hovering over them, sometimes an inner Reason acting by rules somewhat similar to those which govern our own conduct. Nor do the perceptions of Leibniz's monad necessitate one another; God has to regulate their order in advance. In fact, Leibniz's determinism does not spring from his conception of the monad, but from the fact that he builds up the universe with [material] monads only. Having denied all mechanical influence of substances on one another, he had to explain how it happens that their states correspond. Hence a determinism which arises from the necessity of positing a preestablished harmony, and not at all from the dynamic conception of the relation of causality. But let us leave history aside. Consciousness itself testifies that the abstract idea of force is that of indeterminate effort, that of an effort which has not yet issued in an act and in which the act is still only at the stage of an idea. In other words, the dynamic conception of the causal relation ascribes to things a duration absolutely like our own, whatever may be the nature of this duration; to picture in this way the relation of cause to effect is to assume that the future is not more closely bound up with the present in the external world than it is in our own inner life."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)




For us, in Quantonics, it is much simpler to distinguish:

  • affectings choosings outcomes, from
  • causes determine effects.

In our view, those two bullets wrap up this issue nicely and extraordinarily simply juxtapose classical prediction with quantum expectation. Choice is free will with quantum uncertainty and Quality. Determinism is guaranteed detention and quantity. "And there you have it."

"It follows from this twofold analysis that the principle of causality involves
Each of these contradictory interpretations of causality and duration by itself safeguards freedom; taken together they destroy it. two contradictory conceptions of duration, two mutually exclusive ways of prefiguring the future in the present. Sometimes all phenomena, physical or psychical, are pictured as enduring in the same way, and therefore in the way that we do: in this case the
future will exist in the present only as an idea, and the passing from the present to the future will take the form of an effort which does not always lead to the realization of the idea conceived. Sometimes, on the other hand, duration is [classically] regarded as the characteristic form of conscious states; in this case, things are no longer supposed to endure as we do, and a mathematical pre-existence of their future in their present is admitted. Now, each of these two hypotheses, when taken by itself, safeguards human freedom; for the first would lead to the result that even the phenomena of nature were contingent, and the second, by attributing the necessary determination of physical phenomena to the fact that things do not endure as we do, invites us to regard the self which is subject to duration as a free force."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)






This CTM, Classical Thing-king (radically) Methodical-Mechanical, view of Bergsonian duration is a very large part of SOM's anti-sophist, anti-quantum strawman and its verbal abuses of sophism and QTM, Quantum Think-king Modes as, "nonsense, ridiculous, absurd, unreasonable, etc."

216 "Therefore, every clear conception of causality, where we know our own meaning, leads to the idea of human freedom as a natural consequence. Unfortunately, the habit has grown up of taking the principle of causality in both senses at the same time, because the one is more flattering to our imagination and the other is more favourable to mathematical reasoning. Sometimes we think particularly of the regular succession of physical phenomena and of the kind of inner effort by which one becomes another; sometimes we fix our mind on the absolute regularity of these phenomena, and from the idea of regularity we pass by imperceptible steps to that of mathematical necessity, which excludes duration understood in the first way. And we do not see any harm in letting these two conceptions blend into one another, and in assigning greater importance to the one or the other according as we are more or less concerned with the interests of science. But to apply the principle of causality, in this ambiguous form, to the succession of conscious states, is uselessly and wantonly to run into inextricable difficulties [confusion]. The idea of force, which really excludes that of necessary determination, has got into the habit, so to speak, of amalgamating with that of necessity, in consequence of the very use which we make of the principle of causality in nature."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

Consider what Bergson just said, "...the habit has grown up of taking the principle of causality in both senses at the same time..." In Quantonics we know that is what SOM does: SOM objectifies reality! Classical synthesis is radically mechanistic objectification of classical 'parts.' Further, Bergson's " the same time..." evokes SOM's radically mechanistic y=f(t) object symbolism.

Consider how SOM also synthesizes quantum reality's many times into one conventional, convenient, universal unitime! SOM's synthesis of time as "One time-size fits all," is just incredibly naïve. And practical consequences of Western culture remaining in SOM's unitemporal rut are almost unfathomable. Lost annual opportunity cost here is very likely larger than USA's whole GNP! Watch out when Eastern culture's understand this before Western culture does... Major, major, major Millennium III problem! We anticipate: those cultures which arrive last grasping this issue will become extinct! Just two simple examples: (1) ponder some current classical encryption techniques which depend upon phase-locking of SOM's unitime to work. And, (2) USA's GPS and all systems (millions of them) which use it depend heavily on SOM's unitime!

Quantum reality is n¤t a closed unitemporally unilinear, unideterministic monolithic monism as SOM would have it. Quantum reality is an open, omnitemporal omnin¤nlinear, omnistochastic omnicohesive pluralism. Quantum reality intrinsically guarantees both freedom and free will. SOMitic state, analyticity, classical monism, necessity, causality and determinism deny both.

217 "On the one hand, we know force only through the witness of consciousness, and consciousness does not assert does not even understand, the absolute determination, now, of actions that are still to come: that is all that experience teaches us, and if we hold by experience we should say that we feel ourselves free, that we perceive force, rightly or wrongly, as a free spontaneity. But, on the other hand, this idea of force, carried over into nature, travelling [Bergson's spelling] there side by side with the idea of necessity, has got corrupted [because classical science teaches us to keep them apart] before it returns from the journey. It returns impregnated with the idea of necessity: and in the light of the role which we have made it play in the external world, we regard force as determining with strict necessity the effects which flow from it. Here again the mistake made by consciousness arises from the fact that it looks at the self, not directly, but by a kind of refraction through the forms which it has lent to external perception, and which the latter does not give back without having left its mark on them. A compromise, as it were, has been brought about between the idea of force and that of necessary determination. The wholly mechanical determination of two external phenomena by one another now assumes in our eyes the same form as the dynamic relation of our exertion of force to the act which springs from it: but, in return, this latter relation takes the form of a mathematical derivation, the human action being supposed to issue mechanically, and therefore necessarily, from the force which produces it." [Classicists tell us it is crucial to obey, to be authority bound, to adhere cultural mores, to be socially adept. They desire social determinism. All classical hegemony! All classical HyperBoole! All classical detention vis-à-vis quantum freedom and free will. Classicists teach us that we must learn to keep them apart! And be damned sure to adhere former as objective and discard latter as subjective. Classicism: humanities' ultimate ughly!]

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)




Note-reminder to Doug; Is this due to quantum thogonality? Is this a good time to introduce thogons to our readers? Do students of Quantonics need a meme of omnithogonality now? Quantum thogonality keeps things coherently islandic for us, e.g., trancing while painting, playing piano, et al.

Again, in our simplest quantonic lingo, there is no quantum causality! There are only classical apparitions of causality. There is fermionic quantum variable~tentative persistence. Our quantonic hermeneutic of classical 'force' is quantum interrelationships of fermionic decoherent wobbling. In our Wind Quantons Making Water Quantons Wave, we offer some memes of how powerful fermionic interrelationships can be and are. Ponder a quantum epiphany that fermions are n¤t radically mechanistic in an endarkenment of classical determinism! Bosons do n¤t wobble and thus they offer n¤ classical concept of force interactions. Bosons are coherent. They have n¤ means of exerting classical force. Bosons ignore force, including gravitational force. As such, classicists do n¤t believe in quantum coherence!


"There is no doubt that this mingling [interpenetration] of two different and almost opposite ideas offers advantages to common sense, since it enables us to picture in the same way, and denote by one and the same word, both the relation which exists between two moments of our life and that which binds together the successive moments of the external world. We have seen that, though our deepest conscious states exclude numerical multiplicity, yet we break them up into parts external to one another; that though the elements of concrete duration permeate one another, duration expressing itself in extensity exhibits moments as distinct as the bodies scattered in space. Is it surprising, then, that between the moments of our life, when it has been, so to speak, objectified, we set up a relation analogous to the objective relation of causality, and that an exchange, which again may be compared to the phenomenon of endosmosis, takes place between the dynamic idea of free effort and the mathematical concept of necessary determination?

"But the sundering of these two ideas is an accomplished fact in the natural sciences. The
 Though united in popular thought, the ideas of free effort and necessary determination are kept apart by physical science.  physicist may speak of forces, and even picture their mode of action by analogy with an inner effort, but he will never introduce this hypothesis into a scientific explanation. Even those who, with Faraday, replace the extended atoms by dynamic
points, will treat the centres of force and the lines of force mathematically, without troubling about force itself considered as an activity or an effort."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

"It thus comes to be understood that the relation of external causality is purely mathematical, and has no resemblance to the relation between psychical force and the act which springs from it.

"It is now time to add that the relation of inner causality is purely dynamic,
They should be kept apart too, by psychology. and has no analogy with the relation of two external phenomena which condition one another. For, as the latter are capable of recurring in a
homogeneous space, their relation can be expressed in terms of a law, whereas deep-seated psychic [heterogeneous] states occur once in consciousness and will never occur again. A careful analysis of the psychological phenomenon led us to this conclusion in the beginning: the study of the notions of causality and duration, viewed in themselves, has merely confirmed it.

"We can now formulate our conception of freedom
Freedom real but indefinable. Freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs. This relation is indefinable, just because we are free.
For we can analyse a thing, but not a process; we can break up extensity, but not duration. Or, if we persist in analysing it, we unconsciously transform the process into a thing and duration into extensity. By the very fact of breaking up concrete time we set out its moments in homogeneous space; in place of the doing we put the already done; and, as we have begun by, so to speak, stereotyping the activity of the self, we see spontaneity settle down into inertia and freedom into necessity. Thus, any positive definition of freedom will ensure the victory of determinism."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)



One hundred years ago, when Bergson wrote this, physicists thought that reality's external world was classically deterministic. Quantum science shows us now that Bergson's "capable of recurring" is, in general, only a classical apparition. In general, in quantum reality, quantum ensemble of reality ever recurs. Patterns of chaotic similarity recur (e.g., Earth's orbit around Sol, and Moon's orbit around Earth, and at-rest heart's sinus rhythm, etc.); however n¤ quantum ensemble ever recurs holistically in all its countless interrelationships with its boundless c¤mplements. As a result, we can say, just as our quantons do, Bergson's duration is a quanton and it applies n¤t just to psychic states, but to all of reality. We think he would be very pleased with that! Doug - 22Mar2001.

Bergson's relation is what Quantonics calls "interrelationship." It is a describable, yet indefinable, interrelationship twixt quantum actuality and quantum nonactuality. Using our Quantonic notation we show it as quanton(n¤nactuality,actuality). Our comma-space represents that indefinable, quantum c¤mplementary, included-middle, interrelationship.

Bergson's "we can analyse a thing, but not a process" is a very potent statement! It is, perhaps, philosophy's most important statement! We see this, using our own quantum heuristics, as a precocious Bergsonian call for new animate quantum measurement techniques and semiotics~languages. Bergson's statement was factual 115 years ago, but now we can quantum co-here processings, and with quantum computers, processings' compenetrations (quantum stindyanic interrelationships) will be natural. But, be aware, what he is saying is correct: we cann¤t stop reality to analyze it, n¤r can we classically analyze a real quantum process in all its fullness. A real quantum process' animate parameters is unlimited. Then sensibly, only a real quantum process can measure itself. However, we know that real quantum processes (i.e., quantons) can be monitoring other real quantum processes (this is exactly what quantum computers do), without classical state-icity, without stopping reality, without collapsing reality to achieve classical 'state.' Doug, 18Feb2001; 20Nov2001.

In other words keep times free! Classicists defraud and detain time as synthetic y=f(thomogeneous)!

For Pirsig, Bergson's "any positive definition of freedom will ensure the victory of determinism" is what he means when he says that Quality is undefinable. Once analytic thought defines Quality, we lose it. By making Quality actual it becomes Static Quality. To paraphrase Pirsig using Bergson's marvelous statement, "Thus, any positive definition of Quality will ensure the victory of Classical Thing-king Methods." So we now have another analogue for Pirsigean Quality — Freedom! Other analogues which Pirsig mentions are: Good, Moral, etc. Also examine Bergson's specificity. He uses positive. About what is he speaking? He is speaking of positivists, a subspecies of SOMites.

And we see that Bergson has given us another insight into a potential Pirsigean Problematic: can freedom ever really be entrapped and imprisoned? Can Quality ever really be classically defined?

In larger reality, we claim "No!" Only SOMites and CRites who adhere Aristotelian-Newtonian-CTM philosophical underpinnings may delude themselves that they can classically define freedom and Quality. Their SOM box permits them to do that objectively, however, it is only a self delusion.

Ever hear SOMites moan and groan about Murphy? Paradoxes? Dilemmas? Nonsense? Strangeness? Luck? Enigmas? Uncertainty? Problems of Quality 'Management?' Etc.? Yep! Frequently we hear these exclamations of frustration borne of religious, fundamental, 'scientific' (i.e., positivistic) application of CTMs. This only shows us that classicists are genuinely incapable of detending Quality in their churches of reason, their SOM boxes. They are classically incapable of any classical definitions of freedom~Quality. Why? There are n¤ne!

Simply, classicists deny both freedom and Quality! They dismiss them as "subjective" phenomena. They attempt objectification of them via classical definition.

(Doug - 10Mar2001)


"Shall we define the free act by saying of this act, when it is once done, that it might have been left undone? But this assertion, as also its opposite, implies the idea of an absolute equivalence between concrete duration and its spatial symbol [We hear you, Mr. Bergson. No symbol, either animate nor inanimate can capture or portray wholly concrete duration. However, we think animate semiotics will offer much better descriptive powers over inanimate symbols in our attempts to understand quantum reality. Also, they do not lie to us as does static analytic symbolism that they absolutely represent reality.]: and as soon as we admit this equivalence, we are led on, by the very development of the formula which we have just set forth, to the most rigid determinism.

"Shall we define the free act as "that which could not be foreseen, even when all the conditions were known [impossible] in advance?" But to conceive [predict] all the conditions as given, is, when dealing with concrete duration, to place oneself at the very moment at which the act is being performed. Or else it is admitted that the matter of psychic duration can be pictured symbolically in advance, which amounts, as we said, to treating time as a homogeneous medium, and to reasserting in new words the absolute equivalence of duration with its symbol. A closer study of this second definition of freedom will thus bring us once more to determinism.

"Shall we finally define the free act by saying that it is not necessarily determined by its cause? But either these words lose their meaning or we understand by them that the same inner causes will not always call forth the same effects."

(Our brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)

"We admit,then, that the psychic antecedents of a free act can be repeated, that freedom is displayed in a duration whose moments resemble one another, and that time is a homogeneous medium, like space. We shall thus be brought back to the idea of an equivalence (confusion) between duration and its spatial symbol; and by pressing the definition of freedom which we have laid down, we shall once more get determinism out of it.

"To sum up; every demand for explanation in regard to freedom comes back, without our suspecting it, to the following question: "Can time be adequately represented by space?" To which we answer: Yes, if you are dealing with time flown; No, if you speak of time flowing. [Notice how Bergson arrives at a quantum both~and answer. Bravo!] Now, the free act takes place in time which is flowing and not in time which has already flown. Freedom is therefore a fact, and among the facts which we observe there is none clearer. All the difficulties of the problem [confusion], and the problem itself, arise from the desire to endow duration [duration, i.e., animate quantonic empirical evolute extension (EEE) by emersive evolution] with the same attributes as extensity [classical analyticity, i.e., y=f(t)], to interpret a succession [quantum omniadic~omnitemporal ensemble] by a simultaneity [a homogeneous, stopped, moment and locus], and to express the idea of freedom in a language into which it is obviously untranslatable. [Crux! Bergson's most important statement we have read thus far! Bravo! Reword this using Quantumese so we can see what it says in our new lingo. English and other Western culture languages detend thought and expression.]"

(Our link, brackets, bold, color, and violet bold italic problematics.)
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Doug Renselle
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©Quantonics, Inc., 2001-2019 Rev. 21Jul2011  PDR Created: 23Feb2001  PDR
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(25Aug2002 rev - Add 'consensus' link to common sense above.)
(4Sep2002 rev - Correct some typos. Reformat p. 219 Bergson text to emphasize his, "...can analyse a thing, but not a process.")
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(23Feb2004 rev - Correct p. 203 spelling of Betelgeuseans.)
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